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COLONIAL UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN MANDATE PALESTINE: 




This thesis considers the impact of the British Mandate on the town of Nablus from 
the end of World War I to the 1936 Arab Revolt. Starting with its role as a regional 
trading centre under the Ottomans, it goes on to consider the impact of the arrival of 
the British, combined with the challenges of natural disasters and the growth of 
Jewish enterprises along Palestine’s Mediterranean littoral. The first two chapters 
establish the general political and economic features of British rule in Nablus, before 
the thesis looks at three specific case studies (chapters 111 – V). It examines in 
some depth British projects for the development of the urban water supply, the 
impact of the 1927 earthquake, and the relationship between the civil and military 
authorities during the first year of the Arab Revolt. 
The research is designed to fill a gap in the existing historiography of Mandate 
Palestine, which has tended to focus either on the Jewish national home 
controversy, or on Jerusalem and the area of the coastal strip. This is a study of 
British policy at the local level, in a town located in the relatively neglected and 
marginalisedarea of the central hill district. At the same time, the thesis proposes this 
localized approach has wider implications for our view of British imperial history in 
the aftermath of World War I, arguing that a focus on such ‘peripheries’ of empire 
allows us to understand more closely the minimalist state that ruled over large 
swathes of colonial subject populations in this period.  Its primary source material is 
composed of British Government records held at the National Archives in Kew, 
supplemented by a range of other sources, including French and Moroccan, used for 
the purposes of comparison between the British and French colonial systems. 
 
 
The work concludes that Nablus was not a priority for the Mandatory Government, 
which was focused on the coastal strip, and in particular the port of Haifa, to the 
detriment of the smaller towns in Palestine’s interior. Nablus was neglected, and ill-
prepared for the growing competition from new Jewish enterprises. The city’s hostile 
reaction to the Mandate reflects the perspective of locations which have become 
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This thesis examines the impact of the policies of the British Mandatory Government 
in Palestine on the town of Nablus during the first two decades following World War I 
(WWI). The primary location of source material has been the National Archives in 
Kew, and this has been supplemented by a range of sources both in the UK and 
abroad. Apart from the National Archives my main sources have been the Middle 
East Centre Archive, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, and the British Library. The 
material to be found in the Church Missionary Archives at Birmingham University, 
and the Church of England Record Centre in  Lambeth Palace Library, has proved 
helpful in fleshing out various vignettes of local life in Jabal Nablus. In similar fashion 
the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris has proved both a useful source of material on 
the political activities of some of the leading Nabulsi families, as well as on the 
activities of Marechal Lyautey in Morocco. In this respect it complemented the 
material held at the BibliothequeNationale du Maroc in Rabat. In the Palestinian 
territory itself, most of which today is the state of Israel, the Israel State Archives  in 
Jerusalem have constituted very helpful material in the form of detailed records 
recovered from the former British Mandatory authorities covering certain aspects of 
the case studies discussed in chapter II of this thesis. Also in Jerusalem the 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), has 
been an invaluable source of biographical information on the more famous and 
politically active Nabulsis at the time of the Mandate. Finally the Municipal Library in 
Nablus was very helpful in providing an insight into the political thinking of – inter 
alia- Izzat Darwaza, a member both of the Arab Executive Committee and also of 
one of the leading Nabulsi families. 
 
Archives and libraries apart, I am particularly indebted to a small group of individuals 
without whose support the completion of this thesis would have been immeasurably 
harder. First and foremost are my two helpful and supportive supervisors at Sussex 
University, Dr Jacob Norris and Professor Martin Evans. I am also indebted for help 
and advice from Professor Emeritus Mahmoud Musa of the Centre d’Etudes 
Diplomatiques et Strategiques in Paris – a native of the Jabal Nablus area- and to 
Naseer Arafat, a citizen of Nablus andauthor of ‘Nablus, City of Civilisations.’1 Peter 
Clarke, Emeritus Professor of modern history, and former Master of Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge was my academic tutor during my undergraduate days at University 
College London. He was unfailingly helpful at the time I was preparing the proposal 
for this thesis.   
 
No issues of confidentiality pertain to any of the material accessed. All of the 
photographs displayed are old, and out of copyright. Many have been taken from the 
Library of Congress Prints & Photographs online catalogue. 
 





What caught my attention, when I was appointed inspector of education for the 
district of Samaria...was that the number of government buildings for schools had 
remained the same, from 1918 to 1945, as it was at the time of Ottoman rule. All 
expansion in the educational field was being carried out in rented buildings that had 
been built as houses, not schools. The faults of these buildings were that they had 
not sufficient room or playground space, air or light......It is said that the Turks 
entered the country in 1517 on ox carts just as they left it in 1918 on ox carts. 
However, they left behind them in Nablus city four government school buildings, a 
municipal park, a town clock, and the National hospital. But you [British] have not 
built one room during 27 years, or from 1918 to this year 1945.1 
 
 
This thesis is a study of a neglected corner of the British empire in the traumatic 
aftermath of World War I. That corner was the city of Nablus and its surrounding 
hinterland. The primary focus is on the urban area, but it remains cognizant that the 
economic activity in that area was closely linked to the state of the adjacent rural 
economy on whose agricultural production it largely depended. It was an area that 
received little attention from the British imperial regime in Palestine, but nevertheless 
can tell us a great deal about the workings of empire in the interwar period.The 
research presents an original perspective on the history of British rule in Palestine,  
not only because it examines a part of the country that has largely been neglected in 
the historiography of the mandates, but also because it shines a spotlight on the 
workings of imperial rule in areas away from the major centres of colonial 
development, where in fact most of the population lived. By following the flow of 
communications between local government officials in Nablus, the High Commission 
in Jerusalem, and the Colonial Office and Treasury in London, the thesis contributes 
to a better understanding of the impact of the nexus between imperial policy-making 
and its local application.  
 
The city of Nablus and its surrounding hinterland, collectively referred to in Arabic as 
Jabal Nablus, (‘the Nablus mountain’) has long constituted a major centre of trade 
and agricultural production, largely through the olive industry. In the 1920s and 30s, 
Jabal Nablus was the recipientof a form of British governance described in this thesis 
as de minimis.2This approach to local administration by the Mandatory power sought 
little more than to maintain the peace through the use of its intelligence and security 
services. Public services such as health, public works and education were largely 
 
1 Fadwa Tuqan, A Mountainous Journey, A Poet’s Autobiography  (Graywolf Press, Minnesota, 1990),  n18,  
194-195 
2  This phrase is used throughout the thesis in the sense of ‘carrying out the minimum possible, consistent with 
the obligations of a Mandatory power.’ It is not used in the legal sense of ‘de minimis non curat lex’ or the law 
not dealing with trifles or insignificant details. See: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/de%20minimis%20non%20curat%20lex  For an example of how that legal concept  is 
applied to EU State Aid requirements see: https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/articles/de-minimis-aid 
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contracted out – in effect- by a reliance on those charitable institutions which had 
been functioning atthe time of the arrival of the British, and on private British 
companies seeking to profit from Britain’s colonial occupation of Palestine.The image 
conjured up by this form of government might also be described as ‘benign neglect’,3 
notwithstanding the factthat the results of that neglect were anything but benign: the 
thesis argues that the cumulative effect of the process of marginalisation 
experienced by the town in the years after World War I was one of the contributing 
factors to Nablus playing a leading role in the 1936 Arab Revolt. 
 
By focussing on this particular approach to colonial governance in this specified   
geographical area, the thesis reveals both the importance of location and a different 
story from that usually portrayed in studies on Mandate Palestine.  My research on 
Jabal Nablus has revealed a city and its surrounding hinterland largely neglected by 
the British authorities in Jerusalem, focussed as they were on the development of 
the coastal strip and in particular the burgeoning port of Haifa. For the Nabulsis the 
mandatories had little more to offer than de minimis government, with a focus on 
intelligence gathering and security, while public services such as health and 
education were effectively outsourced to voluntary organisations.   
 
The thesis also speaks to both early twentieth century and contemporary 
dichotomies of globalisation:4 the contrast between areas of relative stagnation –and 
populist politics- and thriving metropolitan centres, and the ways in which these 
dichotomies can become drivers of popular unrest. As studies elsewhere of imperial 
territories have revealed,5 the uneven distribution of resources by the metropolitan 
power “led some individuals and groups to move forward very rapidly, and others to 
stagnate or even regress.”6 Relative to both Jerusalem as the new centre of imperial 
power and the burgeoning coastal strip, this region was neglected, and it was that 
sense of neglect which is reflected in the writings of FadwaTuqan,7 a native of 
Nablus, and one of Palestine’s greatest modern poets, whose reflections on the 
mandate period are quoted above. She was expressing the view of many Nabulsis 
that the British had done virtually nothing for the town in comparison with that of the 
preceding Ottoman regime. When the British left, she emphasises, they left no trace 
of their presence in the city.8 The impact of that neglect on a community which had 
been a flourishing commercial and cultural regional centre under the Ottomans forms 
the central focus of this thesis. 
 
3  In terms of British colonial development policy in general, this was not always the case. See Stephen 
Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914 – 1940  (Frank Cass & Co, London,1984),  
288. “Not until the later 1930s did the restraint on colonial development policy begin to ease.......and the years 
of benign neglect increasingly condemned.” 
4   For a short discussion of the global history literature relevant to this thesis, see pages 19 –20 below  
5   See E A Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, The Politics of Economic Change 1919 – 
1939 ( Heinemann, London, 1973) 
6  E A Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment 20 
7  See quote on page 1 above comparing the British and Ottoman contributions to Nablus, written in 1945 




It speaks directly to a series of questions revealing different aspects of how the 
British empire worked at the local level. What were its priorities? What was it trying to 
achieve in a part of the world its officials considered to be unreceptive to Western 
modernity at best, and openly hostile at worst? What role –if any- did it want the 
Nabulsis to play in the new British order in the Middle East? These are some of the  
questions that this thesis addresses. By examining the interactions between the 
British and the Nabulsis during the first two decades after World War I, this study 
contributes to a better understanding of what Susan Pederson has termed the period 
of ‘benevolent imperialism’ ushered in by the League of Nations.9 At a time when the 
rationale for empire was becoming ever more grounded in the justification of 
development, or what some cynical observers described as ‘better and brighter 
natives,’10 this research clearly illustrates that the extent of that development could 
differ very substantially even in territories as small as Palestine. The differences 
however were chronological as much as they were geographical. As a result of the 
Great Depression, the resources made available for development were significantly 
curtailed, and “appointments to the Colonial Service sank dramatically in 1931 and 
1932, including massive falls in the numbers of medical, educational, agricultural and 
veterinary specialists recruited by colonial governments.”11As discussed in chapter I 
below12these were precisely the years when adverse weather conditions and a 
collapse in agricultural commodity prices were having a damaging impact on Jabal 
Nablus. The thesis consequently goes on to argue that a process of relative 
economic marginalisation, exacerbated by both these problems in the rural 
hinterland and a lack of effective support from the Mandatory authorities, created 
very real political tensions, made more acute by memories of better times under 
theancien regime of the Ottoman Empire. That combination of discontent and 
nostalgia13for a more stable past in Jabal Nablus14provides a good explanation as to 
why this particular part of the mandated territory was a centre of opposition to British 
rule during the 1936-39 Arab revolt. 
 
The thesis consequently opens up new perspectives on the Palestine Mandate, and 
argues that there were other important factors driving the opposition to the British 
 
9  For a general discussion of the impact of the League of Nations see Susan Pedersen, The Guardians, the 
League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford University Press 2015). For the reference to ‘benevolent 
imperialism see page 402 
10  Susan Pedersen, The Guardians  402 
11  Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy,  228 
12  For more on the combined impact of the Great Depression and adverse weather conditions on the Jabal 
Nablus area, see pages 49 – 52 below on ‘The Rural Sector and Government Agriculture and Land Policy in 
Palestine  
13  That nostalgia is evident in the writings of Nabulsi authors. Sahar Khalifeh described Palestinian society as 
having “become an orphan after the Turks left.” Sahar Khalifeh,  Of Noble Origins (American University in Cairo 
Press, Cairo, 2012), 40 
14  “As a single unit, Nablus and its hinterland constituted a discrete region known for centuries as the Jabal 
Nablus.” Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700 – 1900 
(University of California Press, London, 1995),  2 
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which were not directly related to their Jewish National Home policy. These included 
the distressed state of agriculture in the years following the end of World War I in a 
country whose economy was almost wholly agrarian, the impact of natural disasters 
such as the 1927 earthquake, and the consequences of the way the British 
Government focussed its development resources and investments in what it 
considered priority geographical areas to the detriment of those it viewed as of only 
marginal importance. In so doing it combines the approaches of both global and local 
history, and employs the conceptual paradigms developed in particular by Salim 
Tamari  in his seminal work on ‘The Mountain Against the Sea’,15 which contrasted 
the more rapidly developing coastal strip in Palestine during the early decades of the 
twentieth century with the relative stagnation of the central hill districts. The thesis 
also looks across different imperial spaces within the Palestinian territory, both for 
the purposes of comparison, and to consider the connections between them. In so 
doing,it draws in particular on the spatial distinctions employed by the French 
colonial administrator Marechal Lyautey, who classified different regions of Morocco 
according to whether or not they were of strategic importance in relation to French 
policy priorities, and consequently whether they were considered either as areas 
meriting investment and development, or left largely neglected.16 
 
The key issue here is how choices were made in respect of priorities, and 
consequently how some geographical areas were prioritised over others. Overall, 
this approach provides a model which can usefully be applied to other parts of 
empire during the decades after World War I when development policies were 
increasingly being used as a justification for retaining control of colonial territories. 
One such justification in this respect was the provision of urban water supplies which 
is the subject of chapter III of the thesis. Such provision inevitably involved 
interaction with the natural environment. This has required me to engage with the 
wider historiography on colonial management of natural resources, and where 
appropriate the work undertaken on the British in Nablus makes reference to the 
empire in India, where control and development of water resources was an important 
theme impacting the relationship between government and governed. Natural 
disasters, which are the subject of chapter IV of the thesis can also be placed in the 
broader context of the nature of imperial engagement with the natural environment, 
and so the lessons drawn from the case study on Nablus can equally be applied to 
other imperial territories grappling with the effects of sudden and unanticipated 
natural phenomena. I have also used them as a comparative analytical tool to better 




15  Salim Tamari, The Mountain against the Sea, Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture ( University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 2009). 
16  For a discussion of this concept of ‘le Maroc utile’ and ‘le Maroc inutile’, see William Hoisington, Lyautey 
and the French Conquest of Morocco ( Macmillan Press, London 1995). See also pages 7 – 8 below. 
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The rest of this introductory chapter sets out to discuss the major themes, 
methodologies and historiographical debates with which this thesis engages. It sets 
out what the thesis is about, together with its main themes. I discuss first the ways in 
which Palestine can and should be considered within much wider historical 
frameworks that help us understand the traumatic transformations taking place in a 
city like Nablus in the early twentieth century. This is followed by a summary of the 
relevant secondary literature and how this thesis pushes that literature forward in 
new directions. It then explains what original contribution the research has made, 
and how it engages with the relevant existing historiography on the Jabal Nablus 
area and Mandate Palestine more generally: including British imperial history during 
the inter-war years. The chapter furthermore discusses the conceptual methodology 
used in the thesis to interpret the source material, as well as the nature of those 
sources themselves, and goes on to consider both the main sources employed and 
the rationale for their selection, together with their strengths and limitations. 
 
Placing Nablus and Palestine in the bigger picture 
 
I have made Nablus as a case study set in the wider context of British imperial 
history during the period following the end of World War I. Nablus  is of particular 
interest because the relative isolation it suffered under the Mandate was in sharp 
contrast to the role it had played as an important regional cultural and commercial 
centre under the Ottomans. As a result, the impact of the Mandate was quite 
traumatic. In this respect its experience in the 1920s and 1930s can be characterised 
as passing through a ‘shatter zone’17created by the disruptive transition from 
Ottoman to British rule after the traumas of World War I.This concept has been 
applied to the mainly East European territories bordering the established states and 
empires disrupted or destroyed by World War I, but is also relevant to those parts of 
the Middle East and North Africa where one of the main consequences of the war 
was the sudden imposition of European imperial powers. As the Nabulsi poet 
FadwaTuqan described it, she was born in 1917  
 
“at a time when one world was in its death throes and another was about to 
be born. The Ottoman empire was breathing its last and allied armies were 
continuing to open the way for a new Western colonisation.”18 
 
Shatter zones of course were not only areas of conflict and precipitate regime 
change, but also areas located on the borders between competing states or 
empires.19 As such, they were places where the ‘centre’ sought to impose its will on 
 
17  This concept has been applied to the mainly East European territories bordering the established states and 
empires disrupted or destroyed by World War I. See Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (Eds), Shatterzone of Empires, 
Coexistance and Violence in the German, Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands ( Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, 2013). 
18  Fadwa Tuqan, A Mountainous Journey  15 
19  Palestine marked the north-eastern edge of Britain’s newly acquired territory in the Middle East following 
the end of World War I, and bordered that of Lebanon and Syria which had fallen to France.  For an analysis of 
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the ‘periphery.’ Following the end of World War II for example, Poland imagined itself 
in relation to Galicia as having“a civilising mission to the wild east.”20It would be an 
exaggeration to suggest that the British harboured similar views about their 
relationship with Nablus, but it is at least implicit that elements of a ‘civilising mission’ 
towards a part of Palestine which they viewed not only as backward and 
conservative but also on the periphery of their priority locations along the coastal 
strip, did form part of the mandatory’s approach.  
 
Nablus was furthermore a shatter zone in the sense that following the ebb and flow 
of the military conflict between the British and Ottoman forces in 1917 and 1918, it 
suffered a precipitate and fundamental regime change. During some four hundred 
years of rule from Constantinople, the relationship between the imperial power and 
the Nabulsis was, in Foucauldian terms, largely characterised along the lines of a 
superstructure in relation to local power networks.21 The  distribution of power across 
the Ottoman territories is important in giving us a better understanding of what the 
Nabulsis were accustomed to prior to World War I, and consequently the 
comparisons they would make in the event of regime change. Salim Tamari has 
argued that the notable families of the town enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy in 
relation to their rural hinterland, and were able to keep control of their agrarian 
revenues and use them as a foundation for their commercial activities.22That 
relatively secure and privileged position was swept away by the arrival of the British, 
whose civilian mandatory administration was preceded by a military occupation: the 
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). Such forms of government are 
those of a sovereign political power whose presence could “be expressed as 
interdiction and exercised as repression.”23 Such repression had been experienced 
by the Nabulsis when exercised by CemalPasha during World War I, but they would 
have been unprepared for the use of military force by the British during the course of 
civilian rule during a period when the territory was not engaged in war. 
 
In the closing decades of the Ottoman Empire the economy of the Jabal Nablus 
region was closely connected by trading links to cities such as Beirut and Damascus 
to its north, more so than to Jerusalem which was only 30 miles to its south.During 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries its position in the central uplands of 
Palestine had enabled it to develop as one of the leading trading entrepots between 
what is today Lebanon and Syria to its north, and Jordan to its south and east – from 
where it purchased some of the ingredients used in the preparation of the soap for 
which it was famous. These trading links were disrupted by the transition from 
 
Anglo-French rivalry in the region, see Remy Porte, ‘Premiere Guerre Mondiale, de l’entente a la mesentente 
cordiale.’ Revue Historique, October 2009,  875 – 896 
20  Bartov and Weitz, Shatterzone of Empires  9 
21 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories, Foucault’s methods and Historical Sociology ( Routledge, 
London, 1994), 155 
22 Salim Tamari ‘A Farcical Moment ? Nabulsis Exceptionalism and the 1908 Ottoman Revolution’.  Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Issue 60, 2014 
23 Ibid  
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Ottoman to British rule, when the former Bilad al-Sham24 was partitioned into British 
and French controlled territories, and the local Nabulsi economy became more 
directly exposed to developments within the new Palestinian national territory at a 
time when its historical links to the north were significantly weakened.25The focus of 
this thesis on the effects of geographical location, and its methodological approach, 
can be used elsewhere to improve our understanding of the workings of imperial 
governments in their dependent territories by linking research on particular urban 
areas to broader themes concerning the aims and objectives of empire at the local 
level. In this way ‘micro studies’ become more relevant to the broader generic 
themes of imperial history. Location is emphasised as a determining factor in 
informing local responses to larger scale developments at the national and regional 
level: which for this particular study fall within the context of British imperialism in the 
first half of the twentieth century. To the extent that a template for the study of 
neglected urban areas and their surrounding hinterlands has been developed in this 
thesis, it can now be deployed elsewhere in imperial and colonial territories. Within 
Palestine itself, possible candidates could include such locations as Gaza and 
Hebron. Jaffa and Jerusalem by contrast, as respectively rapidly expanding coastal 
towns and centres of political power, would not be candidates. 
 
The relative neglect of Nablus and its slower growth and development compared to 
the coastal littoral of Palestine arose at least in part because it was not considered a 
priority area from a British perspective. To better understand this aspect of imperial 
rule the thesis makes use of Marechal Lyautey’s concept of what was –and was not- 
‘useful’ to the imperial power. Lyautey developed the distinction between territory 
that was ‘utile’ –useful- and ‘inutile’ – not useful- when governing Morocco after 
World War I, so as to distinguish those parts of the country which were of particular 
economic, military, or political importance to the metropolitan power from those 
which would require financial and military expenditure out of proportion to the likely 
return.26This thesis argues that Nablus and its surrounding agricultural area was not 
a priority27 for the Mandatory administration which, constrained by the fiscal austerity 
 
24 “The term Bilad al-Sham…..describes the region limited in the north by the Taurus mountains, bordering in 
the east on the Syrian desert, stretching to Aqaba and the Sinai in the south, and opening in the west to the 
Mediterranean. The region does not constitute one political entity and did not do so under Ottoman rule. At 
the same time however it always constituted a geographical region distinct from Anatolia, Mesopotamia, 
Arabia and Egypt. But beyond this geographical situation……a historical awareness of people within this region 
can be observed, which hints at the fact that the region was culturally, socially and historically more integrated 
in itself than related to neighbouring regions – and was considered as such from without.” Thomas Philipp and 
Christoph Schumann (Eds), From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon (Ergon Verlag Wurzburg, 
Beirut, 2004).  1 
25 For a discussion of the disruptive impact of the arrival of the European imperial powers after World War I 
see Sa’id B Himadeh (Ed), Economic Organisation of Palestine (American Press, Beirut, 1938),   377: “Nablus is 
losing its economic importance due to changed transport conditions and trade routes. It no longer supplies 
Trans-Jordan and Samaria. The decrease in the volume of its soap exports has also reduced its trade.”  
26 See William Hoisington, Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco ( Macmillan Press, London 1995),  90 
27 There is no clear English language equivalent to ‘utile’ and ‘inutile’ in British Government reports and 
correspondence on Mandate Palestine, with the exception of occasional references to what were ‘priorities’ 
for policy makers. 
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of the 1920s and 1930s, effectively operated on a de minimis basis in the Jabal 
Nablus area, doing the least necessary to meet its obligations as a mandatory 
power.28 Nablus was all but ignored while the (constrained) resources and 
investment at the disposal of the government were concentrated in such strategic 
priorities as the development of the port of Haifa.29 That town’s development “in the 
British imperial imagination in the 1920s and 1930s as the gateway to the Middle 
East”30 contrasts with Sir Samuel O’Donnell’s31 description of Nablus as “little more 
than an overgrown village”32 which was but one amongst a group of “small and for 
the most part stagnant towns.”33Whether Nablus is viewed from the perspective of 
one of Lyautey’s not useful territories, Salim Tamari’s ‘Mountain against the Sea’, or 
the contemptuous descriptions of British colonial officials, the conceptual leitmotif is 
that of the core versus the periphery – with Nablus very much relegated to the 
periphery. 
 
By examining British governance in action at the local level in a region far removed 
from the focal points of imperial power in Palestine, this study reveals the 
weaknesses in the British response to the deeply ingrained problems facing the 
territory in the aftermath of World War I, in particular the incapacity of the new 
Mandatory power to cope with the impact of war and natural disasters on a regional 
economy almost wholly dependent on agriculture. It failed both to reduce the 
perennial indebtedness of the fellahin, and to mitigate the impact of the recurring and 
adverse weather conditions and environmental problems facing the rural 
economy.These problems were compounded in the Jabal Nablus area by a 
significant weakening of its historical trading and cultural links with what is today 
Lebanon and Syria, and in particular Damascus, as a result of the impact of the 
Mandate.This in turn produced a feeling among Nabulsis that they were unable to 
face the combined challenges of the arrival of the British and the development of 
competition from Jewish businesses.  
 
The thesis also provides firm evidence of how imperial power in the early twentieth 
century had to be negotiated and contested across the multiple layers of its 
administrative machinery. The research reveals the differing perspectives, 
interactions, and divergent agendas between government at the local level in 
Nablus, the Mandatory headquarters in Jerusalem, and the Colonial Office and 
 
28 “Ibrahim Snawbar, an educator born in Nablus in 1904, severely criticized the Mandate Government for 
building no public service buildings in the city during its administration.” Naseer Arafat, Nablus, City of 
Civilisations, 59 
29  For a discussion of British Development priorities in Mandate Palestine, see Jacob Norris, Land of Progress, 
Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905 – 1948 (Oxford University Press, 2013),   99-138 
30  Norris, Land of Progress,  109 
31  A former senior civil servant in the Indian administration, commissioned in 1931 by Lord Passfield, Colonial 
Secretary, ‘to examine and report on the financial and general organisation of the Palestine administration.’  
The report issued in July 1931, and a digitised copy is held at the Israel State Archives  
32O’Donnell report, 81, Israel State Archives 
33Ibid, 33       
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Treasury in London. At the local level the District Administrators were primarily 
involved in intelligence gathering and avoiding the development of hostility to the 
Mandatory power. In Jerusalem the High Commissioner was primarily occupied with 
the development of the Jewish National Home policy and its associated vicissitudes: 
whereas in London the main priority was to constrain government expenditure on the 
Palestinian territory whilst ensuring that it remained an effective buffer against 
potential incursion from any hostile powers which might develop in the Middle East. 
These differing perspectives and priorities, and the information flows between the 
different locations, created tensions between the complexities of policy development 
and the need to respond to the challenge of events at the local level.The pace of 
those responses was very much dictated by perceptions in Jerusalem and London of 
what might cause reputational damage to the imperial power. We may contrast in 
this respect the rapid response to the 1927 earthquake which is the subject of 
chapter IV below with the long drawn out negotiations concerning the provision of an 
urban water supply which are analysed in chapter III. Government correspondence 
in the early 1930s indicates that the Treasury and Colonial Office in London were in 
no particular hurry to agree to the project on the grounds that there was a lack of 
local public demand for it from the Nabulsis. 
 
The differences of perspective between London and local officials in Palestine no 
doubt in part arose because of their differing geographical locations. Nevertheless, 
even when in close physical proximity, such differences could arise from divergent 
sets of responsibilities at the operational level. One example of this is provided by 
the opposing views which arose between the civil and military authorities concerning 
the appropriate response to armed insurrection during the first phase of the Arab 
Revolt in 1936: with the military wanting a forceful response designed to deter future 
unrest, and the civil authority more mindful of the wider responsibilities of  a 
mandatory power which should try to minimise the use of force in the interests of the 
longer term relationship between government and the local population.  Other 
tensions were brought about as a result of the impact of fiscal constraints where the 
research on government reports written at the time reveals that spending decisions 
were influenced by considerations of the potential to achieve future savings. This 
was a factor informing the rationale for certain types of infrastructure development, 
where for example the provision of fresh water supplies was evaluated against public 
health benefits and an anticipated reduction in demand for medical services. Other 
factors informing investment levels in particular geographical areas included British 
perceptions of their relative importance to the imperial power along the lines of 
Lyautey’s classifications noted above. One way of course to reduce the costs of 
imperial government is to co-opt the support of local elites, who had a much better 
understanding of the customs and culture of the indigenous population than the 
Mandatory officials who had recently arrived from the UK. They were consequently 
well placed to play the role of intermediary between the imperial power and those 
10 
 
who became subject to its administration. This theme is examined in the thesis,34 
together with the British penchant for maintaining existing class distinctions in their 
mode of imperial governance.35 
 
The machinery of government within Palestine was largely modelled on the colonial 
administration in India.36Headquartered in Jerusalem, the key figure below the High 
Commissioner, responsible for day to day operational decisions, was the Chief 
Secretary.37That post was the focal point both for dissemination of orders from the 
High Commissioner to the individual departments and districts, and advice to the 
High Commissioner on administrative and political issues.38Whereas departments 
such as Health and Public Works were located in the capital, the government also 
comprised a District Administration covering different geographical regions of 
Palestine.39 Following a reorganisation in 1922 there were four districts, and Nablus 
was located in the Northern District, administered from Haifa.40 Further modifications 
were made in 1927, reducing the number of districts from four to three, while at the 
same time creating four sub-districts in the Northern District. One of these was 
composed of Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm.41 We know from the archival records that 
apart from the soldiers and police located in the military barracks on the east side of 
Nablus,42 various officials of the Mandatory authority were also stationed in the town. 
The correspondence concerning the relocation of the municipal incinerator and 
slaughter house43 indicates the presence of a Sanitary Engineer, Leslie Colhorn,44an 
Assistant District Commissioner for the Samaria Division,45 and a Senior Medical 
Officer for Samaria and the Galilee.46 The town also had its own Governor, F J M 
Bostlethwait, who in 1922 was seeking new accommodation for himself and “a senior 
official.”47The correspondence from the Governor indicates that site and 
 
34  See page 75 below 
35 For a discussion of this issue, see David Cannadine, Ornamentalism. How the British Saw Their Empire (Allen 
Lane, The Penguin Press, London), 2001 
36  For a thorough analysis of the structure of the Mandatory administration in Palestine, see the 1931 report       
of the O’Donnell Commission, a copy of which is held at the Israel State Archives 
37  O’Donnell report, 90, Israel State Archives 
38 Ibid, 97 
39Ibid, 102 
40Ibid, 103 
41  Ibid 
42  Letter of 16 September 1934 from the Northern District Commissioner to the Chief Secretary,  Israel State 
Archives, Municipal Services: Municipality Samaria District, Nablus/Shekhem   119 
43  See pages 11 - 12 below 
44  See his report of 7 December 1935 held at the Israel State Archives in its Municipal Services: Municipality 
Samaria District, Nablus/Shekhem file  43 
45Municipal Services  81: Letter of 19 April 1935 from the Director of Medical Services to the Chief Secretary 
46  Ibid.  Both this and the A.D.C. post appear in the ‘cc’ list at the end of the letter, with their location given as 
Nablus 
47  Letter of 21 April 1922 from Governor Samaria in Nablus  to President Government Buildings Committee, 
Jerusalem. Israel State Archives, Official Residences / New Officials’ Residences, Nablus / Shekhem  202 - 204 
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buildingappraisals were carried out by James Brockbank, the District Engineer for 
Samaria, located in Nablus.48 
 
The presence of these government officials either in the town, or responsible for the 
provision of certain services in it enables us to build up a clearer picture of how 
Nablus was perceived by the Mandatory authorities, and how correspondence from 
or about Nablus was treated by the head office in Jerusalem, in particular by the 
office of the Chief Secretary where most of the operational decisions, including those 
concerned with resource allocation, were made. It is primarily on the basis of these 
exchanges that the leitmotif of this thesis – that Nablus was not a priority for the 
Mandatory authorities – is made. I am not however suggesting that it was completely 
neglected. Some of the correspondence concerning e.g. the Balata landing ground 
discussed below in chapter II49 indicates that significant efforts were made to 
establish what constituted fair compensation to local farmers for the loss of the use 
of their land. Similar levels of detail were entered into by the Nablus engineer 
considering options for the relocation of the municipal abattoir and incinerator.50 But 
what does become clear is that there was neglect in terms of resource allocation – 
and in particular developmental resources- compared with other parts of the territory, 
above all, Haifa.Furthermore, the correspondence and statements from the Mayor of 
Nablus and other members of the politically active ‘effendi’ class in the town  
indicates that they were well aware of the ways that they were becoming 
disadvantaged.51 This is why I conclude that the relative neglect suffered during the 
early years of the Mandate became an important contributory factor to Nablus 
becoming one of the main centres of the Arab Revolt in 1936. 
 
Of almost equal significance was the cultural heritage of those in the central uplands 
of Palestine, which was a strong determinant of the way they experienced the events 
of the 1920s and 1930s. Jabal Nablus had been a provincial capital in its own right 
under the Ottomans,52 and the successive administrative reorganisations during the 
course of the Mandate were symptomatic of its decline in relation to the centre of 
government power. I would argue that these changes, and in particular the reduction 
of seven to four districts in 1922,53 together with the creation of a Northern District 
administered from Haifa, reflected the strategic priorities of the Mandatory, with 
 
48  Letter of 16 July 1921 to Director of Public Works, Jerusalem from James Brockbank. Israel State Archives, 
New Officials’ Residences, Nablus / Shekhem  224 
49See pages 82 – 83 below 
50  Report from the Sanitary Engineer in Nablus, 7 December 1935.  Israel State Archives, Municipal Services: 
Municipality Samaria District, Nablus/Shekhem  43.  See also page 12 below 
51  See for example page 67 below, which discusses a petition from Nabulsi notables who described themselves 
as ‘weak’ in relation to the Jewish immigrants.  See also a letter of September 1933 from Mayor Tuqan to the 
government in Jerusalem requesting “urgent measures” to alleviate the town’s economic depression. Israel 
State Archives,Memorandum by the Municipality of Nablus 
52  Naseer Arafat, Nablus City of Civilisations,  46 
53  O’Donnell report, 102, Israel State Archives 
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itsfocus on developing this particular coastal port.54 The central uplands of the 
interior, and the string of towns running north of Jerusalem, did not feature in those 
considerations. 
 
At the district level of the administration the District Commissioner was the senior 
representative of the Mandatory authority, supported by an Assistant District 
Commissioner and a number of District Officers.55Their responsibilities included the 
maintenance of law and order, collection of tax revenues, and supervision of 
Municipalities and Local Councils.56Much of the time of the district administration 
was taken up with interactions with the Municipalities, which were obliged to submit 
their annual budget estimates to the District Commissioner for approval.57 When the 
occupants of the military barracks in Nablus began complaining about the close 
proximity of the municipal waste incinerators and abattoir in September 1934,58 it is 
possible to trace through the correspondence which subsequently arose the 
interactions between the Municipality, the district administration both in Nablus and 
Haifa, and the government headquarters in Jerusalem.59 The picture that emerges 
from the request to relocate the incinerators and abattoir further away from the 
military barracks is one of thorough analysis and carefully considered proposals from 
the relevant local British officials, such as the engineer in Nablus. The actual 
decision making process however, and in particular that relating to permissions to 
incur expenditure, was both hierarchical and centralised on Jerusalem, with the Chief 
Secretary being the final arbiter of what was (or was not) to be done.60 These 
themes are examined further in chapters III and IV of the thesis, dealing respectively 
with water and municipal services and the 1927 earthquake. 
 
Finally, by gaining a better understanding of how the Mandatory authorities governed 
the Jabal Nablus at the local level, we are in turn able to gain insights on how 
Nabulsi society formulated its various responses to British imperial rule during the 
1920s and 1930s, and the factors which were influencing those responses. Living 
conditions during this period were made especially difficult not only as a result of 
economic stagnation at a time of population growth, but also from the impact of 
natural disasters such as the 1927 earthquake, drought, infestations, and crop 
failures. This was of particular importance to a town whose fortunes were closely 
 
54  Norris, Land of Progress,  109: “Haifa’s newfound importance as Britain’s principal naval base in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and as a major exit point for the region’s raw materials, positioned the city at the nexus of 
British planning in the wider region.” 
55  O’Donnell report  103 – 104, Israel State Archives 
56  Ibid 
57Ibid, 112 
58  There is no letter specifically from the military on this issue, but that of 16 September 1934 from the 
Northern District Commissioner to the Chief Secretary is the first in the correspondence on this subject, and 
mentions the incinerators and abattoir as being “undesirable from the point of view of the Troops and Police.”  
Israel State Archives, Municipal Services: Municipality Samaria District, Nablus/Shekhem   119 
59Municipal Services: Municipality Samaria District, Nablus / Shekhem, Israel State Archives 
60  Ibid 
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integrated with those of the rural area surrounding it, as most of its trade was in 
agricultural produce, and the soap production for which it was famous was closely 
dependent on the quality and quantity of oil from the local olive harvest.61 The 
economic stagnation resulting from the inability of the surrounding rural areas to 
develop sustainable increases in crop production meant that many Nabulsis 
migrated to other parts of Palestine in search of work. The feelings of resentment 
and despair created by the difficult economic conditions which were an important 
factor in contributing to the town’s leading role in the Arab revolt were further 
exacerbated by its cultural heritage as a centre of commerce and culture under the 
Ottomans, and the nostalgia of its inhabitants for its former position prior to World 
War I. As David Bell pointed out in his response to the discussion on the future of 
global history –albeit in relation to the forces shaping the development of the French 
revolution- it is important to understand 
 
“the cultural and intellectual factors that shaped the outlook of its actors – 
factors whose roots lie in large part in the longue dureeof cultural and 
intellectual history.”62 
 
Engagement with the secondary literature 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the trends in the existing historiography and 
the contributions this work makes to a more rounded and comprehensive 
understanding of those trends. There are four main areas to which the thesis makes 
a contribution: the local history of Nablus, the Palestine Mandate, imperial history, 
and global history. The thread that ties these strands of historiography together is the 
tension and dynamic between connecting and disconnecting forces. Under the 
Ottomans the strengthening of state control from the second half of the nineteenth 
century served both to better integrate the town into the imperial network of political 
power while at the same time somewhat loosening its relationship with other parts of 
Palestine as it developed closer trading links with such cities as Beirut and 
Damascus. Under the British by contrast those trading links were weakened by the 
imposition of new national borders, while within the Palestinian territory the town 
became more closely integrated with a Palestinian Arab economy which became 
increasingly separated from –and marginalised by- that being developed by the 
rapidly expanding Jewish immigrant community. 
The modern history of Nablus itself has not been the subject of significant historical 
research, beyond the work of historians writing in Arabic for a largely local audience 
who do not generally examine the city within wider theoretical frameworks.63There is 
 
61  For the importance of olive oil as a raw material for the Nabulsi economy, see Beshara Doumani, 
Rediscovering Palestine 
62 Richard Drayton and David Motadel. ‘Discussion, the future of global history.’ Journal of Global History 
(2018) 13.  17 
63 See in this respect Ihsan Al-Nimr, Tarikh Jabal Nablus wa al-Balqa’ (The History of Nablus and the Balqa’ 
Districts) (Nablus, 1936 – 1961). Four volumes. Also: 
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one notable exception to this: Beshara Doumani’s ‘Rediscovering Palestine, 
Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700 – 1900.64  This is a regional case 
study covering the last two centuries of Ottoman rule which, as the author describes 
it, focuses on “the dynamics of provincial life in the vast Ottoman 
interior.”65Doumani’s essential hypothesis is that the history of  provincial towns and 
cities in Ottoman Palestine has been largely ignored, with historians concentrating 
on the period after World War I, and implicitly writing off the preceding centuries as 
characterised by little more than stagnation and decay.66 He goes on to argue that 
there was also a tacit supposition that any changes in society were simply imposed 
from above, casting the local population in the role of passive recipients.67 By the 
use of local court records, judgements and private family papers68 Doumani’s work 
challenges these suppositions, illustrating both that the process of modernity was 
already underway before the arrival of Europeans bent on ‘rediscovering’ the Holy 
Land: and that the merchant and educated classes were active participants in their 
relations with the Ottoman government.  
My own work examines the same geographical area in the early decades of the 
succeeding century, when an imperial power governed from Istanbul had been 
replaced by one governed from London. During the earlier period, Jabal Nablus had 
grown and flourished as a regional centre of commerce and culture, whereas during 
the period which is the subject of this thesis it suffered a sharp decline in the very 
differing circumstances pertaining after World War I. It consequently continues from 
Doumani’s work in a chronological sense, albeit from the perspective of British 
archival source material containing the reports of the British Government officials 
who either worked there, or were involved in policy decisions in Jerusalem or London 
which had an impact on the Jabal Nablus region. 
If the historiography on Nablus itself is limited, that on the Palestine Mandate as a 
whole is exceptionally large and extensive. It has also been overly influenced by the 
ongoing controversies surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948, with 
much work oriented towards issues relating to the establishment of the Jewish 
national home during the years following the Balfour declaration. It is only in more 
recent decades, especially with the emergence of a new generation of Palestinian 
scholars, that there has been a conscious attempt to better understand the Mandate 
in terms of its impact on the indigenous Palestinian population, as opposed to the 
growth of the Jewish immigrant community.69 This thesis, focused as it is on a town 
 
Akram Al-Ramini, Nablus fi al-qarn al-tasiashar (Nablus in the Nineteenth Century) (Amman, 1977) 
Mussallam Al-Hilu: Qissatmadinat Nablus (The Story of the City of Nablus) (Tunis, publication date unknown) 
64 Beshara Doumani,  Rediscovering Palestine  




69 Apart from Beshara Doumani, mentioned above, these include – inter alia - Sahar Huneidi, Nur Masalha, 
May Seikaly, and Rosemary Sayigh 
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whose population was almost wholly Palestinian, should be set within the context of 
that particular trend. 
In terms of the existing literature which is most relevant to this thesis, a leitmotif can 
be identified concerning developments which in one form or another led to different 
types of separation. At the level of the territory as a whole for example, Barbara 
Smith’s work on the ‘Roots of Separatism’ charts the bifurcation of the Palestinian 
economy into separate Jewish and Palestinian economies.70Chapter I of this thesis 
however argues that apart from the growing separation between these two groups in 
the economic sphere, there was a further set of geographic disparities to take into 
account, the burgeoning urban areas and those parts of the economy which were 
stagnating. These divisions did not take the form of ‘town versus country’ but were 
rather localities consisting of combined urban and rural areas such as Jabal Nablus 
which were in relative decline in comparison with the more rapidly growing economy 
located along the coastal strip.  
The theme of separation is also implicit in Jacob Norris’s ‘Land of Progress’71 which 
analyses the development (albeit not exclusively) of the port of Haifa during the 
1920s and 1930s, which was a strategic priority for the British as the main conduit for 
the transport of oil from Mesopotamia to be conveyed via ship to Europe. It stands in 
contrast to the geographical area which is the subject of this thesis, where Nablus, 
far from being part of the ‘land of progress’ was its antithesis: a region of neglect. 
Nevertheless, conditions within regions are not completely homogeneous, and the 
distinctions between rich and poor remain, with differences between different socio-
economic groups. This is the theme of May Seikaly’s study of the port of Haifa,72 
which examines “the steady change in the balance of power within the city between 
its Jewish and Arab communities in favour of the former.”73  As far as development 
policy was concerned, the town was anticipated to become “a showpiece of 
spectacular  British projects”74 so in this respect represented the very antithesis of 
that towards Nablus, where the Mandatory authorities allocated the minimum 
resources necessary, consistent with their obligations as a Mandatory power. This 
thesis consequently makes a contribution to the existing body of literature on 
Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s by examining an area which has been the 
subject of study in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but not the twentieth: 
and where, strikingly for the Mandate era, there was an almost complete absence of 
Jewish immigration. 
Broadening out the picture to look at the history of empire more generally in the 
interwar years, British support for Zionist immigration can be placed in a wider 
 
70 Barbara Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine, British Economic Policy, 1920 – 1929 (I B Taurus & Co, 
London, 1993).   4: “this book will argue that British policy…..led to the bifurcation of Palestine’s economy.” 
71 Jacob Norris, Land of Progress  
72 May Seikaly, Haifa, Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918-1939 ( I B Taurus & Co, London, 1995) 




picture of colonial development. The historiography on empire during the interwar 
years has analysed the changing ways that the British perceived their goals in the 
Middle East, and the role the region would play in relation to the imperial metropole. 
These themes are examined in James Renton’s work on ‘Britain and the invention of 
the Middle East’,75 and Stephen Constantine’s work on British colonial development 
policy.76In both cases it is clear that there was a supposition on the part of the 
imperial power that its presence was beneficial to the local populace, with investment 
in infrastructure projects which would simultaneously create the conditions for 
economic growth and provide export sales for British firms. Chapter III of this thesis 
examines a concrete example of the latter, when a British company was contracted 
to build a water supply system in Nablus. The relationship of imperial power to 
subject population however was essentially paternal –when not hostile- with the 
justification for the mandate system being that the European metropole would 
prepare the territories under its control for eventual independence.77 
The contribution made by this thesis to the literature on the history of empire in the 
1920s and 1930s is that it shows the limited extent of development and 
reconstruction projects in a specific location: the absence of any real participation by 
the indigenous population in the development process: and the almost complete 
failure of the imperial power to prepare that population to participate in (self) 
government.These phenomena were not of course unique to British imperial 
territories at this time. Historians of the French Empire have shown that a similar 
approach was taken in Algeria and Morocco, concentrating on areas considered of 
strategic or economic importance–including particular locations where mineral 
resources could be developed-and ignoring other parts of the territory.78The idea of 
priority and non-priority areas for development in Mandate Palestine is at least 
implicit in Jacob Norris’s ‘Land of Progress’79where the focus is on the exploitation of 
mineral deposits in the Dead Sea area and the development of the port of Haifa. 
That work did not set out however to make explicit comparisons between priority 
areas for British development in Palestine and the remainder of the territory. A 
comparison with contemporaneous developments in French colonial territories in the 
Maghreb is consequently helpful in understanding the impact of the British Mandate 
in terms of a mosaic in which some parts received significant attention and 
 
75 James Renton,  ‘Changing Languages of Empire & the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 
1917 – 1918’. The Historical Journal, 50, No.3  (2007),  645-667 
76 Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 
77 For a discussion of the Mandate system, see Susan Pedersen’s aptly titled  ‘The Guardians, the League of 
Nations and the Crisis of Empire’ (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
78 For a discussion of the distinctions made between different parts of Morocco according to whether or not 
they were ‘useful’ to the French imperial metropolis, see Moshe Gershovich, French Military Rule in Morocco, 
Colonialism and its Consequence (Frank Cass, London, 2000),   113-116.  For a discussion of the way the French 
colonial government in Algeria co-opted the most fertile agricultural land see Martin Evans, Algeria, France’s 
Undeclared War (Oxford University Press, 2012),  34 – 38. This theme is also discussed in Alison Drew, We are 
no longer in France. Communists in Colonial Algeria (Manchester University Press, 2014) 
79 Jacob Norris, Land of Progress  
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investment, while others were relegated to the imperial backwaters – with Nablus 
constituting a leading example of the latter. 
A study of Jabal Nablus at this time sheds light on the experiences of those who 
were living in the neglected regions. By taking a local perspective from a particular 
town it also creates a reference point from which the broader developments of the 
chosen time period can be measured. At this more specific level of granularity it 
becomes clear that the narrative of development which is clearly apparent from 
government documents and politicians’ statements translated into very different sets 
of concrete actions at the level of specific locations. In the case of Palestine, a study 
of Nablus provides a counter-balance to the existing literature on such well-
researched towns as Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem. 
As a study of a particular geographical area, and the impact of its location on the 
people who lived there, the thesis draws on the conceptual methodology employed 
by Fernand Braudel,80 who argued that at any one time there is a centre of 
international trade, and that wealth and political power declined the further away you 
were from that centre.81 Under the Ottomans, power and wealth was concentrated in 
the imperial capital, Istanbul, and was disseminated via land routes across the 
Middle East and North Africa. Within that extensive, but contiguous territory, Nablus 
was able to flourish as a regional centre of culture and commerce: it was a nodal 
point within a wider matrix of government administration and economic activity. The 
arrival of the British however brought two fundamental changes to that structure. On 
the one hand the single territory under Ottoman control (albeit in varying degrees in 
different locations) was broken up into separate units administered by either the 
British or the French. On the other, an imperial administration which had functioned 
by a series of land routes was replaced by European empires whose territorial 
possessions were not contiguous with the centre, but joined by a series of sea 
routes. As a result, the main coastal ports tended to benefit from rapid economic 
growth as they developed as nodal points in the sea-based imperial communications 
and distribution networks. The interior by contrast became relatively disadvantaged. 
 
Salim Tamari’s ‘Mountain against the Sea’82 draws on some of Braudel’s ideas when 
he notes the more rapid development of the coastal plain under Mandate Palestine 
in relation to the central hill district running from Jenin in the north to Hebron in the 
south: with Jerusalem as an exception given that it was chosen by the British as their 
 
80 For his ideas on particular regions acting as centres of economic activity, see Fernand Braudel, La 
Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen a l’Epoque de Philippe II. Tome Premier ( Librairie Armand Collin, 
Paris, 1966).  For a discussion of how these centres move over time, and their impact on specific locations, see 
Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilisation and Capitalism ( John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1977) 
81 Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilisation and Capitalism  85.  Similar ideas, albeit implicitly, are to be 
found in Bartov& Weitz, Shatterzone  7 in terms of the differences between those who live close to the 
borders of national territories and those living closer to their centres of political power 
82 Salim Tamari, The Mountain against the Sea, Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture ( University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 2009) 
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seat of government. The findings of my own research on Nablus are generally 
concordant with the Braudel / Tamari paradigms. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that I am in disagreement with Beshara Doumani’s work, whose 
perspective “is critical of the coast / interior binary that pervades the historiography of 
the Eastern Mediterranean.”83 The reason for this is that the time period he chooses, 
of the 18th – 19th centuries, corresponds with the late Ottoman era when trading 
routes did not necessarily disadvantage locations in the interior: although during this 
period of course some coastal towns in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean 
were growing as trading links with the maritime European powers strengthened.84 
The opposing but complementary perspectives of Doumani and Tamari reflect in 
particular the trajectory of Nablus, which grew to flourish under the land-based 
Ottomans during the 18th and 19th centuries, only to decline under the maritime 
power of the British during the Mandate. 
 
During the 1920s and 1930s I argue that one of the reasons for opposition to the 
mandate was that the town’s leading families had built up extensive links with such 
capitals as Cairo and Damascus, and were consequently well aware of political 
developments in the territories adjacent to Palestine. By the early decades of the 
twentieth century the basic transport and communications infrastructure of railways, 
telephone and telegraph had been established, with the result that information, 
newspapers, and people could travel easily and rapidly.85  Nablus consequently 
provides a good example of some of the themes discussed in Alan Lester’s work on 
place and space in British imperial history.86 He has argued that spaces such as 
towns are in effect cross-roads where people, things and ideas pass through, to and 
from the inter-connected networks of which the town is a node.87 Some places have 
power and influence, while others are marginalised.88 Nablus can be seen as a nodal 
point in a network linking other towns in the Middle East, and a receptor for the ideas 
flowing from them. This concept is useful in explaining the combination of 
characteristics to be found in the town when under British control. On the one hand it 
was suffering relative economic decline within the Palestinian territory, while on the 
other its heritage of well-established communications with the leading cities in the 
region gave it a heightened awareness of its neighbours’ attempts to break free from 
imperial rule, and the relative success in particular of Egypt and Iraq in doing so. 
This contrasted with the situation in Palestine where there was no indication that the 
Mandate was going to result in independence, and there was the additional 
 
83 Beshara Doumani, Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean, a Social History (Cambridge University Press, 
2017),  21 
84  When discussing economic developments in the mid-nineteenth century, Doumani noted that the Ottoman 
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complication of the Jewish National Home policy. It was this combination of regional 
awareness and economic problems in its own part of the Palestinian territory which 
contributed to the development of Nablus as a centre of political opposition to the 
Mandate. 
 
By the time the British arrived in Palestine it had become generally accepted that the 
main justification for governments to raise taxes and impose legal constraints on the 
people they govern was to improve their general wellbeing.89 In assessing the 
Mandatory power’s approach towards Nablus, and considering the responses to it, 
this thesis draws on the ideas of Michel Foucault, who argued that the 
responsibilities of the modern state 
“required a health policy capable of reducing the infant mortality rate, 
preventing epidemics, and lowering the rates of endemic diseases, 
intervening to modify and impose norms on living conditions (whether in the 
matter of diet, housing, or town planning), and adequate medical facilities.”90 
Specifically as far as the British were concerned, the Mandate marked a period when 
governments were responding to public expectations concerning the provision of 
water supplies and health services. As Leopold Amery had argued, the medical and 
scientific discoveries showing the relationship between water supplies, sanitation, 
and healthcare undermined the 19th century ‘night-watchman’ concept of the state, 
and increasingly obliged it to engage in and develop the basic infrastructure of in 
particular urban communities.91 These concepts of the role and responsibilities of the 
state provide the context to chapter III below concerning the development of 
residential water supplies by the British in the 1930s.  
By adopting this particular local perspective in relation to the nature and extent of 
state intervention, the thesis can be set in the context of recent debates on global 
history.92 These have focussed on how global history’s tendency to concentrate on 
transnational flows of goods, information, and services between metropolitan centres 
of commerce and imperial power might have resulted in the neglect of other areas 
which were either remote or excluded from such centres. This critique however has 
in turn been refuted by the likes of Richard Drayton and David Motadel whoargue 
that global history “is intertwined with the histories of the nation and the local, 
individuals, outsiders, and subalterns, and small and isolated places.”93Nablus falls 
 
89  Foucault has argued that this process of justifying the existence of the state in terms of its role in acting on 
behalf of the population as a whole began to emerge in the latter decades of the 18th century. See Michel 
Foucault, Securite, Territoire, Population. Cours au College de France 1977 – 1978 (Gallimard  Seuil, 2004),  44 
90  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the College de France, 1977 – 1978. Edited by 
Michel Senellart (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009),  367 
91  For a general discussion of this theme see L C A Knowles, The Economic Development of the British Overseas 
Empire (George Routledge & Sons, London 1924), Volume 1,  52 
92  See in particular Jeremy Adelman’s comment piece in Aeon Essays: ‘Is global history still possible, or has it 
had its moment ?’ This should be read together with the response by Richard Drayton and David Motadel, 
‘Discussion: the futures of global history’. Journal of Global History (2018) 13,  1-21  
93  Drayton and Motadel, ‘Discussion’  abstract 
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into this category, albeit in general terms, given the small size of Mandate Palestine: 
the town is only 44 miles from the burgeoning port of Haifa,94 located on the coastal 
strip, which formed the centre of economic growth and development in the 
territory.By looking at the Jabal Nablus – a region relatively excluded from the new 
international trade flows which developed as a result of the British Mandate in 
Palestine –this thesis illustrates the importance of relatively isolated areas in 
deepening our understanding of the exercise of imperial power.This particular 
location is especially apposite in this respect, given that it had acted as a ‘nodal 
point’ in a network of regional commercial centres under the Ottomans, but 
subsequently lost that role with the arrival of the British. As a result, Nablus is a 
better candidate to analyse the effects of being marginalised than a town such as 
Hebron which had not passed through a recent  period of pre-eminence.  
 
In geographical terms, this is a study which has used colonial era government 
documents containing information focussed on a particular locality. As such it can 
reveal insights corresponding to the theme of ‘history from below’95 given that its 
subject matter is that of a relatively marginalised group of people in relation to the 
mandate, and thus akin to such groups as women or the working class which have 
been brought into the mainstream of historical research following the ground-
breaking work of E P Thompson in the 1960s and 1970s. It also contributes a small 
counter-balance to the “profound Eurocentricity of our discipline in the West.”96 
Although the source material is primarily British, the subject matter and analysis is 
very much concerned with the way the Nabulsis reacted to their new imperial 
masters, culminating in the town’s pivotal role in the 1936 Arab Revolt. It is telling in 
this respect that the National Archives in Kew contain documents and reports which 
set out in some detail the thoughts and grievances of the political class in Nablus on 
such issues as Ottoman rule, the impact of World War I, and the reasons for their 
opposition to the Jewish National Home policy. The archives are consequently a rich 
source of material not only on the British imperial perspective, but also on that of the 
people they ruled. 
 
The thesis consequently provides examples relevant to the exchanges on global 
history which examine the relationship between transnational developments and 
specific, local events97 - of either large or small-scale. David Bell has argued98that 
political insurrections are a product both of the forces which shape the context in 
which they take place and the factors specific to their location which shape the 
responses and behaviour of the participants. In the case of the French revolution the 
context was one of global trade and competition, but the development of the Terror 
 
94https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distances.html?n=2323 
95  Drayton and Motadel, ‘Discussion’   5 
96 Ibid, 9 
97 See in this respect ‘Words from David Bell’ in Drayton and Motadel, ‘Discussion’  17 
98 David Bell, ’ Questioning the global turn: the case of the French Revolution’. French Historical Studies, 37, 1, 
2014  1-24 
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also reflected specificities of French history.99 An examination of the circumstances 
leading to Nablus playing a leading role in the 1936 Arab revolt against the British in 
Palestine is illustrative of a similar dynamic in the interactions between forces which 
were cross-cutting, and those which were specific to that group of people in a 
particular location – albeit on a much smaller scale. The context was that of relative 
decline in relation to the rapidly growing coastal strip, exacerbated by rural distress 
due to adverse weather conditions leading to a succession of poor harvests. The 
specificity by contrast was that of a cultural heritage developed over the preceding 
century when Nablus had been an important regional centre of culture and 
commerce. It was this awareness of what had been – and was now lost- which 
provided the psychological impetus for the Nabulsis to rise up against the British a 
little before other parts of the mandated territory had done so. This chronology is set 
out in some detail in the source material, which, together with the selected 
methodology, is the subject of the following section. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
 
As set out below, the main body of source material for this research consisted of 
British Government reports and correspondence between senior officials in Nablus, 
Jerusalem, and London. This material necessarily reflects the issues and 
preoccupations of those who were drafting and considering it, but various conceptual 
methodologies have been employed to both interpret the sources and place their 
subject matter in a broader context. Braudel has been especially helpful in this 
respect, as his ideas concerning the concentration of wealth and power in particular 
centres of commercial and political activity are useful in contrasting Haifa (a 
commercial centre) and Jerusalem (the headquarters of the Mandatory Government) 
with Nablus, left in relative isolation in the central uplands of Palestine. He is 
however also useful in the context of a broader geographical perspective given that 
in the early twentieth century Europe- and in particular northern and western Europe- 
was the closest centre of industrial and commercial activity with which the Middle 
East region engaged. The primary mode of transport between the two regions was 
by sea through the Mediterranean, and this had the effect of accelerating the growth 
of the leading Mediterranean ports – of which in Palestine Haifa and Jaffa were the 
main examples. Braudel’s ideas on the influence of commercial and political centres 
of power both at a local level within a specific territory and at a larger regional level 
provide the conceptual underpinning to Salim Tamari’s ‘Mountain against the Sea,’100 
where he examines the more rapid growth of the coastal plain in Palestine in relation 
to the central uplands, and such towns as Hebron, Jenin, and Nablus. 
 
Other dimensions to the impact of geographical location as a factor to take into 
consideration when analysing source material are to be found in Alan Lester’s work 
 
99  Ibid 
100Salim Tamari, The Mountain against the Sea  
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on place and space in British imperial history. There is no shortage of evidence in 
the archives that Nablus was the centre of the 1936 Arab Revolt, with detailed 
accounts of the uprising available in the military reports. In my view however the 
accompanying analyses of the causes of the revolt do not contain sufficiently 
conclusive arguments. There is much about the opposition of the Nabulsis to the 
Jewish National Home policy, but no real attempt to answer why that issue should 
have exercised that part of Palestine more than, say, Haifa and Jaffa which were 
both far more directly affected by the impact of Jewish immigration than Nablus.  
Lester’s work on the role of towns as nodes of communication in networks linking 
other towns in the Middle East comes as a useful reminder of the close trading and 
cultural links the educated Nabulsi families enjoyed with Beirut, Cairo, and 
Damascus. In these three towns they did business, got married, and sent their 
children to attend the universities there. As a result they arguably had a heightened 
awareness of political developments in the surrounding region, and the greater levels 
of success achieved by Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in gaining (degrees of) independence 
from their colonial masters. I have argued in this thesis that that awareness 
constituted one of the main reasons why Nablus led the Arab Revolt in Palestine. 
 
Finally the ideas of Foucault have been useful in considering that part of the source 
material which deals with efforts by the British to improve the economic and living 
conditions of the Nabulsis discussed in chapters 2 and 3 below. His concepts 
concerning the justification for the powers of the modern state in terms of its capacity 
to improve the lot of the population it governs provides the context for appraising the 
source material.101 This provides the evidence of what was done. It does not 
however, except in the most general terms in the high level reports written by 
officials in Jerusalem on Palestine as a whole, attempt to give any real indication as 
to what extent particular initiatives succeeded in solving the problems they were 
designed to address. To take two examples from chapter II and III below - what was 
the impact of providing training and silk worms for the development of sericulture in 
some of the villages surrounding Nablus on the general state of poverty and 
indebtedness of the agricultural sector in this area ?- and what was the proportion of 
the urban population who were beneficiaries of the residential water supply project ? 
These questions are left unanswered by the sources, and I have argued that a 
combination of the relative neglect of the Jabal Nablus region by the Mandatory 
authorities, together with the inevitable budgetary constraints brought about by the 
Great Depression, created a situation of ‘too little, too late’, and may have 
inadvertently contributed to worsening the extent of the hostility against the British in 
this part of Palestine rather than ameliorating it.  
 
 
101 This is not of course to overlook Foucault’s observations on the role of state surveillance and control in 
creating the conditions necessary for improving the condition of the population it governed. For a discussion of 
the relationship between state control and development, see The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. 
Edited by Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon, and Peter Miller (University of Chicago Press, 1991), Chapter 4: 
Governmentality by Michel Foucault 
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Overall, the research perspective is that of the British Government and its policies 
concerning both the maintenance of law and order and the infrastructure 
development which took place in many colonial territories during the early decades 
of the twentieth century.102 The analysis has chosen a relatively neglected area of 
the Palestinian territory which was not considered a priority for development. The 
focus is on policy, and what the government was trying to achieve at the local level in 
part of the central uplands of Palestine. Its orientation is towards the functioning of 
colonial government in an area set back and relatively isolated from both the capital 
of Jerusalem to its south, and the rapidly expanding economy along the coastal plain 
to its west. The focus of the primary source material has consequently been 
Mandatory Government reports and correspondence of senior officials103 between 
Nablus, Jerusalem, and London – mainly the Colonial Office. It is for this reason that 
the National Archives in Kew have been the main location for source materials for 
the research. Analysis of this material has revealed tensions between officials in the 
three locations, and this is a theme which is examined in chapters III and V of the 
thesis, dealing respectively with the establishment of water supplies to the town and 
the tensions arising between the civil and military authorities on the occasion of the 
arrest of the Mayor during the first year of the Arab revolt. 
 
Other sources have been chosen so as to build out a more rounded perspective of 
British – Nabulsi relations from that revealed by the government documents which 
form the core of the research. The Middle East Centre archive at St. Antony’s 
College Oxford was an invaluable source of papers and information relating to senior 
Mandate Government officials, including the activities of police officers such as 
Raymond Cafferata. Material held in the Church Missionary archives at Birmingham 
University gave helpful insights into both conditions in the Missionary hospital in 
Nablus and the range of health problems faced by the inhabitants of the Jabal 
Nablus region. In Paris, the Institut du Monde Arabe has a range of French language 
monographs, not all of which are available in the UK. It also contains some primary 
source material not available in the National Archives in Kew: including a report on 
the state of Palestine drawn up by the 1925 Palestinian Arab Congress,104 which 
was of particular use in understanding Palestinian perceptions of the state of the 
economy –including the rural economy- at the time.  During the course of a fieldwork 
visit to Nablus made in October 2016 it was possible to consult at the municipal 
library a selection of works written by Izzat Darwaza, one of the town’s leading 
cultural and political activists during the Mandate. Although written in his native 
Arabic, the extensive introduction is in English. Finally, during a visit to Rabat made 
 
102  For a discussion of infrastructure development in Mandate Palestine, see Jacob Norris, Land of Progress  
103  Whose writings can collectively be classified as memoranda: “written communications that give directions 
and transmit information within bureaucratic structures.” See Miriam Dobson & Benjamin Ziemann (Eds), 
Reading Primary Sources, the interpretation of texts from 19th and 20th Century History  (Routledge, Abingdon, 
2009),   123 
104  Report on the state of Palestine submitted to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine by the 
Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress on 13th October 1925, Institut Du Monde Arabe, Paris 
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in June 2018, the BibliothequeNationale du Maroc proved a useful source of material 
on Marechal  Lyautey, whose ideas on the distinction between different parts of 
French colonial territories characterised according to their importance to the imperial 
capital I have used when considering British Government priorities in relation to 
different parts of Palestine: with in particular the contrast between the rapidly 
developing coastal strip and the relatively stagnating central uplands. 
 
Various online sources were used during the course of the research, including the  
Israel State Archives and the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs (PASSIA), both located in Jerusalem. Similar issues arose 
across the full range of source material utilised, whether in physical archives or 
online. These included gaps in narrative sequences, no doubt reflecting the 
precipitate departure of the British from the territory in 1948, and the loss of large 
amounts of material: a problem made more severe in the case of locations situated 
in what is now the West Bank, which has experienced the control of three different 
regimes since World War I, with military hostilities and the loss and disruption that 
entails at each point of regime change. As a result, it is possible to become aware of 
particular initiatives, such as for example house reconstruction after the 1927 
earthquake, but not to know whether they were successfully implemented due to 
gaps in the archival records. 
 
Naturally, particular reports reflected the interests of their authors to the detriment of 
a comprehensive or fully “objective” account of the workings of British colonial rule in 
Nablus. Local officials working in Nablus sought to portray their work in a positive 
light when making submissions to the High Commissioner’s office in Jerusalem, as 
did that office when reporting to London, with the usual and predictable complaints to 
Government  Head  Offices about the need for more resources. In some of the more 
sensitive areas, however, it was possible to deduce that particular individuals were 
less than forthright in their account of events when it was clear that they were trying 
to avoid blame for actions which were later condemned: as was the case with 
Raymond Cafferata in describing his role in the arrest of the Mayor of Nablus on 
behalf of the army which is discussed in chapter V below. 
 
In general terms, however, the combination of reports specific to Nablus on such 
issues as the water supply project which is the subject of chapter III, and the 1927 
earthquake in chapter IV, together with the various reports on the state of the 
Palestine economy, and the 1931 census, were sufficient to build up a reasonably 
comprehensive picture of how the British at the time perceived the problems to be 
addressed. Considered against the various petitions and complaints submitted by 
the Nabulsis there is evidence that in terms of the needs of the population and the 
economy there was no great divergence of perspective between governed and 
government. The problem, however, exacerbated during the years of the Great 
Depression, was a lack of sufficient resources to mitigate the harsh conditions 
suffered by the inhabitants of the Jabal Nablus during the years following the 
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ravages of World War I. What is unsurprisingly absent from the official record are 
any statements that this situation was made even more challenging by the fact the 
region was not a British priority for development. Nevertheless, this can be deduced 
from the differing levels of expenditure allocated to the different towns in Palestine, 
and indeed the significant differences in the volumes of source material relating to 
them which have survived.  
 
Overview and Sequence of the Chapters 
 
As set out above, the themes and issues addressed in this thesis are examined in its 
various chapters, but are not necessarily specific to a particular chapter. The chapter 
sequence itself is as follows: 
 
Chapter I considers the wider economic developments in Palestine during this 
period which constitute the context in which the British: Nabulsi relationship 
developed. It draws on a combination of UK Government reports and 
correspondence, combined with secondary sources, to develop one of the key 
themes of the thesis: that Nablus was not developing at the same rate as either the 
capital, Jerusalem, or the towns of the coastal strip such as Haifa and Jaffa. As a 
result of relatively high levels of population growth, increasing more rapidly than the 
rate of new job creation, some members of the Jabal Nablus region moved 
elsewhere in Palestine in search of work. The advent of migration away from a 
region which had previously been a centre of cultural and economic activity under 
the Ottomans contributed to a sense of loss and isolation which became one of the 
contributory factors to the town’s role as a leader of the Arab Revolt in 1936.   
 
Chapter II focuses on the years immediately following World War I, and examines 
British perceptions of Nablus together with the way that they interacted with the city 
during that early period. Given that the subject of the thesis is the impact of the 
Mandate on this part of Palestine, the purpose of this chapter is to ascertain how the 
mandatory authorities viewed the city following their initial encounters with it: as 
those views would inevitably have an impact on the future relationship. Two aspects 
of British engagement are considered, namely surveillance of the town’s political 
activities and government at the local level - which included the maintenance of law 
and order, education in the surrounding rural area, and public health.The nature of 
that engagement is illustrative of the exercise of de minimis government in a non-
priority area where the primary policy objective appears to have been the avoidance 
of any form of civil or political disturbance on the one hand while on the other 
keeping public expenditure as low as possible, consistent with the responsibilities of 
a Mandatory power. This then introduces what is essentially the leitmotif of the whole 
thesis, namely that Nablus was not a priority for the British Mandate in Palestine, and 




Chapter IIIbegins the process of looking at small scale case studies to demonstrate 
the wider themes discussed in the preceding chapters. This particular chapter 
examines in detail the way the Mandatory Government implemented a water supply 
project for those residential households able to purchase it in the city. As with the 
succeeding chapters, the choice of subject matter was informed by the availability of 
reports and correspondence in the National Archives which gave useful insights into 
the thinking of mandatory officials at the time, and revealed the tensions between 
those working in the city itself, their head office in Jerusalem, and the Colonial Office 
and Treasury in London. The arguments which developed as a result of problems 
with some of the pipes supplied for the project are revealing of the sensitivities felt by 
the British relating to the way they were perceived by the local population.They 
indicate anxieties concerning their capacity to create the basic infrastructure which is 
the pre-requisite for social and economic development - the very rationale used to 
justify their presence in Palestine. 
 
Chapter IV considers an event which had a dramatic impact on Nablus, as it 
suffered much more damage than elsewhere in the territory: the 1927 earthquake. 
The Government response to this event, although speedy, clearly reflected both the 
financial constraints imposed by the Treasury and the fact that the town was not a 
priority for British policy makers in Palestine. The authorities acted on the basis of 
minimalist state intervention in terms of managing the consequences of the 
earthquake, on which a comprehensive report was written. Other source material, 
including contemporary newspaper cuttings, reveal that the mandatory 
administration benefitted from the evolving approaches to humanitarian relief, which 
became increasingly focussed on the needs of the recipients, and used philanthropic 
donations to provide for the immediate needs of those who had lost their homes. The 
Government in Jerusalem was quick to establish a relief fund and rely on private 
donations, including those from the Jewish diaspora in the USA, to provide the bulk 
of the finance to enable the clean-up operation. Its response to the earthquake was 
revealing of an early form of what today would be characterised as a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP), with the Government providing a small amount of ‘seed corn’ 
money and then effectively co-opting the much larger amounts of private donations 
to set up a disaster relief programme. It is nevertheless telling that funds to rebuild 
private houses damaged or destroyed by this natural disaster were provided in the 
form of loans rather than grants.    
 
Chapter V examines a set of issues arising from a particular incident which took 
place during the autumn of the first year of the Arab Revolt in 1936. It involved the 
army, the police, and the Mayor, Suleiman Bey Tukan. His forced co-option by the 
army late one evening in September 1936, and the subsequent reaction to it, provide 
an opportunity to examine the differences of perspective between the civil 
administration and the military in Mandate Palestine, together with the tensions 
arising from them which is one of the key themes of this chapter. Within the broader 
context of colonial administration in the decades following World War I it goes on to 
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argue that to some extent the divergence of views between High Commissioner 
Wauchope and Lieut-General Dill finds a reflection in the differences of approach 
between Marechal Lyautey and his successors in Morocco towards nationalist 
insurgencies during the 1920s and 30s: namely do you use maximum force at the 
outset to crush an insurgency and prevent its development, or do you apply only the 
minimum necessary to restore order, taking into account the need to maintain future 
relations with groups who are currently resorting to armed insurrection ? These 
tensions between the civilian and military authorities were arguably exacerbated by 
the Government’s de minimis approach to the Jabal Nablus. It was not making 
significant investments in the region, and so found it hard to offer anything other than 
forced repression in response to discontent - despite the fact that such repression 
risked further exacerbating the existing state ofhostilities. It is appropriate for the 
chronological sequence considered in this thesis to conclude with the start of the 
Arab Revolt in 1936. That year marked the turning point towards a much more 
interventionist military policy designed to crush the revolt, which combined in the 
succeeding years with increasing state activity in the civil sphere  as the government 
geared up for the start of World War II. 
 
The Conclusion  integrates the various themes of the thesis, based on location, 
development, and infrastructure. It argues that despite the small geographical size of 
Palestine there were significant differences between the growth and development of 
the region covering the central ‘spine’ of the interior hill district and that of the coastal 
plain. It goes on to assert that the Palestine Mandate did not take a monolithic 
approach to the territory under its control, and that there were significant differences 
between the levels of investment made in such coastal towns as Haifa and those 
which were not perceived as a priority in relation to British strategic objectives for the 
Middle East region. Finally it asserts the importance of history, culture, and 
perception as determining factors in the way local communities react to broader 
developments across territories of which they are part. In contemporary parlance this 
was a town of the interior which resented the growing influence and wealth of other 
parts of the country. As such, its predicament under the Mandate speaks to current 
themes of popular discontent amongst those who consider themselves denied the 
privileges of the metropolitan elites, and threatened by the consequences of large-
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THE  IMPACT  OF  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
 
There is no really lucrative industry in Palestine except the soap industry in 
Nablus.The prospects are very poor because of the non-existence of raw material, 
coal or oil in the land.1 
 
Introduction 
The introductory chapter of this thesis has set out its main themes, the subject 
matter to be covered, and the interpretative paradigms used to analyse the primary 
source material. It is argued here that the geographical location of Nablus, set back 
as it is up in the hills away from the coastal plain, was an important factor in 
explaining its hostility to the development of European colonial influence in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. The extensive links of its leading families with such capitals 
as Cairo and Damascus, and their knowledge of political developments from Egypt 
to Iraq, served to reinforce that hostility, given the lack of any clear indication that 
Palestine had been placed on the path to independence. Nablus consequently 
provides a good example of some of the themes discussed in Alan Lester’s work on 
place and space in British imperial history.2 He has argued that spaces such as 
towns are in effect cross-roads where people, things and ideas pass through, to and 
from the inter-connected networks of which the town is a node.3 Some places have 
power and influence, while others are marginalised.4 Nablus can be seen as a nodal 
point in a network linking other towns in the Middle East, and a receptor for the ideas 
flowing from them. Within the Palestinian Mandated territory however it was 
becoming marginalised in relation to the more rapidly developing coastal plain.  
With the introduction of British rule, powerful new economic forces were unleashed 
in the territory, leading to rapid growth in some urban areas, in contrast to relative 
stagnation in most rural areas. The 1931 census recorded a process of emigration 
from the Nablus area which it concluded implied a “comparative degeneration in the 
economic life of that town.”5 Not only was the population moving within the country, 
 
1 Report on the State of Palestine submitted to His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine by the 
Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress on 13th October 1925, 10. A copy is held at the Institut du 
Monde Arabe in Paris. 
2 Robert Aldrich and Kirsten McKenzie (Eds), The Routledge History of Western Empires. (Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis, Abingdon, 2014).  Part VI, Imperial Spaces: Alan Lester 
3 Aldrich and Kirsten, The Routledge History  308 - 309 
4Ibid, 310 
5  E Mills, Superintendent of Census, Census of Palestine 1931: Population of Villages, Towns and 
Administrative Areas (Jerusalem, 1932), 29   A copy is held at the British Library.  
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but it was also growing,6 and more rapidly than the economy. These factors in the 
social development of the area combined to create tensions resulting from the 
growing receptiveness of the population to radical ideas in opposition to the 
Mandate: and these in turn contributed to political unrest.7 
The purpose of this chapter is consequently to examine the impact of  economic 
forces on the ‘Jabal Nablus’ region to ascertain their importance in explaining why 
this particular part of Palestine became a centre of opposition to the Mandatory 
authorities. It consequently speaks to the main theme of the thesis as a whole, 
namely that the conditions which developed during the first two decades of the 
Mandate resulted in the economic marginalisation of the Jabal Nablus region. Both 
chapters I and II have consciously taken a broader perspective of respectively 
economic issues and the operations of the Mandatory authorities so as to set the 
context for the specific case studies which are the subjects of chapters III – V. 
Starting with the Ottoman context, this chapter goes on to examine the economics of 
the inter-war years, combined with the impact of Jewish immigration, and the 
development of the electricity grid in Palestine. This is followed by an examination of 
the effects of population growth and the state of the rural sector. Having established 
the contours of this economic landscape, the chapter then turns to assess in detail 
British attempts to mitigate the declining economic situation of Jabal Nablus. It notes 
that overall these attempts can be characterised as ‘too little, too late’, whether that 
be the delay in imposing restrictions on the volume of cheap food imports from the 
Hauran which undercut prices for Nabulsi growers,8 or the amount of credit made 
available for indebted farmers to improve their agricultural yields. Within the context 
of Treasury budget restrictions the spending priorities of the Mandatory 
administration were focussed on infrastructure development –especially railways- 
and the maintenance of law and order.  As far as Jabal Nablus was concerned, the 
British were inclined to see it as little more than a potential trouble-spot and source 
of opposition to Mandatory rule. Budget allocations for rural development 
programmes took second place to keeping the peace and heading off signs of 
political activism,9and were consequently insufficient to make any significant impact 
on the effects of the Great Depression of 1927 – 1933.10 Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a consideration of how these various factors were perceived from the 
perspective of Nablus, and why they fuelled an arguably higher degree of political 
discontent than that experienced elsewhere in the territory. It identifies the main 
 
6 Mills, Census of Palestine 157: Subsidiary Table No. IV. Proportion of children aged less than 10 to those aged 
18 – 45. The proportion for Palestine as a whole was 77 : 100, with the highest ratio found in Nablus at 88 : 
100. The lowest was in Tel Aviv at 43 : 100. These figures provide prima facie evidence of a post – World War I 
baby boom 
7 See Henry Laurens, ‘Nouveaux regards sur la questionne de Palestine.’ Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes, 2007, 
No.104.  3-28 
8 Discussed on page 38 below 
9 The Mandatory authorities were nevertheless aware that problems in the rural sector could contribute to 
political unrest:  see pages 52-53 below 
10 Discussed on page 50 below 
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reasons for doing so as being grounded in a perception that the town and its 
agricultural hinterland were in a state of decline relative to the rapid economic and 
population growth experienced along the coastal strip.  
The research covered in this part of the thesis indicates that there is potential for 
qualification to certain aspects of the established historiography. In particular, 
Barbara Smith’s seminal ‘Roots of Separatism in Palestine11 which emphasises the 
economic divisions between the native Palestinian and immigrant Jewish 
communities. We need to further complicate this dichotomy by adding a different 
division created by British rule in Palestine: between the burgeoning urban areas and 
those parts of the economy which were stagnating. There is also clearly scope for 
further research on the impact on Palestinian society of the high rates of fertility of 
the Muslim Arab population which are set out in parts of Bernard Wasserstein’s 
work:12as it is possible that one of the reasons that agricultural workers were leaving 
the Jabal Nablus area in search of work elsewhere was that their numbers were 
rising at a faster rate than could be absorbed by existing methods of agricultural 
cultivation. 
Economics and demographics were clearly important contributory factors in the 
development of political opposition to the arrival of the British and their Jewish 
national home policy. At the local level however, as Chaim Weizmann described it:13 
“one place in Palestine occupies a somewhat particular position, both in its 
attitude to Great Britain and to Zionist policy,  that is Nablus. Nablus is very 
powerful economically. The prosperity of Nablus is based chiefly on the olive 
tree and the industry connected with the production of oil and soap.”  
He went on to say that the town feared the Zionists would build competing soap 
factories: and that “the feeling in Nablus against the Jews, unlike in other parts of 
Palestine, is of long standing. No Jew has lived in Nablus or the neighbouring towns 
of Tulkarm or Qalqilya for centuries”14 – although he attributed this in part to the 
animosity towards the Jews from the local Samaritan community. When the Jewish 
community attempted to open a school for Samaritans in the town of Nablus, they 
were met “with hostility and intimidation on the part of the Mayor and other 
notables.”15 In 1925 the Times’ special correspondent in Palestine reported that “a 
 
11  Barbara Smith, The Roots of Separatism in Palestine, British Economic Policy, 1920 – 1929 ( I B Taurus & Co, 
London, 1993) 
12  See in particular, Bernard Wasserstein,  Israelis and Palestinians, Why Do They Fight, Can They Stop ?  (Yale 
University Press, London, 2003), 20: “Following the census a further special enquiry was conducted in late 
1931 on fertility patterns. These showed the extraordinary fecundity of the Palestinian population.”  
13  Letter of 02 February 1920 to Lord Curzon in Eastern Affairs, Further Correspondence Part IV, FO 406/43, 
held at the  National Archives in Kew (henceforth referred to as ‘TNA’) 
14  Ibid 
15  Neil Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question (Frank Cass and Co, London, 1978), 73 
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party of Jews, while passing through Nablus, in connection with the Samaritan 
sacrifice on Mount Gerizim, were stoned by Muslims.”16 
Weizmann’s views and this incident, although helpful in setting the overall context for 
opposition to Jewish immigration, does not explain the varying degrees of such 
opposition between the different urban and rural communities across Palestine. To 
get a better understanding of the impact of British rule on these regional variations 
we need first to consider the economic situation during the closing years of the 
Ottoman regime at the turn of the twentieth century: as those who reacted to the 
establishment of the British mandate did so based on their perspective as Ottoman 
citizens. 
The Ottoman Context and Current Paradigms of Interpretation 
This section considers the pre-World War I status quo ante in comparison with the 
early years of the British mandate in terms of the contrasting hypotheses of Beshara 
Doumani and Selim Tamari on the importance of geographic location as a factor in 
economic development. Within that context it also considers the origins of the 
development of the electricity grid in Palestine and its impact on Nablus.  
As Selim Tamari has argued in his seminal work, ‘The Mountain Against the Sea’, 
the period from the end of the nineteenth century up to World War I saw: 
“the emergence of a cultural divide between mercantile coastal communities 
and mountain-dwelling smallholder peasants. This divide became more 
tangible precisely when the two regional economies became more capitalised 
and more integrated with European and Mediterranean trade networks, thus 
enhancing the cultures’ difference.”17 
His hypothesis is that a new regional dichotomy was emerging between the more 
cosmopolitan coastal cities - which acted as commercial  centres and developed as 
locations for urban Jewish migration - and those located in the central ‘spine’ of 
Palestine, such as Nablus, Safad, and Hebron, which were the seats of 
conservatism and traditional leadership.18 
Beshara Doumani takes issue with some of this analysis, arguing that he is “critical 
of the coast / interior binary that pervades the historiography of the Eastern 
Mediterranean.”19 A synthesis has yet to emerge between these two hypotheses, but 
they are not necessarily as contradictory as they at first appear. On the one hand 
 
16  ‘Jews stoned by Arabs at Nablus’. Article of 09 April 1925, Times newspaper digital archive 
17 Salim Tamari, Mountain against the Sea, 1  It is interesting to note that some supporters of the Zionist 
project envisioned a similar geographical separation between the fertile coastal strip (to be reserved for the 
Jews) and the central uplands stretching East into Trans Jordan, to be reserved for the Arabs. Anthony Crossley 
made this case in a Parliamentary debate on Palestine in 1936. See Hansard, Commons, 24th March 1936, 
Volume 310, Col. 1094 
18 Tamari, Mountain against the Sea 10 
19  Beshara Doumani,  Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2017), 21  
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there is no doubt that in the unique circumstances of the British Mandate in Palestine 
the development of the coastal strip, already gathering momentum prior to World 
War I, was accelerated by the continuous arrival of Jewish immigrants whose 
growing presence established the new town of Tel Aviv and was an important factor 
in the rapid growth of Haifa.20 In terms of economic and population growth, it is clear 
that the ‘sea’ was outstripping the ‘mountain’ during the inter-war years. 
Conversely, being located on the coastal plain was not per se a pre-requisite for 
economic development: Nablus under the Ottomans had been an important regional 
commercial centre, with a well-developed soap manufacturing sector selling both 
within ‘Bilad al-Sham’ and into Egypt.21 It was indeed socially and politically 
conservative,22 a tendency enhanced by the presence of “the shrine of al-Mujahid 
Mujirnad-Din al-Hanbali who was a leader in the Mamluk era”23and who created a 
school of Islam with a tendency towards austerity and conservatism.24 Such piety 
and conservatism however had not inhibited the town’s commercial development. 
CemEmrence has provided a variation on Tamari’s geo-political classification of the 
territories of the Eastern Mediterranean, where he argues that the Ottomans, in 
developing their own contribution to modernity in the Middle East, distinguished 
between the coastal regions, the interior, and the ‘frontiers’ – essentially the desert 
areas inhabited by nomadic tribes which were only partially under Ottoman control.25  
He goes on to observe that “economic transformation strengthened mid-size market 
towns. The latter emerged as regional textile centres, sold manufactured products to 
the hinterland, traded with large ‘caravan’ cities, and established strong connections 
with burgeoning port towns of the coast.”26 This description fits well with the activities 
of Nablus in the late Ottoman period, and so adds weight to Doumani’s contention 
that location in the ‘interior’ does not in itself preclude the development of thriving 
and influential communities. 
Finally on the question of the differences between the coast and the interior, it is 
worth noting Cyrus Schayegh’s observation that during the 19th Century the growth 
of the European empires weakened the power and influence of the Ottoman 
administration in Constantinople ”and in a variety of ways starting with economic 
development, port cities like Beirut became the new locomotives of change, while the 
 
20  See  Jacob Norris, Land of Progress, 102 
21  See Beshara Doumani: Rediscovering Palestine,  71-72 
22  The Nabulsi novelist Sahar Khalifeh described the town of her birth as “old and overwhelmed by worries.” 
Sahar Khalifeh, Of Noble Origins (American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2012), 250 
23  Naseer Arafat, Nablus, City of Civilisations, 196. See also page 211 on the bringing of the hairs of the 
Prophet from Istanbul to the Hanbali mosque in Nablus in 1914 by HaydarTuqan: the mosque being used for 
special religious celebrations 
24Pilgrimage to the Hanbali shrine in Nablus was primarily made by those in the town and surrounding 
agricultural area, together with religious scholars from further afield.  See  Arafat, Nablus,  196 
25  Cem Emrence, Remapping the Ottoman Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State 
(I B Taurus, London, 2012),  2 
26  Emrence, Remapping the Ottoman Middle East  65 
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power of hinterland cities declined.”27 This distinction is important, as it raises the 
question of relative, as opposed to absolute, decline for towns such as Nablus, which 
were clearly flourishing under the Ottomans, but not growing as fast as some of the 
port cities, such as Beirut. 
We furthermore need to take into account that both economically and socially Nablus 
–or ‘little Damascus’ as it was known- was closely integrated into the ‘Greater Syria’ 
region, a fairly well-defined and culturally homogeneous geographical entity, 
bounded by the Anatolian mountains to the North, the Mediterranean to the West, 
and the Sinai and Arabian deserts to the South and East.28 Within this region people 
born in different towns studied together in Ottoman state schools, mostly in Beirut 
and Istanbul, and some went on to work together as Ottoman civil servants, creating 
a network which facilitated the development of  regional contacts.29 
Here then is a key factor in the differences between the coastal and inland towns as 
the Ottoman era was destroyed by World War I and the European colonial powers 
came to replace it in the Middle East. I would argue that for the port towns their 
growth path was relatively unimpeded by regime change, as they were able to 
continue their maritime trade via the Mediterranean. For those in the hinterland 
however this option had never been available as their trade routes were over land. 
The creation of new territorial borders between the Mandatory powers, and the 
inevitable restrictions on freedom of movement which they entailed, consequently 
had a disproportionate  impact  on towns such as Nablus30 - where with the 
exception of its export trade in soap to Egypt, its economic and social orientation 
was very much to the territories to its north that had fallen under the control of the 
French. 
This transition from Ottoman to Mandate rule saw a change in the dynamic between 
the processes of integration and fragmentation which had become apparent in the 
decades prior to World War I. During that period the forces of integration were 
represented by Ottoman attempts to tighten their control over the different regions of 
the Levant. By contrast the growing influence of the European colonial powers in the 
region served to loosen and re-orient the web of trading connections across the 
region.31 At the time, Nablus continued its role as a commercial centre for the 
Northern part of Palestine, serving both the smaller towns in that region and the 
itinerant Bedouin from the Jordan Valley. Its dominance in that role relied in part on 
 
27 Cyrus Schayegh (Ed.) A Global Middle East: Mobility, Materiality and Culture in the Modern Age, 1880 – 1940 
(I B Taurus & Co, London, 2015), 26 
28  Schayegh,  A Global Middle East  27 
29  Ibid  
30  Yosef Castel, a Sephardic Jew and journalist living in Jerusalem, argued after the 1921 riots that it was 
important to give employment opportunities to the Arabs to reduce their hostility to the Zionists. See Neil 
Caplan,  Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917 – 1925 (London, Routledge, 1978), 102 
31 For a discussion of these themes from the perspective of infrastructure and communication, see Thomas 
Philipp & Birgit Schaebler (Eds), The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation (Franz Steiner 
Verlag, Stuttgart, 1998). 
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its geographical location, which straddled the terrain between the Jordan river to the 
east and the coastal plain to the west. Over time this allowed Nabulsi merchants to 
build up sufficient capital to develop a dominant position in different commercial 
sectors.32 
After World War I the forces of integration and fragmentation became more 
concentrated, in particular as far as Palestine was concerned. The fragmentation 
was reflected in the creation of new borders which had a negative impact on towns 
such as Nablus, with its long-established trading links beyond them. Internally by 
contrast the forces of integration were strengthened by the arrival of a Western 
imperial power which established a centralised government in a small territory only 
about  twice  the size of Lebanon. Developments along the coastal strip, accelerated 
by the arrival of Jewish immigrants intent on creating their nationalhome, left Nablus 
feeling exposed to a new wave of competition with which it felt ill-prepared to cope at 
a time when its traditional trading links with the surrounding territories were growing 
weaker and more tenuous.  
It is also possible that this feeling of being disadvantaged was reinforced by the 
development of the electricity grid in Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s, which 
started in the Jaffa / Tel Aviv area, and spread north up the coast to Haifa before it 
was extended to the towns in the central range of hills.33 Jaffa was electrified in June 
1923, as was Tel Aviv, both initially for the purposes of enabling street-lighting.34 
Once established in the towns, the availability of electricity was progressively taken 
up by households seeking power for their water pumps, and industry wanting a 
continuous source for its machinery.35 During the development phase while the grid 
was being built out in the coastal towns, the advantages of being connected quickly 
became apparent to local shops and businesses which were no longer restricted to 
working during daylight hours.36 
In the absence of state subsidies however the deciding factor guiding the 
development of the grid was the capacity to pay for its supply by potential customers. 
With the exception of Jerusalem, electric power supply in Palestine was a monopoly 
concession granted by the Mandatory Government to the Jewish entrepreneur 
Pinchas Rutenberg.37  Having established local generating capacity in Jaffa and Tel 
Aviv he then did the same in Haifa in 1925.38 The attraction of the more affluent 
urban areas was that they contained a more profitable mix of commercial and 
 
32 Gad Gilbar, Economic and Social Consequences of the Opening of New Markets: the case of Nablus, 1870 – 
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33 On the issue of electrification, see Ronen Shamir, Current Flow, the Electrification of Palestine (Stanford 
University Press, 2013). 
34 Shamir, Current Flow  24 
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36Ibid, 63 
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residential customers whose regular payments for his services would provide the 
cash-flow to fund further expansion. As a result however, whether or not intended, it 
was by and large the Jewish immigrant communities who tended to be the 
beneficiaries.39 In Haifa and Jaffa for example, out of more than twenty localities 
connected to the grid, only two, or 10%, were Arab.40 
As different towns were connected, such as Ramleh in the late 1920s41 and 
Nazareth in 1934,42 those Jewish agricultural settlements lying between them were 
given the opportunity to connect to the transmission wires: and unlike their 
Palestinian Arab neighbours their access to credit and investment capital meant that 
they had the wherewithal to do so.43 The mid-1920s had seen a wave of Jewish 
immigrants from Poland keen to establish new methods of citrus cultivation, and 
willing and able to use electric power both for machinery and irrigation pumps.44 By 
1933 the amount of Kw.H sold for irrigation accounted for some 50% of total 
electricity sales,45 due to the increasing use of electric pumps for agricultural 
irrigation purposes, as they were used to tap into sources of subterranean ground 
water.46  As a result, in both urban and rural areas, the economic success of the 
Jewish national home project was closely identified with the development of the 
electricity grid.47 Nablus was very much a passive observer of this development, as 
its town council had declined the possibility of being connected to an electricity 
supply generated by a Jewish entrepreneur.48 The views of the municipality however 
were not necessarily representative of all the residents in the city, as in December 
1934 a petition signed by a number of Nabulsis was submitted to the Assistant 
District Commissioner asking if the Palestine Electric Corporation could extend its 
services to the town.49 
The position of the town council nevertheless prevailed, and the fact that they did so 
suggests that there were reasons other than purely financial why electricity was by 
and large slower to expand into Arab communities than it was to Jewish ones. For 
Nablus in particular, with its reputation for opposition to Zionism,50 the development 
of electric power in the coastal plain both exemplified its fears of foreign domination 
and its sense of having been placed in a trap: as without the power, it would be 
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47  May Seikaly, Haifa, Transformation of an Arab Society,  87 
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harder either to increase the output from the agricultural sector in the surrounding 
villages,51 or to make its soap-based industrial sector more productive and 
competitive. The risk was of a downward spiral, whereby increasing isolation from 
Western technology and development led to greater relative marginalisation and 
weakness, which in turn nourished a growing hostility to the Mandatory Government 
and its policies. For Palestine as a whole, these growing differences in economic and 
investment capacity were creating an increasing divide between the Arab and Jewish 
population.52  It is within this context that it now becomes appropriate to examine in 
closer detail the effect of British rule on economic developments in Palestine during 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
The Economics of the Inter-War Years, and the Impact of Britain’s Jewish 
national home policy 
This section considers the impact on Nablus of World War I, the post-war economic 
problems leading up to the Great Depression, and Jewish immigration. It also notes 
the (largely inadequate) response of the Mandatory authorities to the economic 
conditions of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the growth of Arab nationalism in the 
Jabal Nablus area and its hostility to Jewish land purchases.  
World War I had left Palestine devastated, and on the brink of starvation. Ronald 
Storrs, appointed Military Governor of Jerusalem in December 1917, recalls in his 
memoirs how the population was close to starving, with only a few days’ stocks of 
food: his priority being to establish immediate grain supplies from Egypt.53 The 
historian Bernard Wasserstein paints an equally grim picture of Palestine at this time, 
describing it as a ‘disaster zone’ resulting from population loss, locust plagues, 
famine, and the virtual collapse of the peasant economy.54A report on the state of 
Palestine drawn up in 1925 went on at some length on the destruction brought about 
by the war, both of fields and livestock, and the destitute state of the population.55 
This, then, was the impoverished state of the country at the time of the arrival of the 
British, who arguably caused further shocks to the economic system by re-aligning 
what had been a regional trade orientation under the Ottomans: when the northern 
half of the territory, which formed part of the vilayet of Beirut, was integrated into the 
economies of what is today southern Lebanon, together with the Hauran region of 
 
51  I have found no evidence of lobbying from those villages to be connected to the electricity grid: 
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52 Shamir, Current Flow  149.  For a discussion of the impact of the electricity grid in Palestine on contributing 
to an increasing bifurcation of the Arab and Jewish economies, as well as Nabulsi opposition to it, see  Frederik 
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Syria.56The southern half of Palestine by contrast, and its commercial centres in 
Gaza and Jaffa, was more oriented towards trade with Egypt and maritime exports to 
Europe. Together with this re-alignment, caused by the creation of separate British 
and French mandated territories carved out of the former Ottoman Empire, came the 
impact of the Great Depression and the powerful deflationary forces this unleashed, 
especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This led Palestinian farmers to make 
“increased demands for protection as world food prices tumbled.”57The Mandatory 
authorities had some sympathy with these demands, granting import tariffs on a 
range of crops, including barley, olives, rye, tomatoes, and wheat.58 
During the 1930s, the accelerating rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine caused 
by the rise of Nazism in Europe at least partially off-set the effects of the Great 
Depression. Between 1932 and 1936 Jewish immigration grew from a little under 
9,000 to just under 30,000. That influx of skilled labour and the capital they brought 
with them triggered an economic boom bringing a 91% increase in revenue, a 61% 
rise in industrial production, a 130% growth in imports and 77% in exports, together 
with a 335% increase in electricity consumption.59 However, the economic growth 
caused by immigration gave rise to a much greater increase in imports than it did in 
exports, especially as most of Palestine’s trade was in agricultural produce, and 
production costs in the Hauran, which produced similar crops to those cultivated in 
the Jabal Nablus area, tended to be lower than they were in Palestine.60The negative 
impact this was having on Palestinian farmers was acknowledged by the Mandatory 
authorities, who had permitted duty-free trade in agricultural produce between 
Palestine and Syria under the 1929 Customs Agreement. “In 1935 however a quota 
limit was agreed of 5,000 tons of hard wheat – i.e. the same type as grown in 
Palestine – per year from Syria and Lebanon.”61 
The Government in Egypt was nevertheless generally more protectionist in its 
approach to agricultural production than the authorities in Palestine, who were 
guided by the British commitments to free trade which formed the basis of the 
League of Nations’ ‘Open Door’ policy for mandated territories.62 This difference had 
a significant impact on the levels of soap exports to Egypt, which was the largest 
export market for the olive-oil based soap manufactured in Nablus: and had enjoyed 
annual sales of up to £P 240,000 falling to £P 110,000 in 1931 and then £P 83,000 
 
56  See Roza El Eini, ’Trade Agreements and the Continuation of Tariff Protection Policy in Mandate Palestine in 
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in 1932 as the result of the imposition of Egyptian import duties.63 This was 
unsurprisingly a bone of contention for the Nabulsis, for whom soap production was 
their most important industry. In September 1933 Mayor Tuqan wrote to the 
Mandatory authorities complaining that their business was in steady decline 
“because the Egyptian Government imposed high customs duty on soap.”64He went 
on to complain that: 
“The importation of acid oils free of customs duty for soap manufacturing caused 
competition to the soap manufactured of olive oil in Nablus and as a result of this 
competition the soap manufacturers as well as the fellah, owner of the olive oil crop, 
were badly affected because the soap made of acid oil is being sold at a less 
price.”65 
Unfortunately for the Nabulsis the acid oils remained free of customs duty, and it was 
not until a trade agreement negotiated in 1936 that these tariffs were reduced.66 
As noted above, Jewish immigration into Palestine increased the demand for 
imported goods, although the immigrants themselves were mainly concentrated 
along the coastal strip from Jaffa, through Tulkarm to Haifa, and then North-East 
through Nazareth to Lake Tiberias: in the form of an inverted ‘L’ on the map.67 Of 
importance to any consideration of its impact on the Jabal Nablus area was the fact 
that there was an almost complete absence of Jewish immigration and / or land 
purchase in that part of the country. As late as 1945, in a total land area of 1.5 Million 
dunums, Jewish immigrants owned only 15: by far the smallest number in any part of 
Palestine. Elsewhere they owned either tens or hundreds of thousands of dunums.68 
Whatever their impact on the Nabulsis, it was not that of direct physical proximity. 
Opposition to Jewish immigration was not however based purely on economic 
considerations, but also included the clash of nationalist aspirations which had 
developed in both communities by the time of the mandate. In 1891 the Hebrew 
intellectual AhadHa’am had written: 
‘we are accustomed to think of the Arabs as uncultured desert dwellers, a 
people similar to an ass, who see nothing and perceive nothing of what is 
going on around them. This is a grave error. The Arab, like all the Semites, is 
a clever and cunning man…….the Arabs, particularly the town dwellers, see 
and understand very well what we are doing and what we are aiming at, but 
they are quiet and pretend to know nothing, because they do not consider 
themselves threatened by our actions so far……..but if there should come a 
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day when the developing Jewish community begins to press upon the Arabs, 
they will not give up their positions easily.’69 
Prior to World War I the growth of Arab nationalism was developing in tandem with 
that of Turkish nationalism following the ‘Young Turk’ revolution of 1908, the same 
year that marked the development of organised land purchase and settlement 
activity by the Zionist movement.70 As a result, in July 1913 Arab leaders tried to 
organise a convention in Nablus which would have brought together  representatives 
of all the towns in Palestine, with a view to developing a co-ordinated opposition 
against  the Zionist movement and the sale of land to Jews. In the event, the attempt 
failed and the convention never took place, but from that time on the transfer of land 
to Jews became one of the main issues in the mobilisation of the Arab national 
movement against Zionism and Jewish settlement.71 Events such as these indicate 
that the political culture of opposition to Jewish land purchases was well developed 
before both the Balfour declaration and its subsequent manifestation in the Jewish 
National Home project of the Mandatory government. The growth and extent of that 
opposition in the 1920s and 1930s can consequently be explained by the fact that it 
had already generated a certain momentum prior to the arrival of the British.  
Specifically in the case of anti-immigrant sentiment in Nablus, it is possible that it 
was in part also aroused by local knowledge of some of the more contested cases of 
land sales for the purpose of Jewish settlement. One of these was the so-called 
Wadi Hawarith affair, involving land sales “in the area between the sea and the 
slopes of the Samarian hills.”72 As a public sale, this was advertised in the towns of 
Nablus and Tulkarm, and in May 1929 the Jewish National Fund purchased 30,718 
dunams. An argument subsequently developed over how much land the seller 
actually owned himself, and what proportion of it could rightfully be claimed by those 
Arab farmers who had cultivated and improved it.73 The lawyer representing the 
sellers in this dispute was Awni Abdul Hadi, a member of one of the leading families 
of land-owners in the Jabal Nablus area. In November 1929 the Nablus District Court 
issued a judgement in favour of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) granting it vacant 
possession of the land.74 The JNF subsequently brought suit against the Palestinian 
farmers who were still cultivating there, and the case was heard at the Nablus 
District Court on 30 November 1929: which found in favour of the JNF.75 An 
 
69 Quoted in Arieh Avneri, The Claim of Dispossession, Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs, 1878 – 1948 
(Hidekel Press, Tel Aviv, 1982), 110. Avneri was a member of the research staff of the Tabenkin Institute: 
http://www.communa.org.il/icsa/index.php/the-kibbutz-institutes/yad-tabenkin  He went on to quote Naguib 
Azouri in ‘Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans l’Asie Turque’, Paris, 1905, who stated (page 5) that the growth of 
Arab and Jewish nationalism was developing simultaneously, and that they were bound to clash in Palestine. 








evacuation  order subsequently issued in August 1930.76 These court cases, and the 
involvement of the Abdul Hadi family in them, together with the fact that they dealt 
with the sensitive issue of the expulsion of tenant farmers from land purchased by 
the JNF must have had a significant impact on anti-Zionist sentiment in the Jabal 
Nablus area. As far as the fellahin were concerned, such sentiment may have been 
aggravated by the quiet but continual process of fragmentation and consolidation of 
Arab holdings which was occurring: on the one hand, lands were divided among 
heirs, while on the other, parcels sold because they were too small to support a 
household were purchased by other landowners who consequently increased the 
size of their own holdings.77 
The process of fragmentation was especially apparent in the central ‘spine’ of 
Palestine running up the middle of the country where the hilly terrain militated 
against the development of large-scale agricultural development. In the course of 
posing a question on the amount of land available in Palestine for cultivation by 
Jewish settlers, Lord Raglan made the observation that “considerable areas of the 
higher land, notably the districts of Nablus and Hebron, are closed to Jewish 
settlers.”78 It would be more accurate to observe that they were disinterested in 
settlement because of the nature of the terrain. The Jabal Nablus is located fairly 
close to the centre of these hilly uplands, where some have argued that the majority 
of cultivators never really improved their standard of living during the Mandate years, 
given the unequal distribution of holdings, their continued dependence on cereals, 
and the small size of their plots.79 
Other sources of dissatisfaction appear to have risen from Nablus’s connections with 
Transjordan, where it purchased some of the ingredients used in soap production, 
notably in the area of al-Salt.80 There was strong opposition in Nablus to the Zionist 
practice of giving money to Arabs in Transjordan to purchase land there which was 
then leased to the donor on favourable terms:81 a variation on the contemporary 
business practice of ‘sale and leaseback’. The Nablus area was a centre of 
opposition to this practice, voiced in particular by Istiqlal party members there. 
According to British Government officials  AkramZouaiter82 was able to generate 
opposition to the lease option during Friday prayers in Nablus in January and 
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February 1933 within three weeks of their being signed.83 The sensitivity around land 
sales arose not only from hostility to Jewish immigrants who were unlikely to employ 
Arab labour once they had taken possession, but also because land ownership was 
symbolic of  the privileges enjoyed by the Arab elite. Feeling themselves threatened 
by the arrival of the British, together with the growth of Jewish settlements, they were 
tempted to acquire capital via land sales as a way of compensating for their declining 
socio-economic status.84 
The negative impact of land sales on those who worked it without the protection of 
title to ownership was not of course unique to Palestine. On a broader perspective, 
global population was rising throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, and Christopher Bayly has argued that pressures caused by population 
growth had an effect on depressing farmers’ living standards. Paradoxically, the 
growth in their numbers had the effect of reducing their capacity to negotiate better 
working conditions given that there were always others available to replace them.85 
Amos Nadan has argued that specifically in Palestine the amount of available land 
was declining on a per capita basis as the population rose: and that this was not off-
set by comparable increases in either productivity or the numbers of livestock used. 
The reforms initiated by the Mandatory Government in terms of providing credit and 
services to improve agricultural yields were insufficient to effectively address these 
problems, which were not to be reduced until the war-time demands of the 1940s 
resulted in a rise in the prices of agricultural produce.86 
Some of these problems might have been at least partially mitigated if there had 
been a more effective process of knowledge transfer between the well-capitalised 
and intensive farms established by the Jewish immigrants, and the more traditional 
agricultural methods of the Palestinian Arabs. This however was noticeable by its 
absence. By contrast, the German Templar religious community which settled in the 
area of today’s Tel Aviv, “was admired by the population at large and many of their 
agricultural and industrial innovations were adopted by others. For decades the 
Templers were a major force in the development of the Holy Land.”87 Unlike the 
Zionists they did not get involved in politics, and believed strongly in the separation 
of church and state. They were ready to employ Arab labour, albeit in the more junior 
and unskilled positions, many of whom “formed life-long relationships with the 
Templars, and were loyal and trustworthy.”88 Unfortunately this was not what 
characterised the relationship between most Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish 
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immigrants, and the problems created by the determination of the latter to be self-
sufficient, and not to integrate with the local economy was one of the main issues 
confronting the Mandatory Government. When considering the impact of Jewish 
immigration in Palestine the Royal Commission established to investigate the causes 
of the 1936 revolt noted that: 
“the new immigrants brought with them a new idea. They were not going to 
merge themselves in the life of Palestine as they found it. They were going to 
make a distinct life of their own, to build up a Jewish society, and to make it 
the vehicle of a revival of Jewish culture. This new idea was known as 
Zionism.”89 
The work of that Commission built on earlier enquiries completed in 1930 following 
the 1929 riots: of which the Hope-Simpson report was orientated towards the 
facilitation of Jewish land settlement, and the French report concerned with 
mitigating the effects of dispossession, a great fear of the Mandatory authorities at 
the time. The Commission itself was of the view that in relation to the hill districts – 
such as Nablus-  there was insufficient land, given current agricultural practices, to 
meet the needs of all the people living there. Officials at the time nevertheless 
worried that the fellahin would be tempted to sell what little land they had so as to 
alleviate their burden of debt.90 Specifically in the hill districts however it should be 
added that due to the typically small size of the plots, such sales were more likely to 
have been made to Arab effendi than to Jewish immigrants. That said, it is revealing 
that claims for compensation from displaced Arabs which were accepted by the 
authorities as genuine came from Beisan, Haifa, Jaffa, Nazareth and Tulkarm, but 
none from Nablus.91 This absence both of claims for dispossession and of Jewish 
immigration in the Jabal Nablus area leads one to conclude that other causes must 
be identified for the problems of the people living and working there. 
Rural and Urban Population Growth.  
This section considers the evidence from censuses of Palestine that Nablus had a 
lower rate of population growth both in relation to the territory as a whole and in 
particular with respect to the rapidly developing coastal towns. There is furthermore 
evidence of migration from the Jabal Nablus to areas offering better employment 
opportunities, and I conclude that the primary cause of that migration was the 
depressed state of the agricultural sector. It is helpful to start the analysis with a 
comparison of population estimates in the years immediately preceding and following 
World War I. 
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The Ottoman estimates for the Kaza (district) of Nablus gave its population as 
76,794 in the years immediately prior to World War I.92 This declined by over 6% 
during the course of the war, when “the Ottoman Sanjak of Nablus seems to have 
suffered greater loss of population than other areas of Palestine, but all regions were 
affected.”93The Ottoman Kaza roughly approximates to the Nablus district of the 
mandate administration, so the pre- and post-war population figures can be used for 
comparative purposes. By the time of the British census of 1922, the population of 
the Nablus sub-district was 56,69594 growing to 68,706 by the 1931 census.95 
This relatively low growth rate in the Nablus area differed markedly from that of the 
leading towns in Palestine, where Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv experienced 
rapid expansion. In Gaza, Hebron, and Nablus by contrast the growth was very 
much smaller.96As the mandate progressed, the rapid growth and development of 
the ‘big four’ Palestinian towns of Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv would have 
created the impression for the citizens of Nablus that their part of the country was 
stagnating and falling behind.97That relative decline would have contributed to a 
feeling of inferiority98 which might go some way to explaining why the town was such 
a centre of opposition to the mandate and Jewish immigration, despite the fact that it 
was located in a region which experienced very little in the way of such immigration 
per se. At the level of the town itself, the lack of significant population growth –which 
would normally have been expected in the years following a war, especially of 
males- was even more apparent, with 15,947 recorded in 1922, rising to 17,189 in 
1931.99 That lack of growth, combined with the fact that there were somewhat less 
men than women recorded in these figures could be indicative of internal migration 
from this part of the country to other areas where high rates of population growth and 
the concomitant demand for goods and services were likely to have created 
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employment opportunities.100 We do know for example that some men moved from 
Nablus to work in Haifa.101 The background to this occurrence apparently originated 
in complaints to the British authorities from Jewish immigrants about the use of 
cheap Arab labour from the Hauran in Haifa docks. The Mandatory authorities then 
realised that by replacing the Hauranis with local Palestinian labour they could 
contribute towards reducing the levels of unemployment in Palestinian villages. The 
district administration in Nablus was consequently asked to send 200 workers from 
that area to Haifa in May 1937. In the event 1,200 volunteers came forward, but only 
200 were employed.102The Palestine Post described the general problem of 
unemployment in Nablus quite starkly,103 noting that young workmen had left seeking 
employment in Jaffa and Haifa, returning home at the time of the general strike in 
1936. By the end of that year, their savings had run out, and “they found themselves 
a burden on their town, where they could not find work.”104 
Notwithstanding such examples of migration to growing urban areas in search of 
work, Palestine nevertheless remained overwhelmingly rural in nature. In the Jabal 
Nablus region itself, the proportion was 72% rural in 1922, rising somewhat to 75% 
(the opposite to what might have been expected) in 1931.105 The comparable figures 
for the country as a whole were 65% and 63%.106  That little had changed in the ratio 
of rural to urban population as a whole is indicative that growth was concentrated in 
the small number of towns which were the primary hosts of Jewish immigration, 
offset by those other towns where the population growth was only marginal (e.g. 
Nablus) or declining (e.g. Gaza). The impact of those experiencing rapid growth (e.g. 
Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv) must have been greater on mandate Palestine than 
in Western Europe where the combined processes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation  resulted in a more general movement of people from rural to urban 
areas across national territories.  
Rural  - urban migration, whether part of a general phenomenon, or more specific to 
particular areas, was not of course unique to Palestine. In Algeria at the turn of the 
twentieth century many of the inhabitants of the forested and rural areas migrated to 
coastal towns such as Bone (Annaba) in search of work. The difference there 
however was that the dearth of employment opportunities in those areas was caused 
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primarily by encroachment upon them by the French colonial authorities,107 and not 
so much by the meteorological and environmental problems or depressed 
commodity prices which were the primary drivers in mandate Palestine. 
The geography and terrain of the Jabal Nablus area appear to have been one 
reason why the agricultural sector there would have difficulty in absorbing even small 
population increases. The town itself occupies a narrow valley open to the east and 
west, but closed on the other sides by steep mountains. Most of the slopes 
surrounding the town are barely cultivable. Their slopes and most of the higher 
uplands are very rocky with thin soils.108 It should be noted however that by contrast 
the valley to the East of Nablus is very fertile, with many springs.109 It is also likely 
that the 1927 earthquake, “that devastated mainly Nablus and other major Arab 
settlements in its vicinity”110 provided further impetus to seek opportunities 
elsewhere, notwithstanding the short-term demand that would have produced for 
building reconstruction. David Grossman was of the view that the aggregate impact 
of the various set-backs which impacted the rural sector in general and the Jabal 
Nablus area in particular in the late 1920s and early 1930s was to encourage the 
fellahin “to leave the village and join the workforce of unskilled labourers in the urban 
areas.”111 From what we can deduce from the available population statistics, this is a 
plausible hypothesis: and the more so when we take into consideration his 
observation that “the population (of Palestine) rose from 1922–1946 by 114% while 
the farm-land........increased by only 40%.”112 
The most detailed source document available on population issues is the 1931 
census,113 taken on 18th November of that year. The returns for Nablus show 16,483 
Moslems, 533 Christians, 160 Samaritans, and 6 Jews.114 For the Jabal Nablus area 
as a whole, which included the town, its suburbs, and 98 surrounding villages, the 
corresponding figures were 67,314 Moslems, 1,214 Christians, and 10 Jews.115 
Taken together, this gives an urban population of 17,189 together with a rural one of 
51,301.116 This approximates to a little under 7% of the total population of Palestine 
at that time of 1,035,821.117 
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As it recovered after the ravages of WWI, the population of Palestine grew steadily 
between the 1922 and 1931 censuses, but the growth was uneven between towns 
and districts. That for Nablus, at 22%, is the second smallest across the country as a 
whole, ahead only of Bethlehem at 18%. At the other end of the scale was Jaffa at 
117%.118 Nablus was clearly a town that, relatively speaking, was slipping behind. A 
little over a quarter of its population was literate, and of those who were, most were 
men.119 Of those who were earning, 90% were men.120 These figures give credence 
to the town’s reputation as conservative and patriarchal.121 Clearly the authors of the 
census’s report, whose structure appears to have been based on earlier work carried 
out in India,122 considered Nablus to be a bit of an oddity: 
 “only four towns have any likeness to urban centres as these are understood 
in Europe. These towns are Jerusalem, Jaffa, Tel Aviv and Haifa. Of the 
remainder, Nablus has a special claim to consideration on account of its 
parochial character in history, some of the social consequences of which are 
worth investigation.”123 
Of interest in relation to the issue of internal migration towards these ‘big four’ towns 
(as opposed to Jewish immigration from abroad) is the conclusion reached by the 
censors that “the age distributions in the four towns and in Nablus in relation to the 
general age distribution for the whole country are significant......they may generally 
be taken to indicate an immigration into the four towns of males between the ages of 
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15 and 40 years, and an emigration from Nablus.”124On the supposition that the 
main cause of migration in peace time is a quest for new employment 
opportunities,125 they conclude that “the emigration from Nablus implies a 
comparative degeneration in the economic life of that town.”126That the source 
problem can be attributed to the woes befalling the agricultural sector is illustrated by 
the fact that the dominant economic activity in the country was agricultural 
production, providing employment  for more than half the population. This compared 
with 8.5% for England and Wales in 1921.127 In mandate Palestine, those lacking 
employment opportunities in rural areas had few options other than to seek work in 
those towns which were growing.128 
This discussion of demographic issues in relation to the Jabal Nablus area supports 
the hypothesis that the early years of the British Mandate saw the gradual 
development of separate Jewish and Arab economies in Palestine.129 It is however 
necessary to go further, as at the same time there was clearly developing another 
division, that between the rural and urban economies, or more specifically the urban 
economies of the most rapidly growing large towns in Palestine: Haifa, Jaffa, 
Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. These of course were the towns with the largest 
concentrations of Jewish immigrants, so it is unsurprising that Palestinian hostility to 
them derived in part from the perspective of those who felt excluded from the more 
rapid development experienced in the capital and the coastal plain. The Mandatory 
authorities were not unaware of the tensions caused by this unequal rate of 
development across the territory, so it is worth considering their response. 
The Rural Sector and Government Agricultural and Land Policy in Palestine 
The purpose of this section is to briefly sketch the conditions in the rural sector 
during the 1920s and early 1930s so as to give a better feel for the problems that 
needed to be resolved. It notes the existence of otherwise unrelated phenomena 
which combined to produce a crisis for the rural community. These included erratic 
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annual rainfall: the destruction of crops by locusts and mice: and a fall in market 
prices caused by the development of the Great Depression which contributed to 
increased import penetration of such commodities as wheat and barley. 
The conditions in the rural sector are well documented in the annual reports of the 
Government of Palestine’s Department of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries.130 That 
for 1925 notes “the growing dependence of an agricultural territory on imported food 
supplies and, particularly, on foreign wheat, wheat-flour, barley and slaughter 
stock.”131 In cash terms this meant that in 1924 “the value of imported wheat, barley 
and flour reached the figure of £E 300,000, while during the year 1925 no less than 
£E 550,000 has been spent on purchases abroad of the three commodities in 
question.”132 
At least part of the territory’s incapacity for self-sufficiency in food can be attributed 
to adverse meteorological and environmental conditions. The 1925 report observes 
that “bee-keeping has suffered a temporary set-back as a result of drought and a 
very poor flow of nectar. The abnormal frosts recorded early in the year also had a 
marked effect on honey plants.”133 By contrast, “the plague of field mice was 
somewhat abated by the cold winter of 1924-5 and the rodents were less in evidence 
than usual.”134 But most noticeable in the period covered by this report was the 
variability in rainfall levels, which together with temperatures would have been the 
most significant factors determining levels of agricultural produce in those parts of 
the country lacking in irrigation systems. The Jabal Nablus falls into this category, 
and records from the Nablus  weather-station indicate that annual rainfall was far 
from constant. With an average of 526 mls, the actual precipitation was as follows:135 
 1922 / 23 =    622 
 1923 / 24 =    585 
 1924 / 25 =    371 
 1925 / 26 =    544136 
 1926 / 27 =    875137 
 1927 / 28 =    454 
 1928 / 29 = 1,024 
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 1929 / 30 =    701 
From the 1926 report we learn that “abnormally high temperatures and dessicating 
winds ......during the critical stages of development in Spring limited the ultimate 
returns.”138  The report goes on to compare the differences between the immigrant 
Jewish farmer using capital intensive methods to grow high value added crops –such 
as citrus fruit- and the Palestinian Arab fellah using a minimum of equipment and 
capital expenditure to produce basic commodity crops. “It is consequently held that 
the near future will see distinct systems of farming having reference to the peculiar 
economic and social conditions of the two communities.”139 
A composite report was produced for the years 1927 – 1930, of which the opening 
paragraph mentioned “a catastrophic collapse of values”, presumably reflecting the 
impact of the Great Depression. It also includes a section140 on the field-mouse 
campaign of 1930 – 1931 where “the damage to crops by field mice in 1930, 
especially in Northern Palestine was of such magnitude as to necessitate a co-
ordinated, large-scale campaign by the Dept. of Agriculture against the pest.” Field-
mice however were not the only problem, as anti-locust campaigns were organised 
in 1928, 1929, and 1930.141 
Finally the 1931 – 1932 report noted that “agricultural production.......has been 
severely handicapped by the poor rainfall of the last two seasons.”142 Mention is also 
made of the effects of imports of Cyprus potatoes swamping the market at 
“unremunerative prices” at the same time of the year that the home-grown crops in 
Palestine are being lifted.143 The supply of olive oil, of critical importance for Nablus 
soap producers, must have been constrained by the below average rainfall that year, 
contributing to very low yields in the olive crop, which fell to around 20% of what 
would normally be expected.  Further problems were  caused by the partial failure of 
village water supplies in the hills and foot-hills.144 Adding to the sense of pessimism 
informing this report, was “an unrelieved drought in November and December which 
extinguished the hopes engendered by the early rains. Large areas of winter crops 
died or failed to germinate.”145 
Taking these reports and the tables in their associated appendixes as a group, it is 
reasonable to conclude that commodity prices and meteorological factors had a far 
greater economic impact on the agricultural communities of the central highlands 
than Jewish immigration, which was mainly concentrated along the coastal strip. The 
vagaries of the climate, combined with such problems as locust and mice 
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infestations, ensured that there was never a sufficiently long period of good annual 
crops to enable the fellahin to clear their debts. Their situation was further 
exacerbated by cheap imports of food staples from abroad at a time of declining 
world prices.  This combination of factors indicates the importance of taking 
environmental factors into account when attempting to analyse the range of forces 
impacting on Mandate Palestine. As John McNeill has observed, extreme and 
unfavourable weather conditions, especially on agrarian societies, can bring “severe 
consequences for harvests, prices, and mortality.”146 To the impact of the arrival of 
the British and their Jewish National Home policy must be added the environmental 
destruction caused by the ravages of World War I and the destructive impact of a 
capricious climate on the agricultural production on which Jabal Nablus ultimately 
depended. That impact, I would argue, was in fact exacerbated by the Mandatory 
Government’s relative neglect of the area in relation to the naturally more fertile 
coastal strip at a time when governments generally lacked the resources to 
significantly mitigate the potentially destructive impact of the natural environment. 
To make matters worse for the Nabulsis, two agricultural economies were 
developing as the more self-contained Jewish settlements in the plains produced 
higher added-value products for the urban and export markets. The importance of 
imports of such basic staples as barley, flour, and wheat across the period 1923 – 
1932 indicates that the native farmers were not reaping the benefits of rising demand 
due to urban growth in Palestine.147 The estimates for 1927 – 1932 of crop 
production in barley, olives, and wheat furthermore indicate stagnant or declining 
local production.148 The combination of these factors must have had a significantly 
onerous impact on the Jabal Nablus area, whose population –possibly 
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Imports:  1923   1924   1925    1926    1927   1928   1929    1930    1931    1932 
Wheat:    4,056  5,974  11,209 6,094    805    4,698  17,731 2,207  13,650 27,115   
Barley:  10,050  2,204    6,681  5,633      -             14    1,677      17    11,041  13,903 
Flour:  9,977  12,886  16,934 20,136 18,086 20,296 31,097 15,936 15,051  22,053 
For flour and wheat in this period, imports substantially exceeded exports. For barley, imports exceeded 
exports, but only by a relatively small margin. 
 
148Government of Palestine Agriculture Report 1931 – 1932, British Library. Appendix 1: Estimated Production 
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 1927       1928        1929         1930         1931        1932 
Wheat                 99,406   65,288     87,873      87,339     79,650     51,073 
Barley                  44,524   46,697     46,240      60,071     41,200     24,300 
Olives                  20,551      2,635     15,500        2,993     33,906       6,559 
52 
 
unsurprisingly- was not growing as fast as other parts of Palestine. How the 
mandatory authorities responded to this set of issues it is now appropriate to 
address. 
The Approach of the Mandatory Government towards the Jabal Nablus and the 
Nabulsi response 
This section considers British priorities in relation to the rural sector, and the way 
these reflected fears concerning the development of a landless labouring population 
which might drift into the towns in search of work and become politically radicalised 
in the process. As a result, the emphasis appeared to have been more on improving 
the conditions of land tenure and minimising the possibility of evictions, rather than 
increasing agricultural yields per se. Politically active Nabulsis by contrast voiced 
their concerns about the challenges facing farmers in the central hill districts, where 
uneven land surfaces inhibited the adoption of mechanised farming practices and the 
indebted state of the fellahin meant that they were unable to invest in more intensive 
cultivation methods.   
There is little doubt from the Palestine Royal Commission Report of July 1937, which 
drew on earlier reports produced in the wake of the 1929 riots, that the Mandatory 
authorities were well aware of the importance of agricultural land in Palestine.149 
There were nevertheless two  important constraints on what they could do, either to 
alleviate the indebtedness of the fellahin, or to help increase or diversify agricultural 
production. The first were the general budgetary constraints imposed by the 
Treasury.150 Within that context, the priorities for expenditure –apart from maintaining 
law and order – were for infrastructure development in the territory, with railways 
taking the lion’s share.151 The second was that the responsibilities of the mandatory 
included the establishment of a Jewish national home, of which land purchase by 
Jewish immigrants was one of the key objectives. The rural economy was 
consequently viewed from the perspective of mitigating the effects of land 
dispossession which would be the logical consequence of land being purchased by 
immigrants who would then live on it and cultivate it for themselves.152 
In 1936 the mandatory authorities set out in a Memorandum on Agricultural 
Development and Settlement “the steps taken by the Palestine Government since 
1930 to assist agricultural development and settlement”.153 These included, 
variously, loans for the development of agriculture and hill villages, reductions in 
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rural property taxes, and funds for the development of water supplies. Horticultural 
stations for the dissemination of best practice had been established in nine areas, of 
which one in Nablus, which had also benefitted from a poultry station set up for the 
same purpose, and which provided breeding hens. The memorandum furthermore 
noted a trade agreement with Egypt, which had agreed to reduce the import duty on 
Nablus soap from £E 6,500 per ton to £E 5,000 per ton, as well as reducing the 
freight rate on the Egyptian state railways for the conveyance of olive oil (i.e. 
Nabulsi) soap. 
Clearly efforts were made, albeit within the constraints of the limited resources 
available, to address some of the main problems besetting the agricultural sector. 
Nevertheless, the British limited their objectives in rural areas to the minimum they 
associated with responsible government. Priority was given to the maintenance of 
public order and the efficient collection of taxes. The expansion of services and 
development of the agricultural economy remained secondary to these main 
objectives.154 It is unlikely that the efforts of the mandatory authority would have 
been effective in mitigating the shock of the Great Depression, “which had a severe 
impact on agriculture between 1927 and 1933.”155 The concerns relating to agrarian 
problems reflected fears that unemployed fellahin moving off the land in search of 
work might become a source of instability. Mandatory officials were aware of the 
difficulties of developing an industrial base which could have provided alternative 
employment opportunities, and so attempted instead to keep them in the rural areas 
by ensuring a basic minimum of subsistence.156 
One effect of Jewish immigration into Palestine was to drive up the price of 
agricultural land as demand for it increased to create new settlements. This resulted 
in some of the smaller Arab landholders selling up to larger-scale effendi land-
owners who were intent on increasing their holdings: “in one sub-district in the hilly 
tracts it is reported that in a decade no less than 30% of the land has passed from 
Arab peasants to Arab capitalists.”157 The response of the Government was to 
consider the laws governing agricultural tenancies and to issue new ordinances 
designed to ensure that land-owners would leave their tenant farmers with sufficient 
land to support themselves and their families when selling part of their estates. The 
September 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance fell into this category, but was 
considered, together with further legislation passed in 1921, to be ineffective in 
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preventing dispossession through land sales.158One reason was that landlords could 
simply pay their tenant farmers to leave prior to a sale. 
The mandatory authorities were also constrained by the customs and laws which 
had developed over the generations of Ottoman rule: “colonial policies risked 
confrontation or irrelevance if they strayed unwarrantedly from processes rooted 
administratively in the Ottoman past or held in continuous social conditions”.159 As 
noted above, they were also constrained by fears of the development of a landless- 
and rootless- class of labourers: with increasing anxiety over this issue, reinforced by 
the impact of the 1929 riots, making the idea of individual rights in land less and less 
attractive, as fears increased that those with such rights might sell off their small-
holdings, become landless as a result, and subsequently engage in political 
agitation.160 
Overall it appears that little was achieved either in terms of mitigating the problems 
caused by extreme weather conditions and such natural disasters as locust attacks 
on the one hand, or the chronic indebtedness of the fellahin on the other. There is of 
course a legitimate argument that neither the issues relating to the natural 
environment, nor those related to indebtedness, inherited as they were from the 
Ottomans, could be laid at the door of Herbert Samuel and his successors following 
the establishment of the mandatory authority in July 1920. The Palestinians in 
general however, and the Nabulsis in particular, were dissatisfied with the British to 
the point of open hostility, so it is appropriate to examine why they took such an 
uncompromising stance. 
In October 1925 the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Congress 
submitted a report to the British High Commissioner.161 Members of that committee 
included Awni Abdul-Hadi, Izzat Darwaza, and Adel Zouaiter, all members of 
politically active families in Nablus.162This thirty page document opens with 
comparisons between the Ottoman and British administrations, and complaints that 
Palestine was being prepared for the creation of a Jewish national home, rather than 
independence for the majority of people already living there.163 It then gives an 
overview of what it describes as ‘the Economic Deadlock:’164 
“thanks to the undulated broken nature of the country the use of agricultural 
machinery is restricted to the two long plains extending along its Western and 
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Eastern flanks. The main body which covers Hebron, Jerusalem, Nablus and 
a great part of the Northern District has to be torn open by the fingers of a set 
of hardy but poor men. The blessed olive trees that covered vast areas along 
these broken hills and which were the sources of wealth for a great number of 
their inhabitants, have sustained fearful havoc during the war with the natural 
consequence that the inhabitants thereof were greatly impoverished”. 
In the committee’s view, the overriding priority of the new administration should be: 
“to increase the productive output of the country. To attain this object, the sole 
real producer in Palestine should be materially assisted and encouraged and 
financially relieved. The camp of the Palestine farmer has been depleted 
during the war, his financial capabilities have been sapped of all vitality by the 
endless military acquisitions. He was repeatedly shifted from his home by the 
two combatants as the battlefield overlapped his village. His animal stock was 
brought to a very low ebb. Thus British occupation in 1917 found the country 
hungry and naked.”165 
 
It is interesting –and largely accurate at that time- to see the farmer being described 
as ‘the sole real producer’ in Palestine. From the description given of the ravages of 
war it becomes implicit that the members of the Executive Committee blamed the 
British for their war against the Ottomans, and Allenby’s military campaign leading to 
the battle of Megiddo for having ravaged Palestinian territory. They nevertheless go 
on to acknowledge the efforts of the military administration in making amends, noting 
that  
“about £300,000 were distributed in the shape of cash, cattle and seed as 
loans payable in instalments with 6% interest against mortgage of immovable 
property. All debts due against him by the ex-Government and all tax arrears 
were cancelled. The villages that were vacated because of military exigencies 
were exempted that year from the land tax. Thus the smile of prosperity 
began to show itself on the face of the farmer.”166 
Such improvements however were nevertheless not destined to continue through the 
civilian administration established in 1920: as  according to the committee, following 
the Jaffa Disturbances of 1921, the Zionist Organisation effectively prevented further 
provision of loans and assistance to Arab farmers.167 This assertion is revealing, not 
necessarily for its accuracy, but in confirming the belief amongst the relatively small 
group of the politically active in Palestine that the decision by the British to permit the 
creation of a Jewish national home had pre-empted their capacity to make good on 
the ravages of war. 
The paper goes on with various complaints about the previous High Commissioner, 
Sir Herbert Samuel, for prohibiting the exportation of local products in 
 





1920,168liquidating the Ottoman Agricultural Bank and demanding settlement of 
accounts in 1921,169 and enforcing an old Ottoman law in 1922 which stripped title to 
lands left uncultivated for three consecutive years.170 The remainder of the paper 
covers a series of demands focussed on a reduction of the taxes levied on the 
agricultural sector, combined with an increase in the resources available to the 
Department of Agriculture.171 
The authors were clearly aware of the situation in neighbouring countries, as they 
quoted tax rates in Egypt and Syria, which they claimed to be lower than those in 
Palestine.172 They go on to compare the farmers, obliged to offer up a percentage of 
their annual crops for tax purposes, with “the merchants who are mostly Jews, who 
give no more than custom duties which they instantly extort from the consumers who 
are mostly Arabs. In other words the poor producer is over-taxed while the fat 
intermediary is under-taxed.”173 One detects here the image of the poor, innocent, 
worker of the land contrasted with the rich –and by implication corrupt and urban174-
merchant. This is of course hardly unique to Palestine. Other complaints include 
absentee landlords living in (greater) Syria who sell their lands to Jewish 
immigrants175 - where it is interesting to note that the committee members shared the 
concerns of the British authorities: “when Jews purchase these lands the Arab 
tenants have to vacate them and as they can rarely do anything to gain a living 
besides farming, they roam about, a permanent menace to Public Security.”176This 
fear of social disorder is repeated in complaints about the spread of Bolshevism in 
the Jewish community, and the way support for it was spilling over to Arab workers in 
the port of Haifa.177It is revealing of the fears178 clearly held by those at the top of the 
socio-economic hierarchy of Palestine at that time: and possibly goes some way to 
explaining why the demand which concluded the report was for “the establishment in 
Palestine of a National Constitutional Government in which the two communities, 
Arab and Jewish, will be represented in proportion to their numbers as they existed 
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The case submitted in the 1925 report of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian 
Arab Congress articulated arguments which were oft repeated during the mandate. 
As Kenneth Stein has observed, for example, the politically sensitive issue of land 
sales contained an element of special pleading, given that such figures as Awni 
Abdul Hadi, whilst decrying them in public, were engaging in them in private: 
“land ownership was the last surviving political prerogative for many of the 
Arab elite, whose privileges were slowly circumscribed by the British presence 
and Jewish settlement. Acquisition of capital via land sales became a vehicle 
for temporarily retaining one’s declining social and economic prominence.”180 
That statement, and the Executive Committee report, indicate the presence of deep-
seated fears concerning the arrival of the British and the plans for a Jewish national 
home. Even if they did bring progress, it would not necessarily be for the benefit of 
the established elites in Palestine, and definitely not for areas such as the Jabal 
Nablus, relatively isolated in the central hills, and not a beneficiary of the rapid 
economic and population growth of the coastal strip. That that growth was brought 
by an undemocratic regime no doubt intensified the feelings of marginalisation. As C 
R Ashbee, a member of the British Town Planning Institute, and civic advisor to the 
City of Jerusalem –and staunch opponent of Zionism-put it: “you cannot govern well 
or wisely except by consent – and you cannot, unless you do it by force, govern 
against the will of 85% of the population.”181 During the 1920s and 1930s there was 
angry opposition to the dominance of the newly arrived colonial power, whose 
priority, as set out in the mandate, was the creation of a Jewish national home.182 
This opposition was further fuelled by a perception that Jewish immigrants were 
granted preferential treatment: for example the mandatory authorities granted Jewish 
viticulturalists exemption from export duties, and protected them with tariffs on 
imported wines. By contrast it gave “no such effective assistance to the Arab farmer 
whose wheat and olive oil are beaten in local markets by foreign imported wheat, 
because they are not similarly protected.”183 The impact of the Great Depression 
served to exacerbate this problem, as falling prices in global markets meant that 
surplus production elsewhere in the Middle East could be effectively dumped in 
Palestine at prices which undercut the local farming community. Jabal Nablus was 
particularly vulnerable in this respect, and the scale of the problems in its agricultural 
sector contributed to a growing perception of ‘them’ and ‘us’: the privileged and the 
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disadvantaged. The solution, especially amongst those politically active in Nablus, 
was “a well-guided, well-informed nationalist movement among the Arabs.”184The 
cumulative effects of the ravages of World War I, the impact of the arrival of the 
British, and the economic problems of the Great Depression combined to create a 
growing sense of nostalgia for what were perceived to have been better times under 
the Ottomans: nostalgia which in Jabal Nablus found expression as political 
opposition. As Vinita Damodaran has observed, “it can be argued that resistance 
may have been framed by memory of better times in a less despoiled setting.”185 No 
doubt the policies and practices of the Mandatory authorities during the two decades 
after World War I will have done much to shape the perceptions of the indigenous 
population. It would have been clear to them that their town was not a priority for 
theMandatory authority in the way that either the Dead Sea to the south-east or 
Haifa to the west clearly were.186When considering those priorities, it is worth 
bearing in mind that in one sense the British never chose to come to Palestine in 
quite the same way that their other imperial possessions came into being as a result 
of strategic and / or commercial interests. There were of course both in this particular 
territory, but it came under British control suddenly in 1918 as a result of military 
victory against the Turks. It was not a country like e.g. Tasmania whose climate was 
“comparable to that of the French Riviera”187 and consequently an attractive location 
for UK nationals. The reasons for being there were essentially utilitarian, such as the 
exploitation of Dead Sea mineral deposits, or the transfer of Mesopotamian oil 
through the expanding port of Haifa. By contrast, the diverse range of problems 
suffered by Jabal Nablus which have been the subject of this chapter meant that 
there was nothing naturally attractive in that part of Palestine from a British 
perspective. No doubt this was a contributory factor in its relative neglect. But that is 
not to say that it was ignored completely. What they did there, and what that reveals 
about Mandatory policies and attitudes is the subject to which we turn in more detail 
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Arial  Photograph of Nablus taken in September 1918, showing the town and surrounding 
















BRITISH ENGAGEMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN NABLUS FOLLOWING THE 
END OF WORLD WAR I 
 
Introduction 
Chapter I gave the macro-economic background to developments in Nablus during 
the 1920s and 1930s. It illustrated how the arrival of the British at the end of World 
War I and the development of the coastal strip in Palestine left the town and its 
surrounding hinterland relatively disadvantaged and isolated. This chapter will now 
look more specifically at how the British regime in Nablus functioned in the 
immediate aftermath of the war and during the early stages of the mandate. It will set 
out the preconceptions of Nablus that British colonial officials carried with them into 
their government of the town and how they went about imposing British authority at 
the local level. By providing a survey of the early stages of British rule in Nablus, the 
chapter establishes the essential foundation for the more detailed case studies 
examined in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
Examining the early years of British rule in Nablus reveals a picture of British 
imperialism in Palestine that contrasts with much of the existing historiography. 
Nablus was not one of the rapidly expanding ‘big four’ towns of Haifa, Jaffa, 
Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Nor did it experience any Jewish immigration into either its 
urban area or its immediate hinterland. As a result, British policy towards the Jabal 
Nablus was markedly different from the regime portrayed in most historical accounts 
of the mandate. Instead of a government fixated on implementing the Jewish 
national home policy or protecting its key imperial assets, we find a ‘de minimis’ type 
of engagement in which the British government seeks only to fulfil  the minimum 
obligations of mandatory government.1 To make a comparison with French colonial 
development policy as articulated by Marechal Lyautey,2Nablus fell into the category 
of ‘territoire inutile’3 - part of a colonised territory of no particular economic or political 
importance.4Lyautey’s ideas, the way he characterised different territorial areas, and 
the use I have made of his concepts in relation to the Jabal Nablus are set out on 
pages 7and 8 of the introductory chapter to this thesis. As such the Jabal Nablus 
contrasted with the rapidly growing coastal towns that witnessed a far more proactive 
style of colonial government.5 
 
1 For a discussion of those obligations see Susan Pederson, The Guardians, 130 - 134 
2 As set out in William Hoisington, Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco (Macmillan Press, London, 
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Two aspects of British engagement with Nablus are examined in this chapter. Firstly 
the  surveillance of the town’s political activities as a means of controlling what was 
viewed as a potentially troublesome and rebellious population. Secondly,the more 
mundane workings of local governance, particularly in the fields of law and order, 
education and public health. The nature of that local regime betrays the extent to 
which Jabal Nablus was viewed as a non-priority area where the primary policy 
objective was the avoidance of any form of civil or political disturbance on the one 
hand, while on the other keeping public expenditure as low as possible, consistent 
with the responsibilities of a Mandatory power.6 The expenditure which was 
authorised, such as for the establishment of a sports facility in Nablus, was partially 
justified on the grounds that its expected contribution towards public health ought to 
result in a lowering of demand for medical facilities. Analysis of colonial government 
at the local level during this period contributes to a better understanding of how 
empires functioned in the ‘shatter zones’ described in the Introduction which 
characterised  territories experiencing regime change at the close of World War I. In 
the Middle East, both the British and the French empires established  their territorial 
priorities as the war drew to a close. For the former in Palestine, those priorities  
were concentrated along the coastal strip and in particular the port of Haifa. Nablus 
by contrast was left isolated and relatively neglected in the uplands of the interior. 
The picture which emerges from this location in the central ‘spine’ of the Palestine 
hills is of an administration whose primary concern was to keep the peace and 
discourage the development of any political activities which could either generate or 
increase opposition to the British presence. In terms of resource allocation, already 
constrained by the economic conditions which developed after World WarI, the town 
was governed with the minimum possible allocation of imperial resources, with 
education and health in particular largely left to those charitable and missionary 
bodies which had already established themselves there. Security and surveillance, 
by contrast, received more attention, with the British working through local elites in 
those cases where they could be co-opted, and monitoring and constraining their 
activities in those cases where they could not.7Nablus to some extent was seen as 
being on the periphery of British interests in Palestine, focussed as they were on 
their Jerusalem headquarters, the development of the coastal strip, and the 
expansion of the port of Haifa. The relationship between the imperial power and the 
local population was consequently marked by a degree of suspicion towards a part 
of the territory considered as a potential centre of revolt and hostility.8 
 
6 These responsibilities included ‘well-being and development.’  For a discussion of these concepts see   
Pedersen, The Guardians,130-134 
7 For a discussion of this process of co-option, monitoring and constraint, for which the archival sources are the 
monthly political reports held at the National Archives,  see the section on pages 66 –77 below concerning 
‘Political Surveillance.’ 
8 See page 5 of the introductory chapter of this thesis to set the broader context of this relationship in terms of 
imperial power exercised in ‘shatter zones.’ 
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The primary source material used for this chapter mainly derives from British 
Government files (both civilian and military) held at the National Archives, and also 
from similar material which eventually came to be held at the Israel State Archives 
(ISA).These archives have been extensively mined for documents relating to the 
administration of Nablus. The patterns and themes which emerge from them have 
then been used to build up a comprehensive picture of how Nablus was governed at 
the local level during the 1920s and 1930s.From specific examples to be found in the 
ISA it is clear that efforts were made by the colonial power to accommodate local 
sensitivities, and to provide fair compensation when land was co-opted for use by 
government authorities at the Balata landing ground for the Royal Air Force.9Very 
thorough investigations were undertaken to ascertain the extent of the losses 
experienced by those who had been denied access to the land, suggesting a desire 
to avoid creating grievances amongst the local population which might subsequently 
develop into more widespread opposition to British rule.  The tensions which became 
apparent shortly after their arrival made it clear that there was substantive opposition 
to the JNH policy, and so it was logical for the Mandatory administration to seek to 
avoid other points of contention.  I will nevertheless argue at the end of this chapter 
that despite their efforts to ‘keep the peace’ at the local level, the macro-economic 
policies discussed in chapter I were to disadvantage Nablus vis-a-vis the developing 
coastal strip. The overall effect was  a state of relative decline in the town, forming 
one of the main causes of its pivotal role in the 1936 Arab Revolt. 
This chapter starts with reference to some of the main events which influenced 
British perceptions of Nablus, and then goes on to consider in detail what can be 
concluded about their approach from the monthly political reports held at the 
National Archives. It subsequently considers on a thematic basis interactions 
between officials at the District level in the Mandatory administration and members of 
the Nabulsi political class in the sectors of education, sport, and land-use. I finish the 
chapter by concluding that British efforts to avoid overt hostility at the local level 
during the early years of the mandate were by and large successful. The fact that  
this relative success was not replicated either at the national level or in respect of the 
overarching policy priorities of the Colonial Office10 in London is illustrative of the 
differing perceptions and priorities between the various tiers of colonial government 
in Palestine. At the local level, the District Administrators were primarily involved in 
intelligence gathering and avoiding the development of hostility to the Mandatory 
power. In Jerusalem the High Commissioner was primarily occupied with the 
development of the JNH policy and its associated vicissitudes: whereas in London 
the main priority was to constrain Government expenditure on the Palestinian 
territory11 whilst ensuring that it remained an effective buffer against potential 
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incursion from any hostile powers which might develop in the Near 
East.12Notwithstanding these differing perspectives, all those involved in policy 
making were operating within the Treasury’s fiscal constraints, and these had a 
cascade effect from their point of inception in London, out to the Mandatory HQ in 
Jerusalem, and down to the local level in Nablus: where their effect was magnified 
by the need to respond to the impact of day to day events. 
Nablus following the end of World War I 
The purpose of this section is to outline British perceptions of Nablus at the close of 
World War I as an (impoverished) centre of opposition to Mandatory rule which had 
fallen into relative decline in relation to the rest of the Palestinian territory. This 
provides the vital context in which British governance of the town in the 1920s  and 
early 1930s can then be analysed. 
Following the end of World War I and the establishment of the British military 
administration in Palestine, the territory north of Jerusalem was deemed by the 
conquering British forces to be “a land of pitiable starvation, of adult emaciation, and 
grave infant mortality.”13The priorities of the Occupied Enemy Territory 
Administration were consequently to re-establish a sense of normality after the 
turmoil of both the war and the natural disasters which came with it.14 These included 
the 1915 locust invasion and the 1916 drought.15In its capacity as a military 
government operating in occupied enemy territory, General Allenby’s administration 
was obliged to maintain the status quo in the society it had come to occupy.16There 
were nevertheless examples at the local level of military governors being prepared to 
intervene in local practices in order to impose their own colonial belief systems. 
Nablus was a case in point where British nurses working in a hospital had previously 
been  obliged to wear veils in the same way as local Muslim women.17 The military 
governor nevertheless issued orders that this should cease.18This conforms to wider 
British perceptions, prior to the establishment of the civil administration in 1920, that 
Nablus  was a conservative town, hostile to foreigners in general, and Jews in 
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particular. These characteristics were attributed to its being “an old Turkish 
stronghold.”19 
These early years of the British presence saw approaches which were carried over 
to the Mandate proper, and set the context for its relations with both the town and its 
surrounding area. The constraints on financial resources tended to result in various 
aspects of the territory’s infrastructure being repaired, rather than renewed, as was 
the case with roads.20Whereas under the Ottomans Nablus had been the centre of a 
‘sanjak’ or administrative district,21 under the British it had no particular status in a 
Government structure where all power was centralised in Jerusalem.22 Furthermore, 
at the local level, members of the Municipal Council23 were initially not elected but 
nominated by the military authorities pending the establishment of a civilian 
administration under the Mandate.24 Choosing those through whom they considered 
they could most easily rule at the local level had a certain common-sense logic from 
the perspective of Jerusalem and London, but also created a structure which stifled 
any potential for initiatives from the local population. This in turn meant that there 
were no structures through which discontent could be expressed. This in turn 
contributed to the Mandatory authorities under-estimating the strength of opposition 
to their policies (in relation to the Jewish National Home) which was to lead to the 
Jabal Nablus area becoming the centre of the Arab Revolt in 1936. Finally there was 
the international dimension during this period, when some of the Nabulsis  joined the 
Sharifian army, supporting King Faisal initially in Syria and subsequently in Iraq. That 
awareness of events in the surrounding region was a contributory factor in their 
hostility towards the British.25 
There was furthermore an element of uncertainty concerning the status of the new 
administration, and whether or not there was any scope to modify its policies. This 
was because there was a relatively long period between the end of military hostilities 
in Palestine in 1918 and the final confirmation of the British Mandate in 1923. As the 
British Government noted at the time,26 it was not until the San Remo Conference in 
1920 that the Palestine Mandate was assigned to the UK, with the actual terms of 
the draft mandate not being agreed by the Council of the League of Nations until July 
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conclusion of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey. It was consequently not 
until September 1923, after the Treaty of Lausanne had become operative, that the 
Council of the League was able to officially endorse the beginning of Britain’s 
Mandate over Palestine. British rule of course started with General Allenby’s arrival 
in Jerusalem in December 1917,27 and was followed by a civil administration in July 
1920, but the extended nature of the international negotiations which legitimised the 
British presence meant that there was little incentive to attempt any fundamental 
changes in the territory during those early, formative years. Overall, the approach 
which best characterized the British Government in Palestine during the 1920s was 
one of maintaining law and order, and discouraging political activism on the part of 
the indigenous population.28As will be shown from what is revealed in the monthly 
political reports discussed below, the Mandatory authorities were reasonably 
successful in finding the right people to work with in Nablus, and so able to avoid the 
development of overt hostilities during this period. Also concordant with a desire to 
avoid unnecessary confrontation was the lack of any attempts to intervene in 
personal, religious, or social affairs29-as was often the case with the administration of 
British colonial territories,30 where indirect rule was the favoured mode of 
government.31 Despite some notable exceptions, the new British regime generally 
avoided intervening in local customs and religious practice, and this was especially 
the case as far as the Muslim community – the overwhelming majority in Nablus32 -
was concerned.33 
According to Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, a historian and member of one of the leading 
families in Nablus, the town had played a role in the administration of late Ottoman 
Palestine out of all proportion to its size. This he attributes to the high levels of 
education of its citizens who travelled to both neighbouring countries and Europe to 
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complete their university education.34That combination of travel and education led to 
an awareness of, and interest in, the cultural and political developments in the 
countries neighbouring Palestine, and in particular Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. It also 
contributed to the town’s sense of self-reliance which, combined with its hostility to 
Zionism, led its Municipal Council to refuse electricity supplied by the Jewish 
Rutenberg project.35 This jealously guarded sense of independence was reflected in 
active participation in political and social affairs. The atmosphere in the city led the 
Palestine Bulletin to assert that “Nablus daily proves that it possesses more power, 
life and continuous movement than Jerusalem.”36 The active exchange of political 
and social ideas meant that “every day Nablus has a new opinion.”37 
Political Surveillance 
A state of increasing mutual suspicion between the British and the Nabulsis during 
the course of the 1920sbecomes apparent from an analysis of the monthly political 
reports which are to be found in the FO 608 and 141 series held at the National 
Archives. These reveal a British approach of de minimis intervention whilst 
prioritising the keeping of the peace. The purpose of this section is to examine some 
of those reports with a view to better understanding what they reveal of how the 
British managed and controlled the local population of the ‘Jabal Nablus.’ 
Taking various events in chronological order, one of the first signs of Nabulsi hostility 
to draw the attention of the British authorities was the petition submitted to the 
Versailles Peace Conference by a group of Nabulsi notables. Despite the denial of 
any Palestinian representation at the conference itself, Versailles nevertheless 
offered a channel  for the Nabulsis to articulate their views to the international 
community, and those views were clearly monitored by the British authorities. Part of 
the UK delegation’s papers for that conference include a French translation of a 
petition from the politically active members of the town’s population.38  It was 
submitted on 14 February 1919, and the original was forwarded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Dawnay, acting Chief Political Officer in the Egypt Expeditionary Force 
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(EEF) to the Foreign Secretary.39 He considered “that the sentiments expressed in 
this document are a fair indication of the views held by a large majority of the non-
Jewish population of Palestine with regards to Zionism.”40 The opening paragraphs 
merit some examination, as they provide an insight into the way the Nabulsis thought 
both of their town and themselves in relation to the difficult and uncertain era which 
followed the end of World War I. My own translation of the opening paragraph of the 
petition reads as follows:41 
“We, the undersigned, Muslim and Christian, the inhabitants of the sub-district 
of Nablus, part of Arab Palestine, state both on our own behalf and that of our 
compatriots, that there is much discussion on the question of Palestine as a 
national home for the Jews: who will immigrate here and colonise it. However, 
the principles declared by President Wilson and approved by the Allied 
Powers reject the whole idea of the oppression of a weak people by a strong 
one:42 and as there isfurthermore the issue of safeguarding the rights of the 
weakest, we protest against the claims of the Zionists in the strong hope that 
the Allies’ sense of justice will recognise our rights in the country, and uphold 
them”. 
That Dawnay had forwarded the text to the Foreign Secretary indicates some 
concern both about the level of opposition in Palestine to the JNH policy and to the 
potential role of Nablus as a focal point of that opposition.  At the same time,  the 
substance of the text indicates that in 1919 opposition was  being expressed more in 
terms of an appeal to rights of  national self-determination than an indication of any 
future armed resistance.  
Despite this evidence of significant opposition to their policies, the British authorities 
appear to have remained optimistic, at least throughout the early 1920s,that it would 
not inevitably lead to overt hostility. We consequently see the political report covering 
the August 1922 Nablus Congress43 noting with approval that “the receptions 
at.....Nablus passed off without untoward incident and the speeches were of a 
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moderate character.”44 In the September political report,45 when observing the 
celebrations in Nablus of Mustafa Kemal’s victories against the Greeks in Anatolia, 
the authorities concluded that they represent “a gesture of discontent with the 
present administration, and hatred of its Zionist colour”46 rather than support for the 
Turkish regime per se. This evaluation provides clear evidence that the Mandatory 
Government was well aware of the strong opposition to its JNH policy, and it was this 
awareness that no doubt contributed towards its heightened sensitivity to any 
indications of political activism which might eventually lead to an organised revolt. 
This also explains why Nablus, with its reputation for opposing anything which it 
perceived as counter to its interests, was the subject of close and thorough 
monitoring. The expectation that overt opposition would be the norm rather than the 
exception is revealed clearly in the October political report,47 which quotes the 
Governor of the Northern District in Palestine as being of the view that if everything 
was peaceful then this must purely be the result either of a lack of funds to support 
opposition campaigns, or of internal divisions amongst the activists.48 This somewhat 
cynical view was reinforced by a visit to the villages of the Jenin sub-district which 
revealed no particular interest in politics, whereas in Nablus, by contrast, “political 
questions always attract attention.”49 
The town itself is then the subject of some detailed comment, following the arrest on 
20 October 1922 of nine notables for their opposition to the census.50 Crowds 
gathered as a result who then secured their release while they were being conveyed 
to the local prison despite the intervention of the British gendarmerie which caused 
“no serious injuries.”51This implies that injuries of some sort were inflicted on the 
crowd, and that force was used.52 The notables concerned, however, apparently 
“voluntarily surrendered themselves soon after their rescue.”53 Here then is evidence 
that the politically active members of Nabulsi society who were also members of the 
local socio-economic elite, imposed limits on the extent to which they were willing to 
defy British authority.This was no doubt because they had assets to lose either via 
sequestration by the authorities, or indeed as a result of a truly popular, and 
genuinely revolutionary uprising. 
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This took place about mid-day on 27th October, and was followed later by 
disturbances in Haifa and Nablus. These disturbances were of a serious character 
and the police were subjected to frequent attacks including the use of fire-arms. After 
endeavours had been made to quell the riots by baton charges, the police were 
forced, in some cases, to fire before order could be restored. 
Historians of the mandate have long since demonstrated the extent to which the 
British regime sought to exploit the hesitations of the Palestinian elites. As Bernard 
Wasserstein writes, the Mandatory authorities “regarded the land-owning class as a 
natural intermediary between government and governed.”54On a wider imperial level, 
historians such as David Cannadine have argued55 that British colonial officials 
instinctively and either consciously or sub-consciously tried to replicate the 
hierarchical, monarchical society they were familiar with at home in the UK. They 
have gone on to assert that it was this hierarchy that was more important to them 
than distinguishing themselves from the ‘other’ that was the local population. In 
Cannadine’s analysis, the Middle Eastern territories which came under British control 
following the end of World War I were governed along similar lines to the princely 
Indian states56 - with monarchies established and supported in Transjordan and Iraq. 
Although the distinctions between the imperial power and those over whom it ruled 
were not to be ignored in terms of their racial dimension, categories of social class 
were also an important factor determining the relations between British officials and 
those with whom they interacted. The process of government in mandate Palestine  
consequently became a series of interactions between those members of the British 
‘establishment’ posted there and those at the apex of Palestinian society. 
From the evidence we have, the relationship revealed by the interactions between 
the Mandatory authorities and the educated elite of Nabulsi public life would suggest 
that his hypothesis stands true at the local level in Nablus during the British 
Mandate: and also confirms that maintenance of the status quo was an important 
aspect of Government policy not only under the military administration of the 
‘Occupied Enemy Territory Administration’ (OETA) South but also during the civil 
administration of High Commissioner Samuel and his successors.In the absence of a 
Hashemite monarchical intermediary the British sought to strengthen their 
hierarchical, class-based view of the world. 
Following this incident the report goes on to note that the shops were shut in the 
town the following day, which was generally quiet with the exception of periodic 
congregations of “shouting boys”57 who had to be dispersed by the police.58 It also 
records that operations to confiscate arms “in certain villages of the Samaria 
 
54 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 15 
55 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism, How the British Saw Their Empire (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 
2001) 
56 Cannadine, Ornamentalism  71 




District”59 with concomitant allegations of police severity in the process, “made the 
temper of the people of Nablus none the better.”60 This observation indicates that the 
Mandatory authorities were aware of the links between the urban area and the 
surrounding agricultural hinterland, and that events in the one would inevitably have 
repercussions in the other. 
In the November 1922 political report61 mention is made of the fact that the Nablus 
branch of the Moslem-Christian society had published a statement concerning the 
issue of participation in elections to the proposed legislative assembly. It is revealing 
that what in other contexts would be considered a purely political activity is here 
characterised as potentially criminal: as the report goes on to note that the Criminal 
Investigation Department had been monitoring the contents of telegrams on this 
subject sent from Nablus to the Lausanne conference62 - and as a result were aware 
of the town’s support for a boycott of the elections. The contents of this political 
report are also revealing of British sensitivities concerning the impact of 
developments in Palestine on other Muslim communities elsewhere in the empire. It 
notes for example that the Executive Committee of the Arab Congress had invoked 
the support of the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay, whilst informing their 
Indian counterparts “of the feeling of relief in Palestine at the Anatolian victories of 
the Turks.”63 The text of the Nablus statement, running to four pages, is reproduced 
in full as an annex to the November 1922 political report, indicating that it was 
considered to be of some importance by the British authorities, who no doubt took 
careful note of the contents of its opening paragraph which asserted that the 
proposed constitution for Palestine had been imposed without democratic consent, 
and was consequently rejected “together with the Jewish National Home for which 
provisions were made in it.”64 
The report is furthermore indicative that the Mandatory authorities were aware not 
only of the importance of knowing about what their colonial subjects were thinking, 
but also what information networks they had access to and how they could leverage 
them to give themselves a greater degree of agency in relation to their colonial 
masters. In this particular case we have an example of shared views and opinions 
between Nablus and Bombay. This Indian location carried significance for the British, 
not only because of the central importance of the country to the empire as a whole, 
but due to the fact that the long-standing model of colonial governance developed 
there was subsequently used as a template for more recently acquired territories as 
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in the Middle East.65Christopher Bayly has made the case66 not only for the 
importance of ‘native’ communication systems as such, but also that a failure by the 
British to effectively monitor them contributed to their ignorance of the build up to the 
Indian mutiny, which consequently took them by surprise.67 That lesson was unlikely 
to have been forgotten in Palestine, where some of the most senior officials serving 
there had previously had experience in India, including, for example,General Money, 
the first Military Governor of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South.68 
Viewed in this broader context of colonial government, British suspicions of Jabal 
Nablus, their close monitoring of political activities, and their desire to suppress even 
small-scale demonstrations or incidents in case they developed into something more 
serious, become more readily comprehensible. 
By the end of 1922, political activity in the Jabal Nablus disappears from the British 
archival trail. But it resurfaces in the political report of February 192369 which states 
that one of the speakers at a meeting in Jerusalem had informed their audience that 
special agents had been appointed in and around the town to oppose the elections 
to the proposed legislative assembly. This indicates that the Mandatory authorities 
must have been using paid informants to relay what was discussed at these 
meetings. The question of the elections is covered the following month, where the 
March report70 distinguishes between those it characterised as “moderate 
elements”71 – that is,  who would be willing to vote and so participate in the 
institutional structures the British were seeking to establish – and those who were 
intent on boycott. It was fear of the latter which led Suleiman Bay Tuqan72 to stand 
down as a candidate for the assembly on the grounds that “nomination would mean 
loss of all influence for good”73 that men such as him possessed in their local 
communities. Here again we have evidence of the tensions and ambivalences that 
characterised the actions of the notables that were apparent in the incident of the 
arrests related in the October 1922 report.74 In this report,  the extent to which the 
notables  might either oppose or co-operate with the British authorities was clearly 
constrained by considerations of what was acceptable behaviour as far as the local 
population was concerned. That the British were aware of these tensions, and 
reported on them, is unsurprising given the breadth of their accumulated experience 
in governing colonial territories by the 1920s, and also explains their sensitivity to 
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more strident or armed forms of popular protest as they were well aware of its 
constraining influence on those members of society through whom they would 
normally exercise their rule. That sensitivity could account for the somewhat 
uncompromising approach taken towards those who were considered to be 
challenging the Mandatory Government’s initiatives.  
The April 1923 political report75 noted that proceedings had been initiated against 
several individuals, including Izzat Darwaza of Nablus.76Born into a middle class 
family in the town in 1887, he had started work in the closing years of the Ottoman 
administration as a clerk in its Department of Telegraphic and Postal Services, rising 
to the position of Secretary-General of the General Postal Administration in Beirut  at 
the time of World War I.77 He was elected to represent Nablus at the 1921 and 1928 
Palestinian National Congresses.78The case against Darwaza was that he (and 
others)  had exerted “undue influence during the recent elections.”79 The arrest gave 
rise to a statement from the Arab Executive whose text was reproduced as an 
appendix to the report80 and asserted that the people considered this action to be an 
attempt by the British to paralyse the Arab national movement.81 This had apparently 
led to meetings of solidarity in the town following the arrival of “a great crowd from all 
parts of Palestine.”82 Here then was clear evidence to the British that Nablus was a 
centre of political opposition in the territory that required careful monitoring, and 
could not be trusted. The issue of elections to the proposed legislative assembly was 
raised in Parliament in May 1923,  when Mr Peto M.P., asked the Under Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Mr Ormsby-Gore, whether it was true that Haj Tewfik 
Hammad and six other notables of Nablus had been indicted for encouraging others 
not to vote in the election: and if so,, what was the justification for this ? The 
government’s response was that arrests had been made, but on the grounds of 
intimidation as opposed to simply encouraging people not to vote.83Nablus may have 
been a neglected backwater in Palestine, but the actions of the British colonial 
administration there still gave rise to questions in Parliament. 
The April 1923 political report went on to indicate the existence of tensions in the 
town that had nothing to do with the proposed legislative assembly. Reference was 
made84to a strike by staff at the girls’ school in Nablus “owing to an alleged insult by 
a Christian teacher to the Moslem religion.”85 This led to the Governor for 
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theSamaria region meeting with the local education committee together with the 
parents of several of the girls.86 His presence nevertheless clearly failed to mollify 
the protestors who demanded that the Christian teachers be replaced by Moslems, 
and the school kept open on Sundays and Christian holidays.87 Two months later the 
dispute remained unresolved, as we learn from the June political report that the 
Chief Secretary of the Education Department visited Nablus “with the object of 
settling the dispute.”88  Clearly he did not succeed, as a Mandatory Government 
report on child marriage and education for Arab girls recorded that “in July 1923 
Government was compelled to remove all Christian women teachers from 
Nablus.”89The way a relatively small incident could rapidly escalate into sustained 
and widespread opposition is indicative of the potentially volatile relations between 
the Nabulsis and the Mandatory authorities. 
It would appear that the sensitivities concerning religion in Nablus arose at least in 
part from fears among  the local population that Christian teachers would try to 
convert their children from Islam. Pere Jaussen,90a French Dominican Friar who had 
studied at the Biblical School of Jerusalem prior to WWI,91 describes an incident 
where a school and clinic run by the Sisters of St. Joseph faced accusations of trying 
to convert one of their former pupils who disappeared from the town and was 
subsequently found in a Syrian orphanage in Bethlehem. The young Muslim girl was 
later to assert that she had run away from home because of a conflict with her 
father.92Ela Greenberg has argued93that this incident reflected fears of Nabulsi 
parents who felt that they had a lack of control over the way their children were 
educated in missionary schools. That evaluation however needs to be considered in 
relation to the facts of this particular incident. Jaussen clearly states that the girl who 
was the subject of accusations against the Sisters of Saint Joseph was 23 years old 
at the time she ran away from her father’s house,94 and so no longer a pupil at the 
school. Despite going into great detail concerning the actions of the father which led 
to his daughter running away, the author does not offer any explicit explanation as to 




88 June 1923 political report, 7, para 22, in FO 141/673/1, TNA 
89 CO 733/277/11, TNA, Child Marriage, Education for Arab Girls (1935). The statement comes on page 8 of a 
memo on this subject attached to a letter of 03 January 1935 from High Commissioner Wauchope to Cunliffe-
Lister, Colonial Secretary. The subject-matter covers both education and health issues 
90 Le Pere J-A Jaussen, a Professeur at the Ecole Biblique et Archeologique Francaise in Jerusalem, was of the 
view that the root cause of the hostility to the teachers was that they were Christian, and that it was  ‘honteux 
pour eux de confier leurs filles a des maitresses chretiennes.’ (shameful for them –i.e. Nabulsi parents- to 
entrust their daughters to Christian teachers). See  Le Pere J –A Jaussen,  Coutumes Palestiniennes, Naplouse et 
Son District (Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1927),  49 n.1 
91 Coutumes Palestiniennes,  introduction 
92Ibid, 49. n.1 
93 Ela Greenberg, Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow, Education and Islam in Mandate Palestine (University of 
Texas Press. Austin, 2010),  31 
94 Jaussen, Coutumes  49 n.1 
74 
 
were not involved in her disappearance. He does however set out at the beginning of 
the story that in 1917 the Nablus Municipality had attempted to take over their 
hospital (which preceded the opening of the school), and have the Sisters exiled as 
enemy aliens.95 That they failed to do so was only due to the fact that the Ottoman 
military authorities at the time needed medical staff for their soldiers and co-opted 
their services.96 If the incident of the alleged kidnapping is to be set in a broader 
context, then it is far more likely to be that of the strained relations with the local 
Municipality than that of local parents feeling they had no control over what 
happened in the school. It is telling in this respect that when the young lady was 
brought home from Bethlehem she was initially lodged in Nablus in the house of the 
politically influential Abdul Hadi family97 which was active in its opposition to the 
colonial power.98 
There may indeed have been a feeling among Nabulsi parents that they lacked 
effective control over what their children were taught in missionary schools, but in 
this particular case there were clearly other considerations being brought to bear. 
The broader hypothesis of Greenberg’s book however, alluded to in the title on 
‘Preparing the  Mothers of Tomorrow’ was that a growing sense of national identity in 
Palestine after WWI was accompanied by more emphasis on the importance of 
education, and in particular for girls, in developing the ‘new nation.’99Ideally this 
meant Palestinian schools with local - and so in the case of Nablus, Muslim - 
teachers, and led to a degree of hostility to educational establishments from external 
sources which were perceived as ‘colonial.’100 This nevertheless created a dilemma, 
as it was the Christian schools which tended to be better endowed financially, and so 
had more resources to provide a better education than the local schools.101 Any 
tensions between the desire for self-sufficient development and a fear that this could 
not be achieved effectively without external support must have been exacerbated in 
a town which prior to the arrival of the British had received few European visitors and 
tended not to be tolerant of, or perceive a need to co-exist with, outsiders.102  There 
was consequently scope for mutual suspicion and miscomprehension between the 
overwhelmingly Muslim Nabulsis and representatives of the Christian faith in 
 
95 Jaussen, Coutumes   48  See also 251, which notes hostility on the part of the Mayor in 1910 towards ‘ces 
francaises:’ this increased with the outbreak of WWI (252) . Note also 319: “les Français donnent trop de 
liberte a la femme.” (The French give too much freedom to their women) 
96  Ibid 
97Ibid, 49 
98  For a biography of Awni Abdul Hadi, one of its leading members, see the Personalities section of the 
Palestine Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs: http://passia.org/personalities/21 
99  Greenberg, Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow, 4. Similar themes are explored in Ellen Fleischmann, The 
Nation and its ‘new’ Women, the Palestinian Women’s Movement 1920 – 1948 ( University of California Press, 
London, 2003)  
100 Greenberg. Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow  1 
101Ibid,13 
102 On this point, see David Kushner, ’Zealous Towns in Nineteenth Century Palestine’, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Volume 3, No.3, July 1997  605 
75 
 
schools, hospitals, and government offices whose religion was closely identified with 
the European colonialists. 
That did not mean however that the relationship was invariably hostile. For example,  
the political report for  May 1923 indicates that in general the situation was calm, with 
nothing substantive to report from the Northern District that month.103 In June Amin 
al Tamimi104 was reported to have been asked by the Nablus Muslim-Christian 
Society to interview the Emir Abdullah in regard to the Hejaz treaty.105 This indicates 
both the continuing linkages between the Nabulsi political class and Transjordan and 
the fact that the British authorities were monitoring them. Tamimi would have been of 
particular interest to the Mandatory authorities, given that he was the Nablus 
representative to the Higher Islamic Council, and was elected Deputy to its 
Chairman, Haj Amin Al-Husseini.106 Also that month there was yet further evidence 
of Palestinian notables’ reluctance to manifest overt opposition to British policies due 
to their fears of being stripped of their assets. The report’s author claimed to have 
received assurances from Suleiman Bey Tuqan107 that there would be no resolutions 
against paying taxes at the forthcoming sixth Palestinian Arab Congress due to the 
fact that land-owners participating in the event would be the first to suffer from any 
retaliatory action by the Government.108 That Tuqan was willing to share such 
observations on his fellow notables is also indicative of the level of co-option of local 
Nabulsi elites the British were able to achieve, and the degree of interaction between 
those elites and their social peers in the mandatory regime. 
 
From their own perspective, there is evidence that those at the top of Nabulsi society 
preferred dialogue with the colonial regime to open confrontation as a means of 
realising their objectives. The September 1923 political report109 noted that a loan of 
£200 was obtained from a bank against the signature of four notables in the town for 
the purpose of contributing to funds to send a Palestinian Arab delegation to 
London.110 Two months later a protest against the Balfour declaration was submitted 
to the District Governor by the Nablus Christian society,111 but any further action in 
support of the protest –such as shop closures- was held in abeyance following the 
intervention of Adel Zouaiter, a member of one of the town’s leading families.112 
Clearly the JNH policy was a sensitive issue, but Nablus’s position within the British 
regional government hierarchy in Palestine was not. The February 1924 political 
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report113 noted with some surprise the lack of adverse comment following a 
reorganisation which relegated the town from a District HQ to that of a Sub-
District.114 This subdued reaction could be argued to be the logical consequence of a 
community being in opposition to the mandate per se, and so uninterested in its 
position relative to the administrative hierarchy of the colonial order. Conversely, on 
the British side the reorganisation is indicative that Nablus was not considered a 
priority, and that other parts of Northern Palestine, notably Haifa, were considered of 
greater importance.  
Disinterest in the British administration was not however reflected in attitudes 
towards its own municipal affairs, as a year later it was reported that a new Municipal 
Council had begun to function in Nablus, notwithstanding opposition from members 
of the Arab Executive to nominations for Council members.115 I would argue that this 
development was generally consistent with an outlook that was either indifferent or 
hostile to authority at the national level –of whatever origin-, but put its own interests 
first at the local level, given the central role of a Municipal Council in enabling the 
effective administration of the town.  
As stated earlier in this chapter,116an overall picture consequentially emerges from 
these political reports of success on behalf of the Mandatory authorities in co-opting 
sufficient members from amongst the Nabulsi notables to govern effectively whilst at 
the same time avoiding overt hostilities. There were nevertheless underlying 
tensions arising from the town’s emergence from relative isolation prior to WWI, and 
its support for the developing movement of Palestinian national politics. From a 
British perspective there was clearly suspicion of, and a rapid response to, 
containing any manifestations of hostile activity in public areas, with close monitoring 
of any political activity to ensure that it did not develop into more widespread 
opposition to the Mandate. The incidents with the school teachers are also indicative 
of religious sensitivities, not in the purely theological sense, but arising from a 
perception of Christianity as a possible tool of imperial control. The general approach 
of the British was for early pre-emptive action so that potential trouble could be 
‘nipped in the bud.’ One may speculate on the extent to which such action may only 
have served to fuel the build-up of tensions which finally contributed to the 1936 
Arab Revolt, given that ‘zero tolerance’ policies by the authorities meant that nothing 
was permitted which could have acted as a safety valve for the expression of popular 
discontent. Whether the appropriate response to dissent was draconian –as opposed 
to more calibrated- action was an issue which created real tensions between the 
civilian and military authorities during the 1936 – 1938 period, and which is 
considered in detail in chapter V of this thesis. At this point in the analysis however, 
and in the context of the importance of local affairs to the Nabulsis, it is appropriate 
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to consider how the British inter-acted with them at the local level (as opposed to 
monitoring their activities for political or security purposes). This is the subject of the 
following section. 
Local Governance 
Whereas the policies of the Mandatory Government at Departmental level were 
initiated and developed in its Head Office in Jerusalem, their impact at the local level 
was experienced by the indigenous population in terms of what was implemented in 
their geographical area. The purpose of this section is to examine some specific 
activities, of which some documented in the Israel State Archives, to reveal what 
more can be learned of the British-Nabulsi relationship. On the theme of rural 
development, I conclude that the scale of the projects undertaken, whether or not 
well-intentioned, were insufficient to make any material impact on the size of the 
problems facing the agricultural sector in the rural hinterland in the surrounding area. 
If lack of resources was one of the factors militating against success in that sector it 
may also have been a consideration in the joint efforts between the British authorities 
and the local municipal council, where an analysis of the reports concerning 
proposals to build a sports and recreation ground reveal a perception that monies 
invested in such facilities would contribute to public health and so result in a lowering 
of demands for (and costs of) medical services provision. The overarching 
consideration nevertheless remained the maintenance of law and order and the 
prevention of any activities which might threaten to develop into concerted or 
organised opposition to British rule per se. An example in this respect is provided by 
the use of police in crowd dispersal following demonstrations which developed after 
a wedding reception. 
The background to this incident is that Nablus, together with many other places in 
Palestine, had shown strong support for the Kemalists’ military victories against the 
Greeks in Anatolia during 1921 and 1922.117As a result of these feelings of sharing a 
Muslim culture with the Turks, as well as struggling against European powers, a 
wedding procession in Nablus during the autumn of 1922was turned into a political 
demonstration, complete with Turkish flags and shouts of “down with Zionism, Great 
Britain, and the Balfour declaration.”118  This provoked a hostile response from the 
British authorities who sent in a police contingent to disperse the 
crowd.119Subsequent plans to decorate the town in honour of Turkish forces and to 
organise a religious celebration were then turned down by the local Mayor.120 This 
event indicates both British sensitivities towards public manifestations of nationalist 
opposition to the colonial power, as well as (at that time) a degree of willingness by 
in this case the municipal authorities to co-operate with them against the wishes of 
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populist elements. The Mayor at that time was Shaikh Omar al Zouaiter, who it 
seemed generally tried to avoid confrontation with the Mandatory, given that in 
November of the following year he intervened to prevent the closure of shops in 
Nablus after a protest against the Balfour declaration which was submitted to the 
District Governor by the local branch of the Nablus-Christian Society.121 
These events, and the reaction to them, further illustrate that there was an element 
of ‘divide and rule’ in the approach of the Mandatory authority, which sought to co-
opt the support (or at least passive acquiescence) of members of the Nabulsi elite in 
their efforts to control the population as a whole. As Halabi described it:  
“the urban and rural poor displayed solidarity with the Turks as fellow Muslims 
resisting European armies.....(while) the political elite responded in a more 
deliberate, expressly political manner as they pursued their own struggle with 
the British authorities.”122 
Apart from the maintenance of law and order and containment of possible uprisings, 
one of the main challenges facing the British administration in Palestine was the 
need to develop an economy which had been devastated by World War I and its 
accompanying natural disasters. This issue was examined in greater detail in 
chapter I of the thesis, but a specific project concerning the cultivation of silk worms 
in the agricultural districts surrounding Nablus is indicative of the extent to which 
resource constraints, exacerbated by priorities elsewhere in the territory – such as 
the development of the port of Haifa- meant that the positive impact of British 
intervention was insignificant in relation to the scale of the problem. 
The context for the development of this project can be found in the annual reports of 
the Mandatory authority’s Department of Education, which are revealing both of local 
conditions and of the British perspective on the indigenous population in Palestine: 
and of particular relevance to Jabal Nablus, where wealth was a function of land 
ownership and agricultural produce.123We can glean from these reports something of 
the way in which education and agricultural development (as well as public health) 
were linked in the minds of senior officials. The 1929 -30 annual report of the 
Education Department124 indicated the presence of the Salahiya elementary school 
in Nablus, one of twelve in Palestine which also offered secondary education 
classes.125 It also recorded the existence of the (private) An-Najah School.126 
These reports were unsurprisingly critical of the former Ottoman regime’s 
educational provision, which had been largely confined to the instruction of boys in 
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urban areas.127 The lack of proper education facilities was perceived by the 
Mandatory authorities as one of the reasons for the depressed state of the 
agricultural sector. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, High 
Commissioner Wauchope asserted that it was his: 
“constant aim and endeavour to ameliorate the depressed condition of the 
Arab agricultural classes and I regard the expansion of rural education as one 
means but not the only one to that end.”128 
It would appear however that the Treasury was un-persuaded of the value of rural 
education, considering that experience in the remote rural area of India had shown it 
to be a waste of resources.129 Within the constraints imposed by London there were 
nevertheless some efforts made in the field of technical education as part of an 
attempt to improve rural productivity. In the 1929 – 30 annual report of the Education 
Department for example there is a fairly detailed entry on the introduction of 
sericulture classes in the Hashimiya school in Nablus.130 The report confirmed that 
the “importance of planting mulberry trees was widely emphasised”131 and that 
during the silk-worm breeding season “a course in theoretical and practical 
sericulture was given at Nablus to 26 teachers from various rural schools.”132  It goes 
on to note that a silk-reeling machine had been purchased from Syria and installed in 
the Aishiya girls’ school in Nablus.133 The silk worms themselves were bred in the 
Khalidiya and Hashimiya boys’ schools in the town,134 with the report concluding that 
“with assistance and organisation the development of this industry is a practical 
proposition.”  As Roza El Eini has observed,135 both the Departments of Agriculture 
and Education in Palestine were able to draw on an extensive network of technical 
knowledge developed elsewhere from other colonial territories.136The introduction of 
sericulture into Palestine should be placed in this context, as it represented a new 
activity in the territory with the potential for creating more added value than was the 
case with the traditional subsistence crops which were the staple of the agricultural 
sector at that time. They also tended to focus their available resources for technical 
education on the Arab rural sector, given that the Jewish population had their own 
agricultural institutions.137 
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There were wider reasons, however, for the thinking behind these agricultural 
initiatives. The Director of Education in Palestine during the 1920s was Humphrey 
Bowman, who had earlier held the same position in Iraq following the end of WWI, as 
well as in the Sudan prior to 1914.138 In his memoirs he set out both the positive and 
negative reasons for wanting to keep the fellahin in productive occupations on the 
land.139On the one hand, like many of his contemporaries, he feared the urban 
unrest which could result from the migration into the towns of uneducated agricultural 
labourers140 - one of the themes considered in chapter I on economic conditions in 
Palestine and their impact on Jabal Nablus. On the other, given the overwhelming 
dependence of the Palestinian economy on the agricultural sector, anything which 
could be achieved to improve its output would have a beneficial effect on reducing 
the poverty levels to be found in the rural areas.141 In his view there was a potentially 
virtuous circle to be achieved, starting with improved methods of cultivation, moving 
through increased prosperity, and so reducing indebtedness which was considered 
to be one of the main causes of crime.142 
This, then, is the broader perspective in which the attempts to develop sericulture 
should be understood. Nevertheless, because of the relative lack of available 
resources at the disposal of the Mandatory on the one hand, and the scale of the 
problems of rural poverty on the other, we must agree with Roza El Eini’s conclusion 
that the efforts put into the development of agricultural projects such as these were 
insufficient to make any lasting impact on the rural Arab community.143That failure 
would have been of particular importance to Jabal Nablus, as the close links 
between the town and the countryside would mean that the urban population would 
have been well aware of the problems of their rural neighbours: and so the absence 
of any British ‘success stories’ there meant that there was nothing to mitigate their 
hostility to a colonial power which on the one hand was suspicious of them, and on 
the other was deeply resented for its JNH policy. As far as this part of the Palestinian 
territory was concerned the Mandatory’s generally de minimis approach to 
engagement and investment meant that rural poverty was not effectively 
addressed:144 and it is telling that the Arab Revolt, discussed in chapter V below, 
drew most of its active participants from the villages and countryside, not the towns. 
Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is nevertheless worth noting that the 
deteriorating economic conditions in the UK during the 1920s meant that the 
Government had to contend with rural distress at home, and so was unlikely to have 
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sufficient resources available to effectively engage with the scale of the problems it 
faced in Palestine.145 
Resource constraints can be seen to be a factor in the thinking behind support for 
some types of project where the expenditure involved was anticipated to produce a 
reduction in demand for (expenditure on) other services in which the Government 
was a provider – albeit in the case of health where it was not an exclusive provider. 
An example of this can be seen later in the Mandate when in1939 the Nablus 
Municipal Council proposed the purchase of a piece of land on the western side of 
Nablus which it wished to turn into a sports ground.146The money it would need for 
this purchase was derived from its rental income which the Mandatory authorities 
paid the municipality for the Watan hospital site.147 In the terms of the lease 
governing the rental income it stated that the municipality could use the funds both to 
cover the hospital expenses of “poor persons of Nablus town”148and “other objects 
connected with the improvement of the health of the townspeople of Nablus.”149 
Given the Government’s clear support for the proposal to develop a sports ground150 
we have here an example of how British colonial regimes operating at the local level 
conceptualised sporting and recreational activities in terms of benefits to public 
health. In the absence of agreement from the local landowner, the council petitioned 
the High Commissioner for permission to allow a compulsory purchase order.151 The 
Assistant District Commissioner for the Samaria District considered the project a 
“very desirable one”152 on the grounds that the proposed plot was of sufficient size to 
accommodate a football ground, basketball and tennis courts and, “perhaps most 
important of all, a children’s play-ground.”153 His letter to the Chief Secretary in 
Jerusalem concluded with the observation that the Senior Medical Officer in Nablus 
agreed with his recommendation.154We know from observations made at the time 
that e.g. tuberculosis was a serious problem in Mandate Palestine,155 so it is 
interesting to see both officials lending their support to a proposal which would have 
helped Nabulsi adults and children to enjoy the fresh air and exercise which can 
reduce the risks of their succumbing to such a disease. Unfortunately the archival 
records do not indicate whether this project went ahead, but the available material is 
revealing of these perceived benefits between sport and health, with possibly a tacit 
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understanding that money spent on sport would contribute to improvements in public 
health, and so reductions in expenditure on the medical budget. It is also reflective of 
the way that the local representatives of the District administration were willing to 
support the Nablus Municipal Council in its bid for a compulsory purchase order from 
the Government in Jerusalem in cases where there was a shared perception that a 
particular proposal was in the public interest. That there are not more such examples 
in the archives might suggest that there were not many local council initiatives of this 
nature. Larger scale projects, due to their size and funding requirements, were 
necessarily the preserve of the Mandatory authority, and chapter III in this thesis will 
examine the largest infrastructure development undertaken by the British in Nablus, 
which was the provision of an urban water supply. 
Resource constraints were clearly also a factor in the lease or purchase of land for 
Government use, in terms of ensuring that what was paid did not go beyond what 
was considered fair market value for a particular plot in its specific location. 
However, in the case of the Balata landing ground, the detailed correspondence 
which has survived suggests that the concept of fair value was applied to the land-
owner / lessor as much as it was to the British lessee. This suggests that a careful 
evaluation had been carried out of how an appropriate price in relation to prevailing 
market conditions was likely to have avoided the creation of grievances on the part 
of displaced cultivators which might have become the source of more widespread 
opposition to British rule in the Jabal Nablus region. 
In 1932 the Royal Air Force (RAF) planned to establish a landing ground to be 
available if necessary in the vicinity of the village of Balata.156 Some years later, 
having located a suitable site to lease, it appears that the rental agreed had not been 
paid to the landlords.157 The case had been the subject of arbitration concerning the 
appropriate rental value158 and was also heard in the Land Court of Nablus.159 One 
of the issues to be settled was that of water supply to the site, with the names of 
those supplying water from neighbouring villages, and an agreement on the hourly 
rate.160 From a statement of evidence given by a British surveyor working in the 
Department of Lands and Surveys161it is clear that careful and thorough calculations 
had been made concerning an appropriate rental for the site in relation to the 
agricultural produce foregone because it had been taken over by the RAF. A detailed 
estimate had been prepared by an Agricultural Officer in Jerusalem of the production 
costs and subsequent sales revenue accruing from the cultivation of both onions and 
wheat across a four year period as one of the inputs contributing to the estimate of 
fair value for the land.162 A local Nabulsi land-owner was also invited to be part of the 
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Board of Arbitration set up to establish the appropriate payments to be made to the 
landowners.163 It is furthermore clear from related correspondence that the 
Government was willing to treat the land-owners “generously”164 and to pay a higher 
rent during those periods when water was available for irrigation purposes.165 As its 
Chief Agricultural Officer observed, the land in question was a significant portion of 
the total area owned by its proprietors, and so its use by the RAF would deprive 
them of the means of gaining a livelihood from agricultural production.166  No doubt 
part of the reason for this extensive analysis was that the Government considered 
the original valuation to have been too high167 but there is sufficient evidence in the 
extensive file on this subject168 of genuine attempts to confirm fair value, and we 
know from the opening entries that the leases were eventually agreed.169 
Different concerns were apparent when the military started complaining in 1934 that 
the proximity of the municipal refuse incinerators, tannery, and abattoir to the Nablus 
barracks was leading to concerns regarding the health of the troops and police 
stationed there.170These facilities had originally been constructed in 1921 with the 
approval of the Mandatory authorities when a detachment of the Indian army was 
occupying the barracks.171 By the end of 1934 the Department of Health had 
identified a new site some distance from both the town and the barracks.172 The 
Nablus Municipal authority had no objection to the proposed relocation, but argued 
that it had insufficient funds to carry out the proposed relocation.173 They argued that 
the slaughter house fees were already amongst the highest in Palestine and that it 
was not possible to increase them. “The depressive financial means of the tax 
payer”174 furthermore meant that it was not feasible to either increase the rates, or to 
raise any loans for this purpose. Their argument was not however confined to 
financial constraints, as Mayor Suleiman went on to note that the existing site of the 
slaughter house was a former Ottoman state domain property which had been sold 
to the municipality for the purpose of erecting the incinerator, tannery, and slaughter 
house. The site itself had been chosen by the Department of Health, and approved  
by the Mandatory Government, so it was logical for the British to contribute towards 
the costs of relocation. 
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The extensive correspondence which was exchanged between September 1934 and 
December 1935 between the Chief Engineer in Nablus, the Northern District 
Commissioner in Haifa, and the Chief Medical Officer and Chief Secretary in 
Jerusalem indicates that there was no real dispute concerning the need for central 
government funding to enable the relocation. Unfortunately however, the archival 
records do not contain any definitive statements that such funding was forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, in a letter of 18th January 1935 from the Chief Secretary to the 
Northern District Commissioner175 the former approved expenditure by the 
municipality of £P 430 for the purchase of the proposed new site, the cost of four 
new incinerators, the purchase of a motor refuse truck and the covering and cleaning 
of the existing site.176  The approval did not however come with any firm commitment 
from Jerusalem to provide these funds. Instead it was suggested that that sum 
should be considered as a possible future grant-in-aid to the municipality depending 
on its financial condition.177  This reluctance to make a firm commitment of 
government funds had clearly caused a degree of frustration in the military, as in his 
letter of 19 April 1935178to the Chief Secretary the Director of Medical 
Servicesasserted that he was constantly receiving complaints from the army and air 
force medical services concerning the swarms of flies surrounding the abattoir: and 
went on to claim179 that he had even had a visit from the D.D.M.B. British Troops in 
Egypt on this matter. It would appear that conditions in Nablus were not a priority for 
the Mandatory authorities even when their own troops were vociferously 
complaining. 
These cases at the level of local governance indicate the limitations imposed by 
resource constraints, combined with the efforts made by the British authorities at the 
local level to avoid confrontation with the Nabulsis in the course of their day to day 
administrative activities, and to make at least some attempts –however inadequate- 
to address the problems faced by the people of the Jabal Nablus area. The 
chronology of the correspondence nevertheless indicates that issues arising from 
Jabal Nablus were not considered a priority as far as Government HQ in Jerusalem 
was concerned. That the Northern District Commissioner had to wait until the 18th 
January 1935 for a response from the Chief Secretary to his letter of 29 November 
1934 is indicative of this. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the impact of events during the early years following the 
arrival of the British on their perceptions of the Jabal Nablus area. It has then 
examined the political reports drawn up at the time for what they reveal about the 
 
175Municipal Services, 99 
176  These details are set out in a letter of 29 November 1934 from the Northern District Commissioner to the 
Chief Secretary. That of 18 January 1935 is the response to it 
177  Letter of 18 January 1935 from Chief Secretary to Northern District Commissioner, para 3 
178Municipal Services  81 
179  Letter of 19 April 1935 from Director of Medical Services to the Chief Secretary, para 2 
85 
 
Government’s priorities in maintaining law and order and avoiding the development 
of opposition which could subsequently lead to more widespread disturbances if not 
properly handled at the point of inception. An examination of local governance in and 
around the town has revealed the limiting effects of resource constraints, while also 
acknowledging that the authorities were largely successful in monitoring the political 
activities of the local elites and suppressing any possibilities of popular resistance in 
Nablus.  
It is unsurprising that the British were suspicious of Nablus as a potential site of 
resistance to colonial rule, and that they monitored its politically active elite families, 
given their widespread and active relations with Palestine’s neighbouring territories 
in general, and the Hashemite dynasty in particular. This had a significant impact in 
framing the way they perceived the British mandate and reacted to it. It was 
furthermore an almost exclusively Muslim town, and as Weldon Matthews has 
noted:180 
“the political orientation of the city’s ‘ayan.....tended to face Damascus as 
much as Jerusalem....(its) nationalist leaders displayed a pronounced pan-
Syrian nationalism mixed with an element of competitiveness with the 
Jerusalem politicians.” 
Taking into account that context, the chapter has focussed on the British perspective 
on the town, both in terms of its overriding policy towards Palestine, and from the 
perspective of specific interactions between officials and Nabulsi citizens at the 
Departmental and local level of the Mandatory administration. As stated above,181 
there was a general absence of overt hostility between British officials and the 
Nabulsis in the course of their day to day interactions, so I conclude that hostility 
towards the Mandate in this part of Palestine was based on ideological opposition to 
the JNH policy, reinforced by the awareness of those in the Nablus political class of 
contemporaneous regional events, where other territories were achieving (a degree 
of) independence from their colonial masters. For this town in particular the 
opposition was reinforced by the fact that its population was overwhelmingly Muslim, 
and that prior to the arrival of the British it had not had as much experience as towns 
and cities like Jaffa and Jerusalem in dealing with Europeans. Apart from periodic 
arrivals of Christian missionaries who were treated with suspicion and considered to 
be the agents of the colonial powers, Nablus had largely been left untouched by 
western influence prior to World War I.   
As far as the Mandatory authorities were concerned, those responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order, including the monitoring of political activism, held the 
Nabulsis in some suspicion as at least a potential centre of opposition and unrest. 
That negative perception at the national level of the Government based in Jerusalem 
 
180  Weldon Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in 
Mandate Palestine (I B Taurus. New York. 2006), 39 
181 See page 75 above 
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may have been one of the reasons why the District Commissioner’s staff in the 
northern district of Palestine were careful to avoid any actions which would have 
aroused Nabulsi opposition, as well as taking steps to reduce opposition when it 
occurred: with the decision to remove Christian women teachers from one of the 
local schools in 1923 being a case in point.182Conversely however, due to the difficult 
economic conditions pertaining both in the UK and Palestine in the 1920s, and the 
concomitant Treasury imposed spending constraints, there was no real scope for 
increasing expenditure in this non-priority area, even if it was considered able to 
reduce the levels of latent hostility to the Mandatory authorities. 
There is a further dimension which needs to be taken into consideration if Nabulsi 
opposition to the British is to be properly understood. The town was somewhat 
geographically remote in the Northern hills, both from the capital and from the 
coastal strip. It could be argued that this sense of relative isolation served to 
reinforce Nablus’s orientation towards ‘the interior’, geographically speaking. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter to this thesis, Nablus had flourished in the 
nineteenth century as a nodal point in the network of power relations established by 
the (land-based) Ottoman empire, and was not primarily orientated towards the 
sea.183 The Mandatory administration’s priorities for Palestine were nevertheless 
concentrated on the coastal strip, and in particular on the town of Haifa.184 I have 
argued in the preceding chapter that British macro-economic policies in Palestine 
disadvantaged the central ‘spine’ of the country where Nablus was located in relation 
to the more rapidly developing coastal strip. It was the relative decline which the 
Nabulsis suffered in comparison both with their former Ottoman status and in relation 
to the economic growth of the coastal towns, which was the root cause of their 
opposition. This is not to assert however that the town was entirely neglected by the 
Mandatory authorities, and the following chapter will examine the major infrastructure 




182 See pages 72-73 above 
183 Introductory chapter, page 17 
184 For a general discussion of the importance of Haifa to British development policy see chapter 3 of Jacob 








EMASCULATING  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  MANDATE  PALESTINE: 
THE  CASE  OF  THE  NABLUS  WATER  SYSTEM 
Although other nations have had more imposing buildings and a greater display of 
political influence, none did so much as Britain for the sick poor of the land1 
Introduction 
Chapter II focussed on the years immediately following World War I, and  set out 
British perceptions of Nablus together with the way that they interacted with it at the 
local level. The analysis of that relationship revealed a Mandatory policy towards 
Jabal Nablus of ‘de minimis’ engagement, clearly illustrating that the area was not 
considered a priority for the government in Jerusalem, concentrating as it was on the 
rapidly developing coastal strip.2 As a result, a picture emerged of the ongoing, day 
to day activities of government in an area where the main preoccupation was the 
maintenance of peace and stability. 
This chapter by contrast, in similar fashion to the succeeding  chapters IV and V of 
the thesis, embarks on a much more closely focussed and detailed case study or 
‘snapshot’ of a specific event. Here it is a water supply project, while in chapter IV it 
is the 1927 earthquake, and in chapter V an incident between the Mayor of Nablus 
and the British military forces during the first year of the Arab Revolt in 1936. The 
purpose of such an approach in these chapters is to reveal at the local level the 
impact of the Mandatory government’s policies towards the Jabal Nablus region 
which was discussed at a more macro level in chapter II. This contributes towards a 
better understanding of what a ‘de minimis’ approach meant in practical terms. 
Within that context chapter III examines here the relationship between the British and 
the Nabulsis viewed through the lens of the one significant infrastructure project 
carried out in the town under the Mandate. This was the development of water 
supplies and sewerage disposal in the more affluent residential areas,3 following 
various ad hoc improvements which had been carried out during the 1920s. This 
gave rise to a large amount of correspondence in 1934 between Government 
officials ‘on site,’ the Mandatory HQ in Jerusalem, and the Colonial Office, Crown 
Agents and suppliers in the UK.4 It is consequently a rich source of material to 
analyse the dynamic between these various groups and determine the shifting 
contours of British rule over the city. 
 
1 E.W.G. Masterman, Hygiene and Disease in Palestine in Modern and in Biblical Times (Palestine Exploration 
Fund, London, 1920),  x 
2 For a discussion in this respect of Haifa, ‘the capital of British Palestine’ see  Jacob Norris, Land of Progress,   
99-102 
3 See the section on ‘The New Nablus Water Supply Project’ starting at page 98 below 
4 See the section on ‘Implementation Problems’ starting at page 105 below 
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Water supplies also fell within the widening range of services offered by municipal 
councils in the closing decades of the Ottoman empire.5 The particular project which 
is the subject of this chapter provides a good illustration of the way that the British 
authorities under the Mandate effectively emasculated the powers of the councils 
together with the development of local democracy which had become apparent by 
the turn of the twentieth century.6 The formal position of the Government was that it 
was updating the structure of the old Ottoman system and clarifying and expanding 
the responsibilities of municipal authorities so that the populace could better 
understand the rationale for local taxation.7 Perhaps unsurprisingly its view of local 
administration prior to World War I tended towards the negative, with the 
Administrative Councils established by the Turkish authorities being described as 
“supplementing the somewhat untrustworthy services of a corrupt and inefficient 
body of public officers.”8 That there had been a certain flowering of civic pride and 
municipal development in the early years of the twentieth century was largely 
ignored. In Nablus itself for example there had been a municipal sewage project, and 
a clock tower to celebrate the first jubilee of Sultan Abd al-Hamid, together with the 
establishment of a public park and theatre in the Shuwaytira neighbourhood.9 
Notwithstanding British perceptions of the differences between themselves and the 
former administration, some have argued that there was in fact a good deal of 
continuity in the sense that both regimes essentially used the organs of local 
government as a means of extending the reach of the colonial power.10 
One of the justifications used by the British for constraining municipal autonomy was 
the need for fiscal restraint. It brought the system of local government under close 
budgetary control, justified in particular by reference to the Tel Aviv council, which 
was held to be spending beyond its means and so incurring debts that could 
ultimately fall to the national government in Jerusalem.11 An analysis of the Nablus 
water supply project within the context of such fiscal considerations contributes to 
improving our understanding as to how the issue of development expenditure led to 
a tightening of national government control and reduced the scope for local 
initiatives. This led to the somewhat paradoxical situation whereby a policy of 
minimal government intervention by the Mandatory authorities in Jabal Nablus did 
 
5  The councils themselves were created in 1863. For a discussion of their subsequent evolution see Farid Al-
Salim,  Palestine and the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, Modernisation and the Path to Palestinian Statehood  
(L B Taurus & Co, London, 2015)   195-196 
6  Ibid 
7  For an insight into how the British in the 1920s perceived the Ottoman system and considered what changes 
were necessary for their own purposes, see  the Memo on Municipal Government in CO 733/134/3, TNA 
8  Memo on Municipal Government   page 4, para 5 
9 Mahmoud Yazbak, ‘The Municipality of a Muslim Town, Nablus 1868 – 1914’. Archiv Orientalni, Vol.67, No.3, 
1999, 359.  Academia Publishing House, Prague. 
10  See Usamah Shahwan,  Public Administration in Palestine Past and Present (University Press of America, 
Oxford, 2003)  xv. He argued that “the ideology of administration in this part of the world has been an ideology 
of domination rather than development” – under the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and the Israelis 
11  Ibid.  Covering note of 31st January 1927.  For a discussion of the relationship between municipal and central 
government in Palestine, see pages 93 – 97 below 
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not translate into any potential to expand the degree of local autonomy.Quite the 
contrary, given that the responsibility for raising the initial capital cost for the water 
supply project was vested in the Mandatory Government in Jerusalem under 
conditions set down by the Treasury in London. These included an obligation on the 
local municipal authority to be responsible for the repayments.12 In this respect the 
project reflected the de minimis or ‘under-developed’ approach which is the leitmotif 
of this thesis in characterising the British approach to Nablus. The several years that 
it took to negotiate a loan of £18,000 for the town’s water supply can be contrasted 
with the £1 Million that had been made available for the development of Haifa and its 
surrounding hinterland in 1927.13 
The provision of water supplies was furthermore a significant factor in thinking on 
colonial development during the early decades of the twentieth century. This was in 
part a response to rising expectations amongst the local populace, where “the 
literate, urban middle classes of Palestine demanded cleaner cities and more 
municipal services.”14Scholars such as Michelle Campos trace these expectations to 
the Young Turk revolution of 1908 which saw the dissemination of ideas concerning 
progress and development in society, including, but not restricted to, the reform of 
municipal government so that it better responded to the aspirations of the citizens it 
was responsible for serving.15 The evolving sense of civic pride during the decades 
immediately preceding World War I looked to the examples set by European cities, 
with their modern transport and communication systems as well as running water 
supplies.16 
Running in parallel to these rising expectations was a move away from the classical 
free-market liberalism of the nineteenth century towards a view of imperial territories 
as constituting a single market for the sale of British goods and services, and so the 
rationale for their development along Western lines was that as their standard of 
living increased they would be able to purchase more from the UK, and so offset that 
country’s domestic economic problems brought about by the Great Depression.17The 
insistence by the Crown Agents that only British manufacturers of water supply pipes 
should be allowed to bid for the Nablus urban water and waste water project should 
be seen in the context of this new thinking concerning the rationale for colonial 
 
12  See the section below on ‘The New Nablus Water Supply Project’ starting at page 98 
13  Norris, Land of Progress,  107 
14 Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers, Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine  
(Stanford University Press,  Stanford, 2011)  172 
15 Campos, Ottoman Brothers  172 – 182 on ‘Municipal Modernity’ 
16 Ibid. Campos also sets out in these pages the development of calls for Jerusalem to be furnished with 
modern water supplies, an aspiration that was bedevilled by problems in raising the necessary capital, 
meaning that it was not until the arrival of the British after the end of World War I that a modern water supply 
would become available 
17 For a flavour of this mode of thinking, see Leopold Amery’s introduction to A PLAN  OF ACTION: Embodying a 
series of reports issued by the Research Committee of the Empire Economic Union and other papers (Faber & 
Faber, London, 1932).  See also Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy,  301 
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development which emerged in the late 1920s.18 The issues raised in this particular 
chapter suggest that there may be potential for further research on the activities of 
British banks such as Barclays, and British pipe manufacturers such as Stantons in 
Palestine, the impact they had on local economic development, and their evolving 
relationship with the mandatory authorities.19  By the 1930s a system of imperial 
preferences was encouraging British exports into overseas colonial territories as a 
means of offsetting the reduced levels of demand in the domestic economy at the 
time of the Great Depression.20 As far as Palestine was concerned, remittances in 
payment for goods purchased from the UK could be effected via Barclays Bank, 
which had been appointed as banker to the British Government in Palestine, and 
was considered the leading bank there.21 The generally favourable conditions 
pertaining in the territory, which was relatively unaffected by the global financial crisis 
of the early 1930s,22 made it an attractive location for infrastructure development. 
This goes some way to explaining the rivalry between the Stanton and Staveley pipe 
manufacturing companies,23 both of whom saw Mandate Palestine as an important 
market for the sort of water supply projects which provided their major overseas 
business opportunities. 
The rationale for expenditure on public health and scientific research in the colonies 
was also justified on the basis that increased living standards and economic 
development would lead to rising levels of demand and increased business 
opportunities for UK firms. This can be seen in the thinking behind the 1929 Colonial 
Development Act.24 It is revealing that part of the case for improved water supplies in 
Nablus was based on the argument that better sanitation would lead to 
improvements in public health – and so by implication reduced demands for 
Government funded health services.25 Furthermore, as the Mandate developed, and 
opposition to it was growing in Palestine during the 1930s, another strand became 
apparent in thinking on colonial development, namely that it should enable an 
improved state of well-being amongst the local population – although this was 
arguably more to provide a justification for retaining colonial territories than due to 
any altruism on the part of London policy makers.26 
 
18  For more on the disputes which broke out between the Crown Agents and the Mandatory Government in 
Jerusalem, see page 106 below  
19  As Jacob Norris has noted,  “the penetration of European investment and financial services industries into 
Palestine under British rule has thus far received scant attention from scholars, and there is a need for future 
research:”  Jacob Norris, Land of Progress,  161  
20  Sarah Stockwell (Ed),  The British Empire, Themes and Perspectives (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008)   121 
21  A P S Clark, ‘Commerce, Industry & Banking’ in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences 164,  ‘Palestine, a Decade of Development’, (November 1932), 103 
22  Clark, ‘Commerce, Industry & Banking‘  107 
23  See page 109 below 
24  Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy  302: “the measure was symptomatic of an 
anxiety......for the relief of a British economy in distress.” 
25  Letter of 09 March 1932 from Sir Arthur Wauchope, High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary in CO 
733/226/14, TNA 
26 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy  303 
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Water was a central element in questions concerning the extent of state intervention 
in society and the economy, both domestically in the UK, and also as far as its 
overseas possessions were concerned. As Leopold Amery had argued, the medical 
andscientific discoveries showing the relationship between water supplies, 
sanitation, and healthcare undermined the 19th Century ‘night-watchman’ concept of 
the state, and increasingly obliged it to engage in and develop the basic 
infrastructure of in particular urban communities.27These were not however the only 
reasons justifying state intervention in this sector. The large scale of water supply 
projects, the need to co-opt land for the development of reservoirs, and the 
development of a degree of regulation to ensure equitable supply across a 
multiplicity of private households all combined to make the central government the 
logical choice as overseer.28 
In Egypt and India by contrast the importance of water supplies was perceived more 
in terms of irrigation for a myriad of small scale farmers dependent either on the 
flooding of the Nile or the coming of the annual monsoon rains: and where if either 
did not recur as expected, then the resultant crop failure could lead to food 
shortages, famine, and political unrest.29 In India for example the construction of 
canals enabled the cultivation of land that had hitherto not been used for crop 
production, while the building of railways then conveyed those crops to the growing 
population in the towns.30 In Palestine by contrast irrigation of agricultural land was 
mainly an initiative of the Jewish settlers, and the role of the Mandatory Government 
in relation to railway infrastructure more focussed on enabling the export of 
Mesopotamian oil through the port of Haifa,with the capacity to convey agricultural 
produce asecondary consideration.31 As far as water was concerned the priority  was 
very much the improvement of supplies to the urban population.32 
As such, the project which is the subject of this chapter relates to those broader 
themes of the thesis which consider, inter alia, the minimum necessary development 
investment in a non-priority area concordant with the Government’s responsibilities 
as a mandatory power. It is also relevant to the issue of relations between the 
imperial power and the local notables through whom it attempted to govern, as the 
water supply was restricted to those residential households with the means to 
purchase it, and it was the leading families in Nablus, as opposed to the urban poor, 
who were the beneficiaries. 
 
27 For a general discussion of this theme see L C A Knowles,  The Economic Development of the British Overseas 
Empire (George Routledge & Sons, London 1924), Volume 1,  52 
28 Knowles, Economic Development 52 
29Ibid  
30Ibid, 382 
31 For a discussion of the development of railways in Palestine, and their relationship to the port of Haifa, see 
Jacob Norris,  Land of Progress,  110 - 116 
32 See for example in relation to Jerusalem, Vincent Lemire,  La Soif De Jerusalem, Essai d’hydrohistoire (1840 – 
1948) (Publication de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2010) 
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Considering that focus, and in light of the fact that the new water supply system in 
Nablus was designed to serve only parts of the urban municipal area, it is 
appropriate to start our discussion of the Mandatory Government’s impact on the 
development of the town’s infrastructure with a brief overview of how local 
government was organised under the Mandate. This will be followed by a similar 
overview of water and sewerage in the Jabal Nablus to set the context for the new 
Nablus water supply project which is analysed in detail in the subsequent section. 
The project itself gave rise to various implementation problems, mainly relating to 
malfunctioning pipes, and these are considered from the perspective of what they 
reveal of the tensions between the different levels of the Mandatory Government 
from Nablus via Jerusalem to London. Finally the chapter goes on to consider the 
impact of the 1935 floods on Jabal Nablus and the government response to it. The 
conclusion then draws together the various themes to emerge from the issue of 
water supplies and their associated infrastructure.  
District and Municipal Government in Palestine 
Political and administrative power in mandate Palestine was concentrated in the 
High Commissioner’s post in Jerusalem, and then  exercised through a series of 
District and Assistant District Commissioners (DCs and ADCs), of which the former 
in Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem.33 In the Northern District, governed from Haifa, there 
were ADCs in Haifa, Nablus and Nazareth.34  In the administrative machinery as a 
whole, Arabs and Jews were employed alongside UK nationals, although it was the 
latter who monopolised the senior positions where responsibility for administrative 
policy was vested.35 
No doubt part of the rationale for this was awareness of the controversial nature of 
the Jewish national home policy, although those in Jerusalem would on occasion 
play up the local political sensitivities when seeking to justify claims for increased 
resources from the Government in London. A letter from High Commissioner 
Wauchope is revealing in this respect:36 
“My.....experience of the disturbances of 1933 have convinced me............that 
it would be most unwise to risk the hazard of understaffing the Districts in 
British officers.Public security must be a factor of overriding importance 
in determining the question of the establishment of British officers in 
the Districts, in view of the unpopularity with a large section of the 
 
33  For a discussion of District Administration in 1933 see CO 733/240/2, TNA 
34  CO 733/240/2,  6, note of 04 March 1933, TNA 
35  CO/733/259/6. Draft letter of 22 February 1934, para 2, TNA:“the Secretary of State……concurs... that, while 
it is desirable to increase the number of Palestinians in the higher ranks of the service, such appointments 
must for some time be confined for the most part to vacancies in the technical departments and that, for the 
present, responsibility for the administrative and political affairs of government, in a general sense, must 
continue to be vested in British officers.” 
36   CO/733/259/6  3, para 3, TNA: letter of 12 February 1934 from High Commissioner Wauchope to Cunliffe-
Lister, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies 
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population of the policy which government has to pursue.”(Emphasis 
added) 
Also revealing in the same letter are some of his policy priorities, where Wauchope 
asserts that he is “anxious by every possible means to ensure closer administration 
of the country and to bring about more intensive development of agriculture and 
improvement of conditions of health.”Important as these two sectors undoubtedly 
were – as was education – they were not priorities in terms of the financial 
allocations made within the total budget of £E2 Million for the Mandatory 
Government during 1926 – 1927.37 Of 25 itemised areas of expenditure, the contents 
of the top ten showed that infrastructure and security were the priorities:  
Police and Prisons…………………..£E 306 Thousand (to nearest thousand) 
Railways………………………….…...£E 290 
Transjordan Frontier Force…….……£E 166 
Public Works Recurrent………….….£E 147 
Miscellaneous………………….…….£E 122 
Education………………………..……£E 114 
Posts & Telegraphs……………..…...£E 106 
District Admin…………………........….£E 95 
Health……………………………..........£E 89 
Judicial Department…………....…......£E 6838 
Municipal Government of the urban areas by contrast was mainly locally funded, and 
broadly a continuation of the Ottoman system39 established by the Vilayet  Municipal  
Law of  October 1877.40 The budgets of the 22 municipalities in Palestine had to be 
approved by the District Commissioners, and there was a general expectation that 
they would only spend according to the money they could raise via taxes and licence 
fees in their area of jurisdiction.41 One of their principal sources of income was a tax 
ranging from 5% - 10% of the value of property, with that in Nablus being 7.5%. The 
 
37  Palestine Blue Book, 1926 – 1927. CO 821/1,TNA 
38 Excludes extraordinary expenditure of £E129 K on Public Works, £E 81 K on Railways, and £E 20 K on Posts & 
Telecommunications 
39 For a summary of that system in relation to Jerusalem see Yasemin Avci, Vincent Lemire & Falestin Naili, 
‘Publishing Jerusalem’s Ottoman Municipal Archives (1892 – 1917)’. Institute for Palestine Studies, 2014, Issue 
60, 110  (http://www.palestine-studies.org/jq/fulltext/187215) 
40 For a discussion on the history and operation of municipal government in Mandate Palestine see  CO 




total income of the Nablus Municipality from all sources in 1927 was £P 5,612, a little 
higher than Acre (£P5,154) and a little lower than Nazareth (£P 6,809).42 
In 1926 the issue of Municipal Government was subject to a thorough appraisal by E 
Mills, the Assistant Chief Secretary at Government House Jerusalem.43  A covering 
note to his sixty page report indicated that the drivers for that appraisal included the 
decision to revive the local councils, issues relating to the Tel Aviv council, and the 
recurrence of smallpox in Palestine.44That Municipal Government was viewed in the 
broader context of British colonial administration is evidenced by the views of the 
then High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, that the legal and administrative structure for 
Palestine should be based along the lines of the municipal laws in Ceylon, which he 
understood to be “the most suitable colonial model.”45It is also interesting to note 
Mills’ observation that women were allowed to vote in the local elections in Tel Aviv, 
and his recommendation that the franchise should be extended to them “where such 
extension is suitable.”46The extension of the franchise to women in the town may 
have been a contributory factor to Nabulsi opposition to Jewish immigration, if the 
leaders of the notable families –all male- perceived a threat to their political 
ascendancy by the example of female participation in Tel Aviv.47 
The preface to the report makes clear that consideration was being given to the 
relationship between central Government Departments and the local authorities, and 
was mindful of the structure established in the UK, where the urban population 
enjoyed “a certain freedom of action within the circumscription of the law.”48 As far as 
elections of local representatives were concerned, this contrasted with the Ottoman 
system, where the selection of candidates for membership of the Administrative 
Councils was influenced by the central Government.49It is also interesting to note the 
reasons Mills gave for clarifying the powers and responsibilities of local councils, 
given his assertion that “it is essential that citizens should know to what extent 
restraint may be imposed upon their liberties by the local authority.”50Here then was 
the concept of constitutional government and citizens’ rights, albeit within the context 
of a Mandatory authority. Specific reference is subsequently made to the UK’s 
obligations in relation to the League of Nations,51 including those to assist the subject 
population along the path to independence. He nevertheless draws the conclusion 
 
42 Palestine Blue Book, 1927, 67. No explanation is given as to why municipal revenues in Nablus were lower 
than in the much smaller town of Nazareth, but the disparity might be accounted for by the sale of licences to 
street stall holders catering to the needs of pilgrims visiting Christ’s place of birth 
43An Enquiry into Municipal Government in Palestine, 16 December 1926 in CO 733/134/3, TNA 
44Ibid, 1A 
45Ibid, 3. Unfortunately no explanation was given in this file as to why Lord Plumer had been led to understand 
that Ceylon was the appropriate template 
46An Enquiry into Municipal Government, Para 62 of the covering note 
47 For a discussion of how women were effectively marginalised, especially in terms of constraints on their 
economic independence, see Doumani, Family Life,  237 
48Enquiry into Municipal Government  8 
49Ibid, 4 
50 Ibid, 15 
51 Ibid, 22 para 37 
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that because the responsibility is that of the UK as a member state of the League, 
then 
“it appears to follow that all acts of local authorities constituted by election 
from the people must be subject to the scrutiny and approval of the central 
authority who alone is in the position to ensure that they are of such standard 
and quality as to command universal confidence.”52 
Local autonomy it would appear was constrained by administrative fiat from 
Jerusalem as and when the High Commissioner saw fit. With that caveat the 
Municipal Franchise Ordinance brought into existence elected municipalities in 
Palestine for the first time since the arrival of the British in 1917.53 
Their powers and responsibilities were designed to reflect those of the central 
Government Departments “as formulated and defined in Ordinances which also 
make a municipal council a sanitary authority, veterinary authority etc. when acting 
with the advice” of those Departments.54Here again we see that the model for local 
government in Palestine was influenced by the structures with which the 
administrators were familiar in the UK:55 albeit with an acknowledgement that it 
would take time to develop expertise at the local level in such areas as education.56 
The Mandatory authority consequently maintained a high degree of control over 
municipal affairs. Under the Town Planning Ordinance the construction of roads and 
the erection of buildings was controlled by the Local Town Planning Commission in 
which the municipal representatives were a minority.57Under the Trades and 
Industries Ordinance the issue of all licences were subject to the approval of the 
Public Health Department and the Police, who had powers to impose conditions.58 
Alongside the municipalities was a parallel network of local offices of the central 
Government Departments.59 Should the local councils have issues to raise with the 
Mandatory authorities they were discouraged from writing to the Head Office in 
Jerusalem, and referred to the local District Offices. This happened in September 
1933 when Mayor Tuqan wrote to the officer administering the Government in 
Jerusalem asking for more financial support for the town and its soap industry.60 
Although the response was drafted there, it issued from the District Commissionerfor 
 
52 Ibid, Para 38 
53Ibid, 32 
54Ibid, 47 
55 As well as elsewhere in the colonies: see reference to Ceylon on page 95 above 
56 Enquiry into Municipal Government  48 
57  O’Donnell Commission report  112, Israel State Archives 
58  Ibid 
59Enquiry into Municipal Government 51 para 104: the work of the central government departments is 
“conducted through the local executive officers of departments and the District Commissioners. Each District 
now has an officer at the Headquarters of the District whose duty it is under the instructions of the District 
Commissioner to co-ordinate such approaches and to consolidate municipal activity by advice and criticism.” 
60  Memorandum by the Municipality of Nablus re- general improvements to the Economic conditions in 




the Northern District.61This is unsurprising, given that government administration at 
District level was responsible for liaison between the central Departments based in 
Jerusalem and the local population, as well as having a responsibility of general 
oversight of the work of the local municipalities.62The response itself was somewhat 
evasive concerning government support for the soap industry, noting that a report on  
its future was currently under consideration, and its recommendations were awaiting 
a decision by the High Commissioner.63The impression given was that one of the 
most important drivers of the Nabulsi economy was not considered a matter of great 
importance as far as the government in Jerusalem was concerned. One sector not 
covered in the Mayor’s letter, but consideredof particular importance by the British 
authorities,was that of water and sewerage, whose provision was challenging in the 
hilly terrain of the Jabal Nablus, and whose quality had a direct impact on the health 
of the population. It is to this sector which we now turn. 
Water and Sewerage in the Jabal Nablus 
Nablus lies towards the northern end of a ridge of hills stretching south through 
Jerusalem to Hebron. That location gives it a climate typical of hill districts, where 
rainfall is irregular, and often characterised by short but heavy downpours, with 
significant variations year on year.64 As in most parts of the country there tends to be 
a concentration of rainfall in the winter months, with little, if any, precipitation during 
the summer.65 The combination of these characteristics means that the storing and 
supply of fresh water,66 as well as the treatment and disposal of waste water was an 
issue of significant importance for both the urban and agricultural communities.67 
In the early years of the Mandate work relating to water supplies tended to be carried 
out on an ad hoc basis and was typically related to work on specific buildings. For 
example, during the 1924 – 1925 financial year the Department of Public Works 
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Archives:  Memorandum by the Municipality of Nablus re- general improvements to the Economic conditions in 
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improved the sanitation during the course of general repairs to Nablus hospital, 
which included the installation of a new pumping plant. It also made improvements to 
the latrines at the Health Department offices.68 Upgrading the facilities at Nablus 
barracks by contrast involved the installation of a completely new system to replace 
a water supply which had previously been provided by prison labour carrying water 
carts to the barracks: 
“A complete new water supply service has been installed. The water is 
pumped from the well at the British Gendarmerie barracks and conveyed by 
pipeline to the Police Barracks to supply cisterns of 1,000 gallons capacity. 
Distribution pipes from the supply tanks have been laid to the Inspector’s 
quarters, mens’ ablution sheds and horse trough.”69 
The sanitary aspect of water supply and sewerage was of course a matter of 
concern to the health authorities, and it is interesting to note the description of a new 
drainage scheme in Nablus which appears in the 1925 Annual Report of the 
Department of Health. This improved connections for many households to the 
existing sewerage network by reducing the amount of leakage, and ensuring that 
ventilation of the waste pipes was to the air outside the house, as opposed to 
formerly, when odours from the main sewers could pass up inside the house, so 
threatening the health of the householders.70Generally ad hoc improvements 
continued through the mid-1920s, with reference to an overhaul to the water supply 
at the Old Serai in Nablus appearing in the 1925 – 1926 report of the Department of 
Public Works.71 
The New Nablus Water Supply Project 
In that same report, however, reference is also made to the preparation of a scheme 
for a new water supply for the whole town.72 It was nevertheless some time in 
gestation, as six years later the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem was writing 
to the Colonial Office in London asking for supplementary funds to “improve the 
water supply at Nablus by the installation of a piped supply which will replace the 
present antiquated and insanitary system of transport on animals or by water 
carriers.”73 
It is interesting to note how the case was made for justifying these additional funds. 
The letter notes the rapid development of Nablus, albeit without stating the extent to 
which this is due to new building, expanded economic activity, population growth, or 
a combination of such factors. It nevertheless makes explicit “that the absence of 
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72Ibid, 16 
73  CO 733/209/16, TNA, Letter of 29 August 1931 from John Chancellor, High Commissioner, to J H Thomas PC 
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adequate supplies of water is now restricting further progress.”74 The provision of 
clean and uncontaminated water is considered as ‘very desirable.’75John Chancellor, 
the then High Commissioner, goes on to note that there are readily available sources 
of such water from the local springs to be found in the vicinity of the town. This 
presence of local water sources meant that the provision of domestic water supplies 
in Nablus was essentially one of connection between point of source and point of 
consumption, a relatively easy task. Elsewhere in the Middle East the problems were 
more fundamental – as in the Gulf States, where Nelida Fuccarohas shown how the 
depletion of underground water reservesin Manama meant that new and deeper 
wells had to be sunk in an attempt to improve water supplies.76 Further afield in parts 
of India, the question of water supplies from large rivers was addressed in terms of 
flood control.77 Such attempts at environmental control were largely, but not 
completely absent in Jabal Nablus. As noted in page 106 below, part of the new 
Nablus water supply project involved laying pipes to connect two reservoirs on 
opposite sides of the valley in which Nablus is located. Reservoirs do of course 
constitute attempts to control and manage water flow so that it can more easily serve 
human requirements, but in this particular case they were already in place before the 
project got underway. What we have here is a proposal to make use of existing 
water supplies for the benefit of those Nabulsis willing and able to pay for them: and 
who in the process would also have the advantage of improved drainage systems for 
waste water, together with the concomitant health improvements that such systems 
can bring about. 
The estimated cost calculated by the Public Works Department of  installing “a 
properly controlled pipe supply and distribution system”78is given as £P18,000, with 
an additional £P1,500 for drainage improvements.79 It is revealing that the request 
for supplementary funding is broken down into these two elements, given that the 
size of the sum required for drainage is unlikely to have been of great interest to the 
Colonial Office. More likely this was a tactical ploy in requesting a sum total of £P 
19,500 with the tacit implication that £P 18,000 was what the Government Office in 
Jerusalem would be happy to receive.Moreover, in keeping with the general 
understanding that the colonies should as far as possible be self-funding,80the letter 
made clear that the sum requested would be in the form of an interest bearing loan 
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to be repaid in twelve years time. The capacity to do so would come from anticipated 
revenues from the levying of water rates based on the rental value of properties, and 
Chancellor asserted that 400 households had already signed up.81Given that the 
population of the town was a little over 17,000 around this time82 it is reasonable to 
presume that these households were those of the wealthiest families.83 One might go 
on to speculate that a critical mass of this number represented the minimum required 
to make the project viable, and from the estimates given of revenues rising from £P 
2,310 in the first year of operation to £P 3,900 in the twelfth84 that it was anticipated 
to build out the network to adjacent households over time. 
Unanswered, however, is the question of what would happen to those households 
unable to afford the water rates. If we presume ten occupants per household, then 
around 4,000 people had signed up representing less than 25% of the urban 
population. That figure would presumably grow over time, but it does indicate that 
more than half of the people of Nablus could have been excluded from the new 
water supply schemeand obliged to make do with their existing water supplies. Large 
scale infrastructure developmentsof this nature have  to proceed by stages, given 
the scale of investment and work which needs to be undertaken, but one is 
nevertheless left with the feeling that during those initial stages, where relatively 
small numbers of the population were beneficiaries of the new services, the effects 
on the larger numbers unable to afford them would have carried the risk of 
increasing feelings of marginalisation and exclusion.  
Paragraph 5 in the letter moves on to the real reason for its despatch to London: 
namely that Barclays Bank had indicated their willingness to grant a loan to fund the 
project, secured on the anticipated revenues from the water rates, but conditional on 
a UK Government guarantee to underwrite the repayments. It is on the request for 
such a guarantee that the letter concludes.85 Clearly the proposal had succeeded in 
generating some interest in Whitehall, as a note issued on 05 October 1931 from 
Downing Street in support of the High Commissioner, albeit with the caveat that 
“Barclays Bank may not now be willing, in the changed financial circumstances, to 
grant a loan of the amount required.”86 
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The response that came from the Treasury some three months later on the 19th 
November 1931 is revealing of the broader context of the Great Depression and the 
closer scrutiny of Government finances which was one of its results.87 Clearly the 
Colonial Secretary did not have the authority to make such an undertaking on behalf 
of the Government, and had been obliged to pass Chancellor’s request to the 
Treasury in view of the importance it attached to tight fiscal control in colonial 
administration, combined with a desire not to set precedents on the subject of loan 
guarantees for infrastructure development– including those selectively agreed for 
priority projects.88 The Treasury response was unequivocal: 
“there is clearly no urgency about the matter, and there appears to be no 
urgent public demand or health requirement which calls for a change in the 
methods of water supply.”89 
Its use of words is also revealing. ‘Urgency’ and ‘urgent’ are used in close proximity 
but without attempting to articulate from whose perspective the issue might be so: 
although its coupling with ‘public demand’ suggests that one of the criteria is the 
extent to which the colonial population wanted the development project in question. 
We might argue that that criterion sits rather oddly with the rationale for some of the 
main infrastructure developments in Mandate Palestine – such as the port of Haifa- 
where any ‘demand’ from the local population was negligible in relation to its 
strategic importance to the British Empire. This then leaves open the question as to 
whether part of the reason for the refusal to underwrite the loan was that the 
Government in London simply did not consider Nablus as a strategic priority within 
the broader context of British colonial development.  
An internal memo in the Treasury,90 drafted immediately prior to the formal response 
to the Colonial Secretary, suggests that this may in fact have been the case. In it, 
Nablus is described as “a small town, mostly of Arab population in the middle of 
Palestine.”91 Whereas it is accepted that piped water supplies are “essential”92 in 
Western towns, the note goes on to assert that although desirable, that is not the 
case “in an Arab village or small town.”93  There are then some more conventional 
Treasury arguments brought to bear, including the observation that the Nablus 
Municipal Government already owed the Mandatory authority in Jerusalem £2,500 
for sums it had earlier borrowed, and that implementation was expected of the 
O’Donnell-Brittain Commission’s recommendation to increase local urban rates. This 
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would mean that in Nablus a supplementary addition to fund the proposed water 
supply would add even more to the local tax burden, and as a result this could 
reduce the number of households electing to receive it, which in turn would reduce 
the level of estimated revenues from water supply and further weaken the financial 
position of the Municipality – possibly triggering a call on the requested Government 
guarantee.94 
These exchanges towards the end of 1931 continued for the next six months or so,95 
with the Colonial Office supporting the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, and the 
Treasury repeatedly pushing back on the grounds both of the risks involved and the 
precedent that would be set in providing a guarantee to a commercial bank. One of 
the reasons for the Treasury position was that the interest charged by in this case 
Barclays would be at a higher rate than the cost of borrowing if the Government was 
to raise the money for the project itself. Notwithstanding these continued objections, 
it is evident that the new High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, had clearly 
drawn the right conclusions from the earlier exchanges when he decided to write 
again on the same subject in a letter of 09 March 1932 to the new Colonial 
Secretary, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister.96 No doubt mindful of the impact of the Great 
Depression both on the UK economy and Treasury thinking, he agreed that the 
financial situation was not propitious as far as the proposed scheme for a new water 
supply in Nablus was concerned. Although echoing his predecessor’s opinion that 
the project was important, Wauchope argued that it merited continued consideration 
on the grounds of its potential contribution to public health, hinting, but not stating, 
that money spent on clean water supplies could mean money saved on healthcare.97 
By developing the case for the project along these lines the High Commissioner was 
staking out a position that was aligned to thinking at the time concerning the 
justification for colonial rule: namely its potential, via the use of experts, to improve 
the quality of life of the local population in ways which –by implication- they were 
unable to do themselves.98His approach was likely to have been more than simply a 
tactical consideration concerning how best to reduce Treasury opposition, as 
following his career in the colonial service, Chancellor was appointed in 1937 to the 
Colonial Development Advisory Committee.99 Having decided how best to present 
his case for approval to incur expenditure for these purposes the High Commissioner 
went on to develop his argument, noting that the current method of water distribution 
in the town “makes it perhaps the most dangerous drinking supply in the whole 
country.”100 This was because the water channels conveying the water to 
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residentialareas had fallen into disrepair, and, more importantly from a public health 
perspective, were in close proximity to the drainage and sewerage system which 
was in a similar state of disrepair.101 “The result is that the system is open to 
contamination at every point with sewage and by the time that it reaches the 
consumer is more dangerous than the dirtiest village well.”102 At this point in the 
letter the linkage to public health considerations (and their consequential cost) is 
made explicit, as Wauchope asserts that the incidence of typhoid and related 
intestinal diseases had been increasing both in the town itself and in the surrounding 
villages – which had a shared water supply to the extent that both sets of 
communities used the same sources of spring water. Evidence of the impact of those 
diseases was provided in terms of a ‘seriously high’103 infant mortality rate:  
“especially between the ages of one and two years, the time when they are first 
introduced to the town’s contaminated supply as their chief source of water.”104 
Wauchope was probably correct to draw attention to high infant mortality rates, as he 
could have pointed at the time to the recently published 1931 census of Palestine 
which indicated that they were especially high for the Moslem population105 - and 
Nablus was a predominately Muslim town. Those reporting to him who were resident 
there would also have been aware of the high proportion of children to that of the 
population as a whole: in Nablus the ratio of those aged less than 10 to those aged 
18 - 45 was 88:100, the highest in Palestine.106 It was consequently plausible to 
argue that contributory factors to the causes of diseases at which young children 
were at risk ought to have been a priority for Government intervention.   
Wauchope then continued to build his case in terms of risk mitigation by stating that 
he had decided that construction work for the new water supply should be carried out 
by the Department of Public Works, which would be made responsible for ensuring 
that there were no cost overruns.107 The operational phase would then be overseen 
by a Water Board whose membership represented an integration of local and 
national government interests, with the local mayor acting as chair, municipal 
counsellors, and medical and engineering representatives from the District 
Commissioner’s office.108 This proposed structure provides a good example of what 
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might be referred to today as ‘joined up government.’ Wauchope further proposed 
that separate accounts should be kept for the Water Supply Department, with any 
profits accruing which were not required for essential maintenance and improvement 
being reserved for the purposes of loan repayment. In today’s parlance, water supply  
money was to be ring-fenced so as to provide assurances that it would not be used 
to cross-subsidise activities other than those for which it was originally allocated. 
It is at this point in the letter that the High Commissioner then brought forward the 
proposal that he clearly thought was designed to allay Treasury fears about 
providing Government-backed guarantees (which would of course have to be 
entered as a liability in its accounts). He proposed that in the event that the 
requested guarantee was called in, that it would then become a preferential debt on 
the finances of the Municipal Council.109No explicit mention was made of what, if 
any, pressure had been brought to bear on the Nablus town council to accept this 
liability, but it is revealing that this statement is then followed by the observation that 
“it should be borne in mind that the annual estimates of the Municipality are 
approved by the District Commissioner.”110Here then is an example of how the 
network of District Commissioners’ offices in Palestine, both representing and 
reporting to the Government in Jerusalem, effectively controlled the finances and 
activities of the local town hall. 
Still on the subject of risk mitigation, Wauchope went on to consider the impact of 
possible variations in the rate of interest charged by the lender to finance the project 
– Barclays Bank. His solution to this problem was to propose extending the term of 
the loan so as to avoid any increase in the amount of annual repayments which 
might otherwise have resulted.111The closing point of his case is then made in the 
observation that the proposed funding method – a local bank loan in effect 
guaranteed by a local council- would not entail any capital expenditure as far as the 
Treasury in London was concerned.112 This then was a much more sophisticated 
approach than that made the previous year when the project was initially proposed. 
By the summer of 1932, however, it became clear that the Treasury’s concerns over 
the Nablus project were at least in part driven by a desire that it should not be 
assessed in isolation, but within the broader context of other infrastructure projects in 
Palestine for which the Mandatory Government  were considering the possibility of 
financial support from the Colonial Development Fund.113 Two of these were for 
water supply and drainage in Jerusalem, amounting to c.£515,000, and two for the 
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indicated that for tactical reasons they might be minded to allow the Nablus project to 
proceed, albeit with certain caveats, if it could be used to strengthen its case for a 
comprehensive review of the other, much larger scale proposals being developed at 
the time. The Treasury Commissioners must have shared their view, as on 26 July 
1932 they wrote to the Colonial Secretary116 informing him that the project could 
proceed, conditional to the Mandatory authority in Jerusalem supplying the loan to 
the Municipality of Nablus from its own financial surplus balances.  
High Commissioner Wauchope was predictably unhappy with this stipulation, and 
the exchanges continued to the end of 1932, culminating in a letter from Jerusalem 
of 10 December 1932117 from his office which rather surprisingly stated that the 
manager of Barclays Bank Palestine branch “has now stated that the bank is 
prepared to make a loan of £P 20,000 to the Municipality of Nablus…..without the 
stipulation of a Government guarantee”. Given that the need for such a guarantee 
had been the main stumbling block which was the subject of correspondence 
between Jerusalem and London covering a period of almost 18 months, we can only 
surmise the extent to which Barclays had become more eager to do new business. 
The bank’s change of position regarding loan guarantees might have reflected the 
fact that the economy in general was recovering from the ravages of the Great 
Depression, or alternatively that it thought that a relatively small loan made in Nablus 
would improve its chances of more lucrative business elsewhere in either Palestine 
or other British controlled territories. 
The Treasury was nevertheless quick to point out, in an internal note of inter-
departmental exchanges of 21 December 1932,118 that even absent a formal 
Government guarantee, in practice should a local municipality default then the 
Mandatory authority (and by implication the Treasury itself) would be obliged to step 
in and prevent its becoming insolvent. It then went on to cite the examples of 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, expressing the hope that a new Local Government 
Ordinance would provide effective controls against the municipalities taking on 
financial liabilities which they might not be capable of discharging unaided. It would 
have been ironic if Nablus, a centre of opposition to Jewish immigration and the 
National Home project, had been denied improvements in its water supply due to 
fears concerning financial risks which arose, inter alia, from the capacity of Tel Aviv 
to manage its municipal affairs unaided. 
Implementation Problems 
Some eighteen months later the Nablus water supply project again became the 
subject of exchanges between Jerusalem and the Whitehall Departments, when by 
July 1934 the contentious issue of financing had been replaced by arguments over 
the quality of pipes supplied via the Crown Agents for the project by the UK firm 
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Stanton & Co.119 A memo of July 1934,120 drafted by Mr Foot, the Assistant District 
Commissioner for Samaria at the request of the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, 
set out the problem, which centred on a consignment of defective 8 inch pipes. 
Ordered in January 1933, they arrived in Palestine in April, having previously been 
tested by the Crown Agents as meeting the required specifications, which included a 
capacity to sustain a pressure of 175 lbs per square inch. Further tests carried out in 
situ prior to laying revealed however that they burst at a pressure well below 100 lbs 
per square inch.121 Subsequent correspondence indicates that the specific purpose 
of the 8 inch pipes –as opposed to the smaller diameters used on this project- was to 
connect two reservoirs on opposite sides of the valley in which Nablus is located122 
(between Mounts Ebal and Gerizim). Despite the fact that almost all of the other 
gauge pipes, totalling some 12 kms in length were found to work to specification, the 
strategic importance of the 8 inch pipes meant that their failure prevented completion 
of the project.123 
Foot’s memo listed the consequences, which unsurprisingly included the extra 
expense incurred by efforts at repair (although Stanton had offered to install 
replacement pipes at their own cost)124 and the financial losses resulting from the 
delay in getting the water supply scheme operational. In the circumstances such 
complaints are fairly predictable, but worthy of note at the end of his list is the 
observation of: 
“a loss in public confidence which has certainly led to fewer people applying to 
have their houses connected to the distribution system.”125 
This is then followed by the assertion that: 
“it will be difficult to remove from the minds of the Nablus Municipal Council 
and of the other inhabitants of Nablus the impression, which many of them 
feel bitterly, that the insistence of Government that only British pipes should 
be used has not been justified by results”126 
This statement merits some reflection. We know from other correspondence on the 
same file that some complaints had indeed been made by Italian suppliers about not 
being allowed to quote for the Nablus Water Supply project, but that should not have 
caused any one in Nablus to ‘feel bitterly’ unless they suspected that a British 
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supplier would have been significantly more expensive. More likely, this statement  
by Mr Foot, in his capacity as Assistant District Commissioner for Samaria, and so 
the most senior official directly involved with the project at operational level, reflected 
frustration that he had been made to look a fool in the eyes of the Nablus 
Municipality: a British official had promised British pipes to convey much needed 
clean, fresh water, but the moment they were put to the test, they had failed. 
This in turn however raises the further question as to why should he feel so 
frustrated by this apparent loss of face? One possible answer of course is that he 
was the local representative of the Mandatory authority, and so responsible for 
meeting the leading members of Nabulsi society face-to-face: in a way that both the 
Head Office staff in Jerusalem and central Government officials in London were not. 
But to worry if you lose face indicates that you value the level of esteem in which 
others hold you, so I would argue that this memo holds prima facie evidence that at 
least some regional Government officials in the Mandate administration, far from 
seeing the Palestinians merely as ‘colonial natives’ did in fact consider them as 
having a certain importance, at least to the level of ensuring that British 
commitments towards them were fulfilled. 
The memo continues with complaints about the Crown Agents through whom the 
pipes were sourced, chiefly to the effect that there was an inordinate delay of more 
than three months between placing the order and receiving the deliveries, and that it 
would have been much faster if it had been permissible to place orders direct with 
British firms.127 A further bone of contention was that the price quoted through the 
Crown Agents included a premium for testing that the goods met the required 
specification, which in this particular case they had not.128The tone and subject 
matter of the text provides evidence of the frustration felt by  officials working ‘on the 
ground’, who were constrained both by their Head Office in Jerusalem and the 
authorities in London from taking the initiative and dealing direct with potential 
suppliers. This then was the perspective of those at the bottom end of what was 
clearly a ‘top-down’ hierarchical Government system. 
Annoyance with bursting pipes was not however confined to the District 
Commissioner’s office in Samaria. When the Chief Secretary’s office in Jerusalem 
forwarded Foot’s memo to the Colonial Office in London on 02 August 1934, the 
covering letter129was of the opinion that: 
“The whole business is little short of a scandal and is not calculated to 
advance British trade in this country or inspire confidence in the Crown 
Agents. It also reflects on the Palestine Government which insisted that only 
British pipes should be used. Had the breakdown occurred in the course of a 
more important work(though the importance of the Nablus scheme cannot be 
underrated) there is no doubt that it would have aroused bitter public criticism: 
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and you know how eagerly incidents of this kind are seized upon by our 
manydetractors for the purpose of embarrassing the Government.” 
The tone of the reaction portrayed in this paragraph goes beyond what would 
normally be expected for the failure of only one part of a consignment for a relatively 
small project. No doubt there was a degree of bad feeling in Jerusalem on the part of 
the officials there who had insisted on using the Crown Agents. It also reveals that 
from the perspective of Palestine’s capital, the town of Nablus was not considered a 
priority, although that in turn raises the question of what then was the underlying 
reason for such a sharp response. Furthermore the text reveals sensitivities in 
relation to ‘our many detractors’. Their identity is unfortunately not specified, but in 
the absence of a specific statement we can only surmise that this is a reference to 
those who were politically active in the Palestinian Arab community and who actively 
opposed the overarching imperative of British policy in the territory to establish a 
Jewish National Home. If so, then opposition on that issue meant that everything 
else the British did in Palestine was viewed through the same critical lens, eager to 
identify any weaknesses or failures which might indicate the possibility of frustrating 
the National Home policy. 
That said, evidence of the underlying fears in Jerusalem surfaces in paragraph six of 
the letter130 which notes that Stanton had not only contracted to supply its pipes to 
Nablus, but also for a Jerusalem water supply project, and was known to be 
interested in others. In the circumstances, 
“the High Commissioner thinks a rap over the knuckles might now be timely 
and might save more trouble hereafter. Perhaps therefore the Secretary 
OfState might agree to signifying to the company his displeasure at the 
manner in which the contract was fulfilled and to taking the Crown Agents to 
task over their faulty inspection.”131 
In other words here was a company active in infrastructure projects in Palestine, and 
the Mandatory Government did not want any more embarrassing incidents such as 
had occurred in Nablus. This was a plausible position to take, especially in view of 
the deteriorating relations between the authorities and the local population following 
the 1929 riots. The possibility however of switching to alternative suppliers is not 
alluded to, which is a little surprising, given that a letter of 17 August 1934132 from 
the Crown Agents in London, when responding to the criticisms raised by the High 
Commissioner’s office, pointed out that they had in fact recommended an alternative 
supplier, the Staveley company, whose steel pipes were more flexible, and less 
brittle than the iron pipes manufactured by Stanton. The Director of Public Works in 
Jerusalem had nevertheless insisted on Stanton pipes “with the result that we now 
see.”133 If that was in fact the case the angry words emanating from Jerusalem were 
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the result of a predicament of their own making: they had apparently chosen the 
wrong supplier, and used an intermediary who had charged for, but not carried out, a 
sufficiently thorough test programme prior to the despatch of the consignment. We 
might consequently surmise that the letter from the High Commissioner’s office 
represented at least in part an attempt to regain its credibility with its regional 
Government network of District Commissioners’ offices which were obliged to act 
upon its instructions. 
Apart from the Crown Agents, none of the Government offices in London became 
involved in the broken pipes issue, given that once the policy decision had been 
taken to agree to the project, and in particular how it was to be funded, the 
implementation phase was a matter for officials in Palestine, in particular the 
Department of Public Works. The exchanges which continued throughout the 
summer and into the autumn of 1934 largely involved Stanton, and its local 
representatives – a combination of an individual -Colonel Kisch-134 and a company, 
Engineering Equipment Ltd, based in Jerusalem.135 It is evident from this 
correspondence that Stanton was well established in the Palestine market, as in a 
letter of 06 September 1934136 its Managing Director indicated that he had decided 
to despatch 300 of the offending 8 inch pipes to replace the defective ones in 
Nablus, and that in the event that they were not all required “we feel that this is a 
size which is much in demand, and they will be rapidly liquidated.”137 It is also 
possible that this generosity in maintaining a high level of readily available stock in 
the local market was partly driven by a desire to maintain a competitive advantage 
over their commercial rival, Staveley, and its more flexible steel pipes. With 
infrastructure projects for the development of water supply and sewerage systems, 
once laid in the ground it could be many years before further business opportunities 
would arise for installing replacements.  
Finally on 06 October 1934138 the High Commissioner confirmed that half of the new 
stock despatched from the UK had been forwarded by rail to Nablus, while the other 
half had been stockpiled in Haifa: indicating the port’s role as an entrepot  for capital 
goods entering the Palestine market. But even then, some six months after the 
original problem had emerged, the issue clearly left a sense of anger and frustration 
in Jerusalem, as the letter concluded: 
“I have arranged for all this information to be conveyed in detail to the 
Municipality in the hope that it will assuage their very natural and intense 
exasperation at the whole affair. But the damage has been done and no 
number of iron or steel pipes, nor payments of compensation, can now 
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remove the very bad impression that has been given of British 
manufacture.”139 
Given the chronology of events and the decisions taken by the Director of the 
Department of Public Works in relation to this project, it must nevertheless be a 
matter of conjecture as to whether the bad impression created related only to 
Stanton’s pipes, or also to the Government in Jerusalem. We can only conclude that 
the somewhat exaggerated and long-drawn out response to a problem that ought to 
have been contained locally by the British officials responsible for the ‘Jabal Nablus’ 
area was symptomatic of the wider tensions and controversies developing in 
Palestine at a time of accelerating Jewish immigration.140 June 1934 saw the night of 
the long knives in Germany,141 and in August of that year Hitler declared himself 
Fuhrer following the death of Hindenburg.142 Events such as those in Germany were 
clearly having a significant impact on developments in Palestine, with growing 
tensions in the Holy Land reflecting contemporaneous struggles within the European 
continent. 
The 1935 Floods143 
Water was still a topical subject in Nablus the following year, as correspondence of 
March 1935 from the Office of the Engineer in Charge of the Nablus District to the 
Director of Public Works in Jerusalem indicates that there was a serious flood in the 
town on 4 February 1935144 which caused significant damage. This was due in part 
to the incapacity of the main drain to cope with the volume of water. As was usual in 
this type of situation the High Commissioner appointed a committee to investigate 
and then make recommendations as to what needed to be done to repair the 
damage, both to municipal property and to that of the town’s residents. 
A letter of 23 February 1935145 recorded what had presumably been their opening 
meeting, when it was noted that £P35 had already been spent on food and shelter 
for people who had been flooded out of their homes, together with £P400 to clear 
flooded houses and streets. This led the committee to recommend that a grant-in-aid 
should be made to the municipality to cover what was clearly unanticipated and 
unbudgeted expenditure. It went on to propose further sums recommended by a sub-
committee composed of the Mayor, the Municipal Engineer, and a representative of 
the Public Works Department. They estimated that £P 2,000 would be required for 
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the reconstruction of the main drain in Nablus, £P755 for the repair of roads and 
drains, and £P400 for repairs to the water supply. 
As far as the residents of the town were concerned, it was estimated that damage or 
destruction of household property amounted to £P3,666 and of commercial 
merchandise to £8,698. It is interesting to note that within these two figures the value 
of the destruction to property and merchandise “suffered by people who are very 
poor”146 was separately evaluated as £P2,328 for household property, and £P1,753 
for merchandise. These figures raise some interesting points. It is unsurprising that 
very poor people owned only 20% of the damaged merchandise, as one would not 
expect those engaged in any sort of commercial activity involving stock to be 
amongst the poorest in the community. Conversely, the fact that this group suffered 
64% of the household property losses suggests that the living areas of the poor 
suffered disproportionally from those of the better off, who may have had houses on 
higher ground. If so, there may have been a degree of ‘noblesse oblige’ in Nablus, 
as the letter went on to note that the committee had already received £P 479 “from 
private sources for the assistance of flood sufferers,”147 with the expectation of more 
to come. 
Clearly concerns about the dispossessed poor were a matter of some importance to 
the committee, which came up with the proposal that the Mandatory authority should 
make a public statement to the effect that it would match the level of donations made 
by private individuals and organisations so as to double the funds 
available.148Unfortunately there is no further correspondence on the file to indicate 
what was the response of the High Commissioner in Jerusalem to either this 
proposal or a further one which drew on the experience gained from the 1927 
earthquake(which is the subject of the following chapter). This arose from the fact 
that some of the houses damaged by the flood, although standing, might need to be 
subsequently demolished if inspections by structural engineers deemed them 
unsafe. We might speculate on this point that a flood which left a property standing 
but unsafe could indicate that the foundations and / or building materials used for the 
superstructure were of poor quality and liable to crumble in the event of significant 
exposure to water. This would be expected in cases of people of limited means 
understandably wanting a place to live, but unable to afford good quality 
construction. 
The recommendation of the committee in these circumstances, where a property 
would need to be demolished, but where the inhabitants lacked the money to have a 
new one erected in its place, was that they should be allowed to make use of the 
spare land in the plot which had been originally set aside for those who had been 
displaced by the earthquake. It furthermore proposed that a sum of £P2000 should 
be made available in the form of building grants “of the same amounts as those 
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approved for the earthquake sufferers.149 Clearly the 1927 earthquake, which will be 
examined in more detail in chapter IV below, had set a precedent that Government 
money should be made available for the purpose of disaster relief. Moving on to 
consideration of the effect of the flood on the outlying agricultural areas surrounding 
the town, the committee noted that a separate damage assessment was being made 
which would also take into account damage that had accrued to agricultural land 
elsewhere in the Samaria District.150 That being the case we can deduce that there 
must have been unusually heavy rainfall in the North Eastern part of Palestine in 
February 1935, consistent with the pattern noted earlier in this chapter of hilly terrain 
being subject to sudden and sharp downfalls in the winter months.151 Indeed, the 
Palestine Post reported that the storm in Nablus “brought with it in 24 hours 150mm 
of rain.”152Clearly the flood was a serious one, as the newspaper’s correspondent in 
the town reported that “in some cases ropes had to be tied around the bodies of 
people stranded in their houses, to rescue them from rooms turned into 
pools.”153Apart from the human dramas indoors, the flood also wrought havoc 
outside, and it is interesting to note that the cost of damage to gardens in the urban 
area was estimated at more than £P 6,000.154 That is approaching twice the 
estimated cost of damage to household property, indicating that the gardens in 
question were not merely for the personal enjoyment of householders, but more 
likely to have had cultivated fruit and vegetables for commercial sale. This 
supposition is consistent with what is shown in photographs of the perimeter of the 
town during this period.155 
The letter ends with a plea to entirely rebuild the drainage system in Nablus, on the 
grounds that it had been “damaged beyond repair”156and needed replacing with one 
with proper outlets for sewage and storm water.  It is signed off by Messrs Tukan 
(Mayor of Nablus), Foot (Assistant District Commissioner), Bigger (Senior Medical 
Officer), and Bushrui (District Officer), indicating both how the municipality worked 
together with local representatives of Palestine Government Departments through 
the regional District Commissioners’ network, and how there was a degree of 
participation by Palestinians alongside the British. 
Conclusion 
It is clear, in part from statements made in the more formal letters issuing from 
London, but more especially from the internal memos of the officials responsible for 
drafting them, that the town was not considered a priority for infrastructure 
development. While Haifa and Jerusalem took the lion’s share of the funds available, 
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Nablus, despite its historical importance as a leading commercial and cultural centre 
under the Ottomans, was relegated somewhat to the margins. As a result, at least as 
far as piped water supplies were concerned, the scale of the project agreed to would 
mean that only around a quarter of the urban population would become 
beneficiaries, thus throwing the divisions between the affluent and the poor into 
sharper relief. 
Notwithstanding its relative neglect by the mandatory power, the available evidence 
from the UK Government archives concerning the Nablus water project suggests that 
relations between the Palestinians in the Municipal Authority and the British in the 
Samaria District Commissioners’ office were reasonably harmonious. It would 
appear that a similar relationship existed between the small group of elite families of 
notables and the much larger numbers of urban poor,where there is some evidence 
of charitable donations from the former to the latter at particular times of crisis such 
as the1935 floods - with those who were able voluntarily donating money over and 
above their municipal tax obligations.  
Conversely, there were also clearly tensions and constraints reflecting the broader 
context of political conditions in Palestine, which in turn were affected by the impact 
of both the Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1930s.157 At 
the local level there is evidence of some frustration between the District 
Commissioner’s Office and the Headquarters of the Mandatory Administration in 
Jerusalem, with those responsible for infrastructure project development chafing 
against what they considered to be inflexible constraints imposed upon them in how 
they could source the materials they required. Nevertheless, officials in both Nablus 
and Jerusalem also shared the same sense of frustration in relation to Treasury 
imposed conditions concerning the manner of project funding,where caution 
combined with the desire to avoid debt liabilities – even if only contingent on third 
party default - clearly reflected the severe constraints on the public finances in the 
UK at that time. It might be argued that that general approach to fiscal policy on 
behalf of the Treasury meant that the Municipality of Nablus had limitations imposed 
on its borrowing capacity due to what the authorities in London considered were 
profligate examples set by Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, for which repetitions elsewhere 
were to be avoided. 
Also worth noting in the context of this particular infrastructure project is that it was 
initiated by Government in the form of what today would be known as a public-
private partnership – commissioned and initially financed by the public sector, built 
by the private sector, and with the costs subsequently repaid by those consumers 
who benefitted from the resultant service. As Daniel Headrick has argued in ‘the 
Tentacles of Progress,158 this meant that the choice of which sector(s) to develop 
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was essentially political and ‘top down,’ an initiative of the Mandatory authorities 
rather than a response to consumer demand. During the early decades of the 
twentieth century, the idea of development and its associated technology transfer 
was one of the main justifications for empire, going some way to explain the 
exaggerated reactions to the problem of the defective pipes in the Nablus water 
supply project. 
These reactions must in part have reflected an awareness by the Mandatory 
authorities of Palestinian opposition to the overarching Jewish National Home policy. 
The internal correspondence of officials in Jerusalem suggests that awareness of 
that opposition led the British to become extremely sensitive to failures regarding the 
implementation of policies other than those related to the development of the Jewish 
National Home. This nevertheless suggests that if they had concerns about 
Palestinian perceptions of the quality of the Mandatory Government, then at least 
this would indicate that they held them in a certain esteem. These sensitivities may 
also have reflected the fact that all the important policy decisions were taken by 
British officials, so that if anything went wrong the responsibility was theirs alone. 
Both the water supply project and the Mandatory Government’s response to the 
1935 floods were examples of the ‘top down’ approach to development and 
rehabilitation which characterised British imperial rule. Decisions were taken at 
senior levels of the administration, and cascaded down through the hierarchy, with 
minimal involvement of the local population, whose role was little more than that of 
passive recipients. Although this approach was maintained in the response to the 
damage caused by the 1927 earthquake, the suddenness of that event, and the 
need it created for British officials,  members of the armed forces, and local Nabulsis 
to work together in helping to dig the injured out of the rubble, did involve substantive 
























View of Nablus with Mount Ebal in the Background, July 1938 
American Colony . Photo Dept, photographer. Nablus &Ebal, July 13 & 14. Nablus West Bank, 1938. 
July. Photograph retrieved from the Library of Congress at, 








THE 1927 EARTHQUAKE 
The earth under me trembles, spinning wildly without axis.....The terrible earthquake 
in Nablus in 1927 had sown the seeds of constant fear of Ibrahim’s death in my 
childish heart that clung so closely to him1 
 
 
Palestine events. The earthquake of 11 July, 1927. Blocked-up street in Nablus, choked by fallen 
houses which entombed many inhabitants 








1 Fadwa Tuqan, A Mountainous Journey,  104.  Ibrahim was the author’s elder brother, mentor, and teacher 





Chapter III considered the development of water and sanitation supplies in Nablus, 
and what this core form of infrastructure revealed about relations between the local 
representatives of the Mandatory Government, their Headquarters in Jerusalem, and 
the Colonial Office and Treasury in London. The development of urban water 
supplies is both time-consuming and capital intensive, and the whole project, from 
inception to implementation, took several years. The cost and scale of the project 
necessarily entailed a high degree of planning across both the construction and 
operational phases. 
Chapter IV by contrast will examine an unanticipated and unplanned for natural 
disaster to assess what can be concluded from the response of the Mandatory 
authorities, given that it made sufficient impact for the Government in London to be 
made aware. This was the earthquake of July 1927 which caused widespread 
damage across Palestine, with the most serious effects in the town of Nablus.2 It 
reveals that the Government, partly no doubt due to financial constraints, operated 
on the basis of minimalist state intervention in terms of managing its consequences. 
The earthquake thus provides a further example of relative under development in the 
way funds were disbursed by the Mandatory authorities. Monies made available for 
reconstruction were used in the repair and renewal of government owned 
infrastructure, in particular the railways.3Funds for rebuilding houses in Nablus 
damaged or destroyed by the earthquake were made available in the form of loans 
rather than grants.4  Furthermore, despite the extensive destruction suffered by the 
town – more than any other in Palestine- no attempts were made to initiate a 
programme of urban redevelopment.5 This neglect can be contrasted with the 
government’s scheme to transform the municipal area of Haifa, drawn up in 1930.6 
The chapter also examines how the mandatory authorities benefitted from the 
evolving approaches to humanitarian relief, which became increasingly focussed on 
the needs of the recipients, and used philanthropic donations to provide for the 
immediate needs of those who had lost their homes. Specifically in Palestine such 
relief  tended to focus on the plight of minorities –such as Christians and Jews-
considered to be most at risk by the colonial powers in relation to the Muslim Arab 
majority. This theme – and its implications- is examined in Keith Watenpaugh’s work, 
‘Bread from Stones.’7The Mandatory authorities were quick to establish a relief 
 
2 The effects of the earthquake, and the Government response to it, is the subject of CO 733/142/ 13, TNA 
3  See page 131 below 
4  See page 134 below 
5  See page 135 below 
6  Norris, Land of Progress, 137 
7  Keith Watenpaugh,  Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism 
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fund8and rely on private donations, including those from the Jewish diaspora in the 
USA, to provide the bulk of the finance to enable the clean-up operation. The 
generosity of the donations speaks to the importance of Palestine as the location of 
the Jewish national home, but from the Mandatory authority’s perspective the 
distribution of the donations had to be handled with a degree of sensitivity, given that 
the areas most affected by the earthquake were predominantly Arab. To better 
understand the response of the Government, and the way it made use of private 
donor networks both within the territory and abroad, it may be helpful to begin with a 
brief consideration of the response of imperial powers to natural disasters during the 
years following World War I. 
Handling Natural Disasters 
In the decade preceding 1927 the most significant natural disaster, albeit 
compounded by the vicissitudes of war, was the famine of 1915-16, initiated by the 
locust plague of 1915.9 The response to it was organised by a combination of 
Ottoman officials, Municipal Government, and private initiatives of local residents. In 
her work ‘From Empire to Empire, Jerusalem between Ottoman and British rule’, 
Abigail Jacobson10argues that it was around this time that the longer –standing US 
humanitarian presence, typically represented by missionary bodies, was becoming 
more institutionalised so as to act as a vehicle capable of promoting American 
influence in Palestine, and supporting the evolving pro-Zionist stance of the US 
government. This chapter takes that insight forward by examining how the British 
Mandatory authority made use of disaster relief funds raised in the Jewish 
communities of the United States so that they could benefit the Arab communities 
which constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of the city of Nablus: 
as it was this location which suffered the most from the impact of the 1927 
earthquake. 
At the time of World War I the famine had its most severe impact on the poorest 
members of society, given their lack of food reserves, but coming as it did at a time 
of war, the effects were felt across society as a whole, and so there were strong 
practical incentives for its constituent elements to work together. This was also the 
case in the years immediately following the end of World War I in Palestine, which 
were characterised by severe levels of deprivation, and saw the development of 
many charitable organisations  whose purpose was to alleviate the suffering of those 
most in need11 on an ongoing basis.  This contrasts somewhat with the earthquake, 
which in Nablus had a severe impact on those whose houses collapsed, but 
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otherwise did not inhibit agricultural production, given that it struck in the afternoon 
when most of the agricultural workers were out in their fields, and so able to continue 
working without sufficient disruption to have a negative impact on that year’s 
harvest.12 As a result, the imperative in the short term was to provide food and 
temporary shelter for the mainly poorer inhabitants of the town whose more flimsily 
constructed houses had suffered the most.13 
Within the broader context of events in the Middle East following World War I, the 
main emphasis at the time was on humanitarian relief, with organisations such as the 
American Committee for Relief in the Near East attempting to reduce the scale of 
suffering caused by famine in the Levant and the mass killings and expulsions of the 
Armenians.14  In the case of the latter the readiness to help was not only a response 
to the scale of the suffering, but also a reflection of the fact that Western donors 
were more naturally sympathetic to a fellow Christian community in the Middle East 
region.15  There were however other dimensions to the Armenian killings that are 
important in any consideration of the evolution of humanitarian programmes during 
the first half of the twentieth century. Many of those who tried to help the 
communities who came under systematic attack from the Ottoman state in Anatolia 
in 1915 were Christian missionaries living and working there at the time. The 
methods that they used to gain international support to rescue the victims have been 
seen by some as the precursor to what later developed into the modern aid 
programmes of the latter half of the twentieth century.16  The justification for 
intervention was based on the helplessness of the victims. As many of the initial 
killings were of Armenian men, those who managed to escape to Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Syria tended to constitute large numbers of women and children.17 
The women in particular were seen by the Protestant missionaries as “the key to 
religious change and social improvement.”18 By implication the predominantly Muslim 
society of the Ottoman empire was seen as patriarchal and conservative, while the 
missionaries saw themselves as harbingers of European modernity, and thought that 
women in the local communities could be used as agents of development.19  Crises 
and emergencies such as the Armenian massacres provided the opportunity to instil 
‘Western values’ on the hapless survivors – including training in the benefits of 
becoming self-reliant, as practiced in a Scottish mission’s girls’ school in Jaffa during 
the Mandate period.20 In this respect, the impact of the 1927 earthquake on Nablus 
 
12 The earthquake is discussed in some depth in CO 733/142/13, TNA. The point about the agricultural workers 
in the fields is made on page 70 of that document, and the timing (15.00) on page 44 
13 CO 733/142/13, TNA 
14  Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones 92 
15  Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones  165 –166 
16   See Nefissa Naguib & Inger Marie Okkenhaug (Eds), Interpreting Welfare and relief in the Middle East (Brill 
Publishing, Leiden, 2008),  6 
17  Ibid 
18  Ibid 
19  Ibid 
20  Nefissa and Inger, ‘Interpreting Welfare’  6-7 
120 
 
is revealing not so much in terms of what the British Government authorities did to 
assist in the process of reconstruction, but rather in the way that this particular crisis 
was not exploited as an opportunity to influence the subsequent development of 
Nabulsi society. The surviving reports in the National Archives offer a good deal of 
information on the efforts made to meet short-term requirements21 but do not indicate 
that any resources were made available for the longer term needs of those families 
where the main or sole bread-winner may have perished. This is consistent with a 
generally ‘de minimis’ approach to government in Nablus by the Mandatory 
authorities which this thesis argues is its primary characteristic. 
Nevertheless, that approach did at least leave space for local initiatives by religious 
organisations, where such Islamic social institutions as the Zakat committees 
typically provided educational, health, and employment opportunities.22  This 
contrasts somewhat with the approach taken by the Mandatory authorities in 
Palestine in relation to the earthquake, where humanitarian concerns per se appear 
to have taken second place to a concern to maintain law and order:  
“The main police functions were quite clear. Namely to rescue people – 
preserve public order and confidence – prevent looting – keep prisoners 
secure – prevent food hoarding and assist the civil services with water, 
electricity and sewage.”23 
It would appear that the supposition was that a sudden, albeit traumatic event would 
send a shock through society to which the appropriate response was essentially 
utilitarian, and focussed on the short term: the priority was to re-establish the status 
quo ante, and then to move on. As will be argued subsequently in this chapter, this 
was consistent with the British view of the Palestinian Arab population as being 
largely primitive, superstitious, and prone to panic.24  The overriding consideration 
was consequently to get things back to normal as soon as possible. If this was the 
context of current thinking on the appropriate response to the earthquake, it is now 
appropriate to briefly consider the geological location of Palestine which explains its 
occurrence: as that which took place in 1927 was by no means the first. 
Earthquakes in Palestine 
The line running up the Dead Sea to the Galilee and beyond marks the presence of 
a geological fault between the tectonic plates of the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Western limit of the Asian continent. It is known to geologists as the Dead Sea 
Transform Fault, and earthquakes along this fault line have been recorded since 
biblical times.25 The earthquake of 11 July 1927 was known as the Jericho 
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earthquake, and had a magnitude of 6.2. Its epicentre was a few miles south of 
Jericho on the west bank of the Dead Sea.26 According to an American earthquake 
expert who happened to be in Cairo at the time – from where he felt the tremors- it 
was “of moderate severity and very brief duration”.27After the initial tremor a second 
and more serious shock occurred two minutes later, which may have increased the 
casualty rate as people returned to their houses in the mistaken belief that it was 
safe to do so.28 A second, smaller earthquake was experienced on 24 February 
1928, with tremors causing light damage. According to a report made by the High 
Commissioner that day, “no loss of life and no serious damage to property 
resulted.”29 A third and final ‘slight earthquake shock’ was experienced on 5th August 
1928, with no damage resulting.30 
For the purpose of analysis in this chapter however the focus will be on the July 
1927 earthquake, as the subsequent tremors did not produce any situations 
requiring Government intervention. Although the earthquakes in this region occurred 
on a fairly regular basis, they were not frequent in terms of human timescales, with 
the most recent occurrence being in 1837, or 90 years previously.31 As a result, the 
Palestinian territory was not a location where the population were in any way 
prepared for their occurrence in the same way as Japan is today. Whereas draughts, 
crop failures, and periodical locust attacks were an intermittent occurrence that the 
population had become accustomed to, earthquakes were sufficiently rare not to 
have left an enduring impression. As Libby Robin observed in her review of ‘Natural 
Disasters, Cultural Responses’32 such unexpected phenomena could only be 
managed in terms of the subsequent clearing-up operation, rather than by measures 
designed to mitigate their impact.33In the absence of any prepared responses at the  
local level  it consequently fell to the Mandatory authorities to initiate the necessary 
actions in terms of damage assessment, reconstruction, and dealing with those who 
had been made homeless. The archival records on these responses are reasonably 
comprehensive, and can be  examined in detail. 
The Initial Response of the Mandatory Authorities 
In keeping with their broader objectives in Mandate Palestine, the Government 
considered that its first priority was to establish the extent of any damage to its 
communications and transport infrastructure. According to the General Manager’s 
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office of the Palestine Railways in Haifa it took only ten minutes from the timing of 
the earthquake to ascertain that telephone communications across the railway 
network were still intact.34 It furthermore took only eight hours to complete the 
necessary reports confirming that railway tracks and bridges were unharmed, and to 
then resume normal service at 23.00 that same evening of 11th July 1927.35 Clearly a 
premium was placed on getting the services up and running again as soon as 
possible, as those same reports indicated that several station buildings, including the 
one at Nablus, “were in varying degrees seriously shaken and cracked.”36 
Having ascertained that their communications and transport infrastructure was still 
basically intact, the next responsibility of the Mandatory authority was to inform the 
Government in London of the developing situation. One day after the earthquake, on 
12th July, telegramme 115 from the High Commissioner’s office in Jerusalem to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies was able to report that no UK or European 
nationals had been killed, and that the highest level of casualties had been 
experienced in Nablus (50 killed and 250 injured), followed by Lydda (30 killed and 
70 injured). Elsewhere, casualties had been light.37 
The picture established from these records is consequently one of an efficient 
administration which within a period of 24 hours had been able to confirm that its 
capacity to function as a Government across the mandated territory had not been 
significantly impaired, and had also ascertained in which urban areas the most 
significant damage had occurred. It consequently had available the necessary 
information to enable a rapid response, presuming the resources were available to 
carry out the measures considered necessary. We can also conclude that the 
Government machine was not impeded in its capacities by the absence of both of its 
most senior staff, given that during that week in July both High Commissioner 
Plumer and Lieutenant-Colonel Symes, who was Acting High Commissioner at the 
time,38 were out of the country. Symes was in Transjordan–which also suffered from 
the earthquake- and flew back to Palestine from Amman on the Wednesday morning 
(two days after it occurred), immediately undertaking visits to Lydda, Nablus, and 
Ramleh.39 
Both men were clearly aware of the political sensitivities arising from the destruction 
caused, which was typically concentrated in poorer areas where houses were made 
of low quality materials and more likely to collapse.40  Fatalities consequently arose 
only amongst the native Arab population and not the colonial administrators. As a 
result the Mandatory authority was blamed for doing too little, too late by 
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demonstrators who had learned of Lord Plumer’s planned visit to see for himself the 
extent of the damage in Nablus. In the event, he had no difficulty in the town itself, 
but did have to manoeuvre around a road block when en route up from Jerusalem.41 
Once inside the town, Plumer was quick to praise the work of the police who had 
maintained long hours helping to dig people out of the rubble.42 Here then were 
representatives of the Government being seen to engage at the local level in an 
attempt to show that their actions were aligned with the concerns of the people they 
governed. How much they could do of course depended on the scale of resources at 
their disposal, and the degree of support which could be made available from the 
wider international community.  That those working in Government House in 
Jerusalem were aware of these constraints and opportunities became apparent in 
the next stage of the response to the earthquake, after the initial damage 
assessment had been completed. 
Contemporary newspaper reports painted a fairly grim picture as far as  Nablus was 
concerned. The Palestine Bulletin43 complained that one of the houses there 
collapsed when its correspondent was visiting the town to ascertain the local 
conditions.44It clearly made an impression, as a section in the article covering the 
impact of the earthquake across Palestine as a whole was entitled ‘Nablus the 
Unfortunate’.45 It claimed that half the houses in every street were in ruins, and gave 
a list of the most important buildings to have been either damaged or destroyed. 
These included two cigarette factories, a mosque, two schools, the Y.M.C.A. Centre, 
the Police barracks, the veterinary hospital and the old Government court.46 These 
individual buildings apart, the Samaritan quarter in the old town was reportedly 
entirely destroyed,47 and the community forced to live in tents48 pending more 
permanent accommodation alternatives. According to an article in the Times 
newspaper,49 by October 1927 preparations had been almost completed “for 
providing dwellings for those rendered destitute by the earthquake.”50It went on to 
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assert that the local authorities in Nablus had “approved the pattern of the huts which 
are being prepared......for the homeless.”51We can only speculate to what extent the 
quality of these ‘huts’ became one of the reasons why the Samaritans eventually 
relocated to their current location at the top of Mount Gerizim.52 
Preparing For The Clearing Up Operation 
The first substantive report to the Colonial Office in London was made by Symes on 
15th July, four days after the earthquake.53 It is revealing of what the Mandatory 
authorities considered to be their priorities, given that the first itemised statement on 
the damage caused, following the opening scene-setting paragraphs, was that an 
estimated £1,000 worth of damage was done to the railways: “but otherwise 
Government premises and property escaped lightly.”54 At that time there was known 
to be only a single fatality as far as Government personnel were concerned, and this 
individual is described as “a Muslim schoolmistress from Nablus.”55 The statement 
indicates that the indigenous population in Palestine was identified according to 
religious, as opposed to national, affiliation. Unsurprisingly the report aims to present 
the work of the authorities in Palestine in a positive light vis-a-vis the head office in 
London, as mention is made both of the “valuable services....rendered by the British 
Police detachment at Nablus”56 and to the contribution made by private hospitals 
which had “rendered all possible assistance” in Jerusalem, Nablus, and Ramleh.57 It 
is interesting in this respect to note that the comment about the role of the private 
hospitals comes in the same sentence as reference to the work of the Department of 
Health in organising emergency relief and medical services, and so implying that the 
Government was working together with private organisations in what today we might 
characterise as public-private schemes for the deliverance of public services. Efforts 
were also made to reassure the Colonial Office in London that the Mandatory 
authority, working at the national level, had engaged with the local and municipal 
bodies to ensure that “serious panic or disorder”58 was averted.  
Paragraph 6 of the report raises the question of fund raising to help meet the costs of 
reconstruction, noting the establishment of relief committees in each District in 
Palestine, an offer of assistance from Near East Relief,59 and the creation of a 
Jewish Relief Fund aiming to obtain contributions from diaspora community 
members in the USA.60 Specific mention is made of a gift of £5,000 from a donor in 
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New York to the Hadassah Medical Organisation that was to be distributed on a non-
sectarian basis.61 As a result, Symes had written to the Area Officer at Nablus and 
the District Officer in Ramleh on how the money might be best disbursed for the 
purposes of reconstruction.62 The ground however was clearly being prepared, if not 
for an overt request for supplementary funds from London, then at least for setting 
out the case as to why they might become necessary: the report notes that advances 
had been authorised to the municipalities of Nablus and Ramleh to enable rebuilding 
programmes, and goes on to note that Symes anticipated “many further calls of a 
similar nature on Government funds.”63 He was nevertheless clearly aware that the 
Treasury would expect all other funding avenues to have been exhausted before any 
supplementary money was made available from London, given that on the same day 
as the report issued from Jerusalem, the Official Gazette of the Government of 
Palestine advertised the creation of an Earthquake Relief Fund and invited 
subscriptions to it.64 
It must have been helpful in this respect that King George V had sent a message of 
sympathy which the reporting telegram from Jerusalem of 16th July confirmed was 
being published in the territory.65 Two days later, an extraordinary edition of the 
Palestine Gazette, consisting only of its front page, conveyed the message from the 
king, and informed the reader that it had been sent by the Secretary of State (for the 
Colonies) “to His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government by His 
Majesty’s Command.”66  No doubt this was the standard form of words used at the 
time, but the statement that the mandatory authority exercised power in the name of 
the monarch, as opposed to on behalf of a democratically elected parliament, is 
worthy of note in a territory which was characterised, inter alia, by an absence of 
representative institutions. The message of sympathy itself was short and to the 
point: 
“I am deeply grieved to learn of the destruction and loss of life caused by the 
recent earthquake in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Please convey assurances 
of my sympathy to all who have suffered. George R.”67 
 
What followed was revealing of the largely passive relationship the people of 
Palestine were presumed to have with the Government in Jerusalem, as the reader 
was informed that the king’s message “will be much appreciated by sufferers on 
whose behalf”68 the High Commissioner had tendered “cordial and respectful 
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thanks.”69 Colonial subjects it would appear were not expected to express their own 
views, although clearly the dissemination of the message of sympathy must have 
contributed to expectations that tangible measures would be taken to aid the victims 
of the earthquake: as failure to do so would reduce it to empty words. Similar 
pressures must have been created by the interest taken in Parliament about what 
was being done, given that before the House rose for the summer recess Lieutenant-
Commander Kenworthy M.P. “asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether 
it is intended to make any grant for the alleviation of suffering and damage by the 
earthquake in Palestine ?”70 The response from Mr Ormsby-Gore was that no 
request had been made from the Government in Palestine, and that the situation 
would be reviewed following the return of the High Commissioner to the territory.71 
Clearly the authorities in London were not going to make any offers before formal 
requests were submitted for consideration. It becomes clear during the course of 
subsequent exchanges between the two M.Ps. that precedents had been set by–
inter alia-St. Lucia, which had submitted a request for funding prior to receiving any 
supplementary grant.72 It also becomes clear from a later question posed by Colonel 
Wedgewood M.P. that when it came to Palestine, from the perspective of London 
humanitarian considerations were not necessarily to the fore: given that his interest 
was in “whether any historical monuments”73 had been damaged – a point on which 
the Secretary of State was happily able to confirm in the negative, at least as far as 




Running in parallel with the national response directed from Jerusalem were various 
initiatives at the municipal and local level. The municipality of Jaffa nominated a 
committee for the relief of victims of the earthquake, and their initiative inspired that 
of Tel Aviv to do the same: as well as sending “large quantities of bread to the towns 
of Nablus, Ramleh, and Ludd.”75 Similar donations of bread and other foodstuffs 
were made to Nablus by Jerusalem and Tulkarm, amongst others.76It would appear 
that the reason for this was that the bakeries in Nablus had either been destroyed, or 
were in the danger zone.77The Tel Aviv offer however went beyond food, with a 
proposal from the Maccabee organisation to send a group of some thirty volunteers 
to the town to assist the Government authorities in the clear-up operation.78 
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Similar offers came in from the Tel Aviv fire-brigade, the Hapoel labour sport 
organisation, and the Organisation of Architects and Engineers.79 The response of 
the Mayor of Nablus was enthusiastic, asking that the volunteers should come over 
as soon as possible.80 In the absence of firm documentary evidence it is difficult to 
conclude to what extent these offers of help from Tel Aviv were inspired by altruistic 
motives. The general separation in Mandate Palestine between the Arab and Jewish 
communities however, and the concentration of Jewish organisations almost 
exclusively on members of the ‘Yishuv’81 would suggest that considerations relating 
to public relations may have been a factor. This might also explain why the response 
of the Mandatory authorities, represented by District Officer Babcock, was a good 
deal more measured than that of the Mayor of Nablus, putting off any outside help 
pending receipt of instructions from Jerusalem.82 His position was reflected by that of 
the District Commissioner at Jaffa, who declined a request to facilitate the transfer of 
volunteers by rail from Tel Aviv / Jaffa pending completion of a technical assessment 
of the damage suffered at Nablus.83 
 
Mention is not made of the Tel Aviv offer in Government documents held at the 
National Archives, so it is not possible to know with certainty whether only a natural 
caution was being exercised prior to the completion of an initial damage assessment, 
or whether other considerations pertained. These could have included fears about 
the reaction of townspeople in an overwhelmingly Muslim community to the presence 
of Jewish volunteers from the new town on the coast which epitomised more than 
anywhere else the new world of Zionist immigration to which the Nabulsis were so 
bitterly opposed. Given the tensions created by the Jewish national home policy, the 
Mandatory authorities may also have been reluctant to be seen to be accepting help 
from Tel Aviv, both because that might have created the expectation of some sort of 
quid pro quo in the future, and as it might reinforce the perceptions of those in the 
Palestinian Arab community that the British were too closely associated with the 
Jewish immigrants. As we saw in chapter III,84 concerns had also begun to develop 
in the Treasury that some towns in Palestine, and in particular Tel Aviv, had been 
spending more than their municipal budgets and risked default, so officials in 
Jerusalem may have looked askance at offers of assistance from a municipality 
which they considered would be better off concentrating on the management of its 
own affairs. Whatever the reasoning, a decision was taken to refuse the offer of help 
on the grounds that sufficient workers had been provided by the Northern District 
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The Use of Expert Opinion 
Somewhat fortuitously an American academic expert on earthquakes from Stanford 
University,86 Bailey Willis,87 happened to be visiting Cairo in July 1927, and was 
asked by the High Commissioner in Jerusalem if he would come up and report on 
the situation.88 As it becomes clear from the archival records that his views 
influenced the thinking and approach of the Mandatory authorities towards the 
clearing up phase, it is worth examining some of the language he used in his report. 
This was based on fieldwork carried out in Amman, Ludd, Nablus, Ramleh, and 
Salt.89 The area of destruction ran from Amman in Transjordan to Ludd in Palestine 
on the east-west axis, and from Nablus to Hebron on the north-south axis with an 
overall shape corresponding to an elipse.90 
Willis based his analysis of the impact of the quake, as far as damage to or 
destruction of buildings was concerned, on the nature of the terrain on which they 
had been built. This could range from stable, hard rock formations to soft, marshy 
ground.91 The less secure the base, the greater the damage which would be caused 
by an earthquake. In the specific case of Nablus he refers to investigations that had 
been carried out by Mr Babcock, the District Officer,92 whose work there was singled 
out for praise by the High Commissoner’s office later in September.93 The conclusion 
is interesting, as it refers to the effects of the earlier earthquake known to have 
occurred in 1837: 
“In Nablus the most densely built up portion of the old city stands according to 
Mr Babcock, on fields and rubbish of old houses thrown down by a former 
earthquake. Being in the valley itself, this material is probably full of water at 
no great depth. It is a dangerous foundation. The zone were better cleared 
and planted to olive trees right through the town.”94 
More generally, Willis attributed the extent of the damage to poor quality building 
construction.95 He was furthermore not the only person to do so, as when a paper 
issued from the general manager’s office in Haifa on the state of the railway network 
following the earthquake, it contained the observation that the most serious damage 
had occurred to the older station buildings constructed by the Ottoman Turks, and 
that “from this the conclusion can be drawn that the bad materials built into these 
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structures and the indifferent workmanship, contributed greatly to the damage 
suffered.”96 Such disdain was also extended towards the Palestinian population, 
judging from Willis’s observation towards the end of his report that earthquakes were 
natural occurrences, not a mark of divine providence, which he recommended 
should be clearly explained to the locals so as to “offset the terror inspired by their 
ignorance and superstition.”97 It is furthermore implicit, and in keeping with this 
attitude, that he thought the work of reconstruction, if not carried out by the British, 
should at least be supervised by them. When describing the standard procedure for 
dealing with buildings where the foundations have been damaged, and it becomes 
necessary to reinforce the superstructure, Willis comments somewhat acidly that 
“trained judgement, which the natives rarely have”98 is required to ensure that the 
reinforcements are sufficiently robust to bear the weight of the building they must 
support. Care must of course be made in drawing general conclusions from his 
writings, but the fact that the report was forwarded in its entirety from Jerusalem to 
the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leopold Amery, and without any 
comment on its language, suggests that the occupants of Government House in 
Jerusalem broadly concurred with the language employed.99 
Corroborating evidence to these shared perceptions is provided in the covering note 
addressed to Amery. Symes set out as would be expected the measures taken by 
the Mandatory authority both in terms of relief measures for those who had lost their 
homes and demolition of houses no longer fit for human habitation. He then makes 
the interesting observation that not much money would be needed as an incentive to 
get people to rebuild in Transjordan, given that the people there are “generally 
simpler and more virile than in Palestine.”100 In contrast with their hardier neighbours, 
the Palestinians it seems were considered weak, and easily frightened. One can only 
speculate to what extent these attitudes may have contributed to an under-
estimation of the potential seriousness posed by the threat of the Arab Revolt in the 
succeeding decade.Nevertheless, the aftermath of the earthquake may have 
contributed to this generally negative perception of the Palestinians. The Times for 
example noted that “at Nablus the able-bodied male population refused to assist the 
police in removing debris or to enter the devastated suk owing to fatalism or fright, 
and had to be compelled to do so after the police had worked without cessation for 
twelve hours.”101 
Nablus is given a whole paragraph in the covering note,102 more than any other town 
or area, and here again, the choice of language is revealing. It starts with basic 
factual information, to set the scene - informing that some 180 houses had either 
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collapsed or become unsafe, and that most of them were in the old city centre. 
Between 3,000 and 4,000 people had in consequence been in receipt of (free) food 
rations. These numbers apart it is nevertheless the way they are described which is 
striking: “an almost completely derelict population, many of them diseased.”103 
Symes considered it ‘unthinkable’ that they should be allowed to rebuild ‘the rabbit 
warrens of masonry’104 which they had previously inhabited. However, as the 
narrative proceeds, it becomes apparent that the general sense of negativity was 
being driven by financial considerations. First the reader is told that the displaced 
population in Nablus was composed of people who had previously lived ‘on the 
borderline of destitution’105 and that consequently they lacked the means either to 
purchase or to rent newly built housing. As a result, building loans would not 
represent an appropriate response to their predicament. The only practical solution 
would be to relocate them to vacant land outside the town where temporary 
accommodation could be erected before the coming of winter. Even the most basic 
structures to accommodate a few thousand people would require significant –and 
hitherto unbudgeted- expenditure, and it is in this context that we should consider the 
establishment of the fund set up to enable it. 
The Palestine Relief Fund 
The Mandatory authorities moved quickly in their attempts to source voluntary 
contributions towards the cost of humanitarian relief. Within days of the earthquake 
the Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine was advertising an Earthquake 
Relief Fund, to which members of the public, both in Palestine and abroad, were 
invited to donate.106 They were also in contact with the Jewish community, which 
was in the process of seeking the aid of the Jewish Distribution Committee of 
America.107 These initiatives clearly paid dividends, as that same month a Mr Nathan 
Strauss of New York donated £5,000 to the Hadassah Medical Organisation towards 
the relief of suffering from the earthquake.108 
Examination of the Palestine ‘blue book’ of Government statistics for 1927 reveals 
that relief work had commenced in July of that year: was ongoing at the end of the 
year: and had cost a little over £8,000, defrayed upon the earthquake relief fund.109 
The Official Gazette of the same year indicates that by August 1927 plans were 
indeed about to be implemented for the construction of temporary accommodation 
“for certain persons rendered homeless.....in the town of Nablus.”110 The plans for 
the land on which the accommodation would be built were deposited at the District 
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Office there.111 The fund itself had been established within days of the earthquake, 
and its governing board had their first meeting in the High Commissioner’s office on 
21st July, only eleven days after the event.112 Clearly the Mandatory authorities were 
capable of moving rapidly when the situation demanded it. They were also sensible 
to the presentational advantages of co-opting members of Palestine’s notable 
families: membership of the board included Awni Bey Abdul Hadi and Omar Saleh, 
both from Nablus.113 By the end of July an appeal had been made both in Palestine 
and abroad, which had succeeded in raising some £4,000 to complement the £5,000 
donation made by Mr Nathan Strauss.114 By the end of the year the total sum had 
increased to over £21,000 and included donations from the Palestine Relief 
Committee in New York, private individuals in the United Kingdom, and employees of 
Departments in the Palestine Government.115Given that the names of donors were 
published in the Gazettes’ lists of donations it would appear that a degree of prestige 
pertained to those who contributed to disaster relief.116 
As far as the Government of Palestine itself was concerned, most of the cost of the 
clearing up operation appears to have been borne from within existing budgetary 
resources, and supervised by the Department of Public Works.117 Various reporting 
telegrammes to London had noted damage to the railway,118 and by the autumn a 
request for £875 to repair damage to the Palestine railway network, together with 
£2,845 for the Hejaz railway was agreed in December 1927.119 The timing of this 
request appears to have coincided with what were then the final stages of what 
became the Palestine Loan Ordinance, signed off on 1st November 1927.120 This 
however provided £4.5 Million, of which just over half for the railways, a little over £1 
Million for ports and harbour construction, and the remainder for public buildings, 
telegraphs, and telephones.121 
As far as the UK Government in London was concerned, the earthquake in Palestine 
was essentially a local issue to be addressed with local resources, so this goes 
some way to explaining why the authorities in Jerusalem put efforts into promoting 
the Palestine Relief Fund, as it represented the best chance of procuring monies for 
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the rehabilitation of the people affected, as opposed to the infrastructure which was 
clearly the Government’s priority. Those efforts clearly bore fruit, as apart from the 
donations coming in from the UK and the USA, the registers of correspondence 
between Jerusalem and London note the arrival of monies from Hyderabad.122They 
also note questions being raised about a £1,000 contribution for the repair of 
mosques, and whether the Supreme Moslem Council was capable of ensuring that 
the money was spent on its intended purpose.123 The earthquake had clearly given 
rise to a range of financial flows designed for its mitigation. Palestine Government 
funds and private local donations were augmented by infrastructure loans and grants 
from the UK Government, and by private donations from the Christian, Jewish and 
Moslem communities from different countries across the world. 
This international dimension was also apparent in the way the authorities in 
Jerusalem shared their own experiences of the earthquake, and sought to benefit 
from knowledge of such phenomena elsewhere. In April 1928, two months after the 
second, smaller earthquake struck Palestine, the British Embassy in Tokyo wrote to 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, the then Foreign Secretary, enclosing information on 
seismic activity in the Kwante district of Japan which had been provided by the 
Earthquake Damage Prevention Council of the Japanese Ministry of Education. The 
letter went on to note that copies were being sent to the British High Commission in 
New Zealand, “and to the Palestine Government from whom an enquiry with regard 
to earthquakes has recently been received by this Embassy.”124 
The Impact of the Earthquake on Nablus 
As already observed, the primary concern of the British authorities in both Jerusalem 
and London was to repair and maintain damaged infrastructure: although the 1927 
report of the Department of Public Works indicates that work of this nature was also 
undertaken so as to provide relief from unemployment.125 That Department also 
seconded two senior technical officers to the Municipality of Nablus “for several 
months after the earthquake in July”126 indicating the severity of the damage there: 
with the only other town receiving secondees being Jerusalem.127 Efforts were made 
to initiate repair work before the winter rains set in, and the priorities for Nablus and 
its municipality included the police offices and barracks, the Old Serai, and the 
Hashimyeh  school.128 Not all the emphasis however was on Government or 
Municipal buildings. Plans were drawn up by the Department of Public Works, in 
consultation with the Department of Health for basic housing structures consisting of 
a living room, kitchen, and toilet for those made homeless by the earthquake: with 
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land leased for their construction at the rate of ¼ dunam129 per house.130 The size of 
these plots clearly indicates that the new houses were located outside of the central 
urban area of Nablus.131 This is confirmed in the annual report for the Department of 
Health in 1927 which noted in its housing and town planning section “the 
construction of good residences outside the old town in replacement of those 
damaged or destroyed by the earthquake.”132 The following year’s report, taking a 
retrospective view, considered that some good had resulted from the destruction, 
noting that the health of those moved into temporary accommodation133 had 
improved since their relocation from what the Department considered to be 
“overcrowded and unhealthy” conditions.134 
In terms, however, of relations between the British and the Palestinians, although 
there is clear evidence of collaboration both in the administration of the Palestine 
Relief Fund, and of the police working together with the local people in Nablus to 
extricate victims from the rubble, the overall relationship was still characterised by 
the same sort of ‘top down’ approach evident in the development of water 
infrastructure: it was the Mandatory authority, operating within the fiscal constraints 
imposed by London, which assessed the requirements and initiated the projects, with 
the local community acting as passive recipients. This may help explain why the 
1927 earthquake and the subsequent reconstruction operation did not mark any 
particular improvement in the somewhat guarded and unsympathetic relationship 
between the British and the Nabulsis.135 
In the same way that the administration in Jerusalem was obliged to operate within 
constraints imposed by London, so the local Municipal Authority in Nablus was 
obliged to operate within the constraints imposed by the Mandatory Authority in 
Jerusalem. On 22nd August 1927 the Palestine Bulletin reported that the Mayor of 
Nablus had asked Lord Plumer for a loan of £ 150,000 to repair the earthquake 
damage, during the course of the High Commissioner’s visit to the town to ascertain 
how badly it had suffered.136Rebuilding loans were made available by the Mandatory 
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authorities,137 with individual loans not to exceed £40 “to persons who can obtain two 
or more sound guarantors, but who cannot arrange an immediate mortgage on their 
land.”138 £10,000 was made available for loans for this purpose to the Northern 
District, together with £5,000 for the Southern District and £5,000 for the Jerusalem 
Division.139 The letter made clear that “only persons of integrity and means”140 
should be accepted as guarantors, so in practice the loans would be limited to the 
affluent and well-connected. Unsurprisingly this gave rise to complaints that not 
enough was being made available for rebuilding.141  The Arab Commission in 
Jerusalem, formed to protect the interests of the Arab earthquake sufferers, resolved 
to write and complain to the Permanent Mandates Commission at the League of 
Nations, as well as to Government and Parliament in the United Kingdom.142 
The Impact of Developments within the Department of Public Works 
It is possible however that the lack of generosity in loan funding was the result not 
only of the overall fiscal constraints imposed by the Treasury, but also due to a re-
orientation of the priorities within the Department of Public Works which held lead 
responsibility within the Government of Palestine for building programmes.  That 
process saw changes in both the type of work carried out, and the geographical 
regions within the territory which were the primary beneficiaries of resource 
allocation. In terms of activities, the shift in focus was set out in the Department’s 
1929 Annual Report, which noted “a marked change in (its) policy and activities.”143 
In essence, this change was away from a focus on developing the territory’s 
transportation infrastructure via the programme of road and bridge development 
which had characterised the first decade of the Mandate. Henceforth there was to be 
a greater emphasis on the construction of new buildings. The rationale for the latter 
was that hitherto the Government had been leasing existing buildings144 which (by 
implication) were not considered fully fit for purpose, and where any improvements to 
them would accrue to the landlord, not to the Government. This situation is reflected 
in the 1926 Annual Report, which illustrates that the two largest single items of 
recurrent expenditure were on road and bridge maintenance, followed by rent for 
office accommodation.145It is also confirmed in a separate report on staffing levels 
which has references to “unsuitable rented buildings.......which are for the most part 
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in bad order, badly sited, and discreditable to Government.”146 A picture is 
consequently built up from these reports that by the end of the 1920s a decision had 
been taken to improve the condition of the ‘Government estate’ via a programme of 
new, owner-occupied buildings. These would not only contribute to operational 
efficiency –and thus longer term cost savings- but also act as a tangible symbol of 
the British mandatory presence in Palestine. 
These however were not the only changes taking place around that time, as the 
evidence makes it clear that the building programme was concentrated in some 
areas at the (relative) expense of others. The 1926 report for example lists about a 
hundred entries under ‘Public Works Extraordinary’.147 Out of these, Nablus was 
designated for only two (related to improvements to the Government owned hospital, 
and the former Ottoman military barracks.)148 Haifa by contrast was the beneficiary 
of ten, and Jaffa eight.149 The organisational thinking around this time also appears 
to indicate a restructuring which would facilitate the concentration of resources in 
smaller, more discrete areas. In March 1928 Lord Plumer wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary proposing a reorganisation of the Department of Public Works so that 
instead of operating in simply a northern and southern district in Palestine it would 
henceforth cover “four independent districts.”150These would consist of a northern 
division with headquarters at Haifa: a Nablus division: a Jaffa-Gaza division: and a 
Jerusalem-Beersheba division.151 A possible interpretation of this proposed 
restructuring is that Nablus would benefit, given that henceforth it would have its own 
division instead of being part of a much larger northern district. The stated rationale 
for the changes however was that major projects such as the Rockefeller museum in 
Jerusalem, the Jaffa Post Office and Jaffa port development meant that more staff 
were needed at the headquarters drawing office in Jerusalem.152 None of those 
projects were in the northern half of Palestine, and a restructuring which split out 
Nablus from a new northern division based in Haifa would make it easier to 
concentrate the available funding for that part of the territory on port and industrial 
development in Haifa. 
The colonial secretary Leopold Amery agreed to Lord Plumer’s proposals later that 
same month, albeit with some caveats concerning the grading of staff in the new 
structure.153 This led Plumer to respond subsequently,154 and part of the text is 
revealing of his priorities, given that he envisaged the possible need to divide the 
northern division into two smaller districts so that less senior grades of engineer 
would be required. Should that occur, he was of the view that class 2 engineers 
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would remain in charge of Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, while the more junior class 3 
engineers would be appointed “to the less important posts at Nablus and Nazareth or 
Tiberias.155 Here then is a clear statement of how Nablus was viewed from the 
perspective of the Mandatory authority in Jerusalem: less important than the capital 
or leading coastal towns, and only on a par with the small towns of Nazareth and 
Tiberias which, notwithstanding the religious significance of the former, were both 
less populous, and of less economic importance than Nablus.156 
The somewhat dismissive view expressed by the High Commissioner is also 
reflected in decisions concerning the posting of one of the engineers in the 
Department of Public Works. The internal minutes on the district reorganisation file 
reveal that Mr G T Caryer, “was found unsuitable as an Assistant Engineer, and it 
was proposed to discontinue his services.”157 It is nevertheless clear from the 
correspondence between Jerusalem and London158 that Caryer had acted as the 
senior engineer in Nablus, pending his return to headquarters in Jerusalem as an 
Assistant Architect.159 Taken together, the London-Jerusalem exchanges and the 
internal correspondence on file indicate that he was not considered an effective 
engineer, but was by contrast an acceptable architect. As a result he was ‘parked’ 
temporarily in Nablus while awaiting a suitable architectural post in Jerusalem. 
Clearly he would not have received that interim posting if the department had 
considered Nablus to hold the same importance as towns such as Haifa or Jaffa. 
By 1929, the new High Commissioner had decided that he would indeed divide the 
new northern district into two.160 His rationale for this was the large amount of work 
in the district, and the need to reorganise the Haifa office.161 This no doubt reflected 
the anticipated workload from urban infrastructural development alluded to later that 
year.162 Once again, the internal correspondence between officials in Jerusalem 
reveals the lower status accorded to Nablus, where it is presumed that the engineers 
there and in Nazareth will be grade 3 posts, while those in Haifa will be the higher 
grade 2.163 All these developments of course came a year or two after the 
earthquake, but they are clearly indicative of the way the Government was thinking, 
and where its priorities for expenditure were located. Jerusalem and the coastal strip 
were to be the main beneficiaries of building programmes which marked the second 
phase of infrastructure development following that of the road-based transport 
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network which had consumed much of the available budget during the first decade of 
the Mandate. 
That network undoubtedly held the same potential to benefit Nablus as it did any 
other town in Palestine which was connected to it, but improved transportation links 
in themselves could not act as a substitute for the sort of economic programmes 
which would be necessary to develop an impoverished territory which had 
successively suffered the ravages of war, crop failure, and the 1927 earthquake. 
Nablus suffered greater material losses than anywhere else in Palestine in terms of  
buildings destroyed and lives lost, but there was no serious effort made by the 
Government to initiate a rebuilding and urban development programme in those 
parts of the old town which had borne the brunt of the damage. In this respect, the 
fate of the Samaritan community was symbolic: originally located in the south-
western part of the old town,164rather than start anew in their existing location, the 
earthquake inspired them to move progressively out to the suburban areas and on 
up to their present location at the top of Mount Gerizim.165 If crises bring 
opportunities they were not capitalised on as far as Nablus was concerned, which 
suffered only losses: of buildings, people, and economic activity. 
Conclusion 
The 1927 earthquake was a natural disaster to which the Mandatory authorities 
brought an essentially minimalist approach where the over-arching priority was to re-
establish the status quo ante as far and as fast as possible. It was also revealing of 
prevailing attitudes concerning humanitarian aid and Palestine. It came at a time 
when both governments and emerging civil society organisations tended to favour 
and support those groups of people in countries other than their own where they had 
developed a relationship.166 Some analyses of these developments have argued that 
this prioritised approach to which groups and places to focus on coincided with a 
parallel trend for governments to use humanitarian relief as an instrument of foreign 
policy.167 The experience of Palestine, and in particular Nablus, in 1927 suggests 
that this argument needs to be qualified according to specific circumstances. What is 
striking about the response of the Mandatory authorities to the earthquake is that 
they used money donated by private individuals via the Earthquake Relief Fund they 
established, and only used their own budgeted funds for the repair and renovation of 
communications and transport infrastructure –i.e. their own assets. As noted on page 
125 above, donations to the fund had reached £21,000 by the end of 1927, in 
contrast to only £875 of supplementary government funding for the railways: with the 
whole of the £4.5 Million Palestine Loan Ordinance agreed that November allocated 
for infrastructure development, not earthquake relief per se – certainly not in respect 
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of humanitarian relief. These figures suggest that the Mandatory authorities were not 
even leveraging or matching private sector donations: they were relying on them to 
provide the food and shelter required for those people who had been made 
homeless when their houses either collapsed altogether or became too badly 
damaged to safely return to. 
What money was made available by the government for house building and 
reconstruction came in the form of loans: reference is made in one of the despatches 
from Jerusalem to London to “special credit facilities to individuals.”168 Nowhere is 
there any mention of grants. Indeed, in correspondence between the Colonial Office 
and the Treasury, the latter agreed to the High Commissioner’s proposal that any 
loans made available for the purposes of house (re)building should be limited to 
£200 per application, charge interest of 6%, and be repayable within ten years.169 
The imposition of such conditions would suggest that only the better off would be 
likely to make use of such funding, given the relatively short repayment period, and 
the lack of concessionary interest rates.  Those lacking the means to take up such 
loans would consequently be dependent on the humanitarian relief supplied by non-
Government agencies. 
On the issue of funding sources from what would today be described as Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), the timing of the earthquake was significant, as 
the late 1920s saw a change from the attitudes found in the years immediately 
following World War I, with its emphasis on “pro-Christian and pro-Western 
proselytising”170 towards an approach whereby the donor was more willing to be 
guided by the priorities of the Government administrating the territory in need of aid. 
This growing acceptance of local, recipient-led priorities must have made it easier for 
the Mandatory authorities to on the one hand launch their appeals via the Palestine 
Relief Fund, while on the other being able to maintain the initiative in how the funds 
were dispersed without having to worry that there would be too many ‘strings’ 
attached to the donations.The 1927 earthquake, and the response to it, 
consequently marks a shift from the approach towards the World War I disasters 
analysed in Keith Watenpaugh’s ‘Bread from Stones’ towards one which was 
becoming more secular and needs based, with less emphasis on the cultural or 
religious affiliations of the recipients. 
Reflecting these developments, the Relief Fund established by the mandatory 
authorities enabled a conduit of finance to flow in from the United States, where 
many of the donors were Jewish, and moreover happy to donate simply to 
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‘Palestine.’ Once transferred into the fund’s bank account this nevertheless came 
under the full control of the Government of Palestine, creating the impression that 
this was quasi-Government money, not directly related to the national home project: 
and as such uncontroversial as far as the sensitivities of the Nabulsi community were 
concerned. By contrast, direct offers of aid coming from within Palestine, especially 
from the new town of Tel Aviv, and involving the physical presence of Jewish 
volunteers offering their labour, appear to have been considered unacceptable to a 
Government administration which was well aware of the controversies caused by its 
Jewish national home policy. 
It is also clear from the records of the Department of Public Works that the 
earthquake came at a time when thinking on the priorities for expenditure was 
changing: with a move away from the transport infrastructure that had accounted for 
much of the Department’s budget in the first years of the Mandate towards an 
expanding programme of public building in those towns where the Government 
wished to showcase its presence: in particular, Haifa and Jerusalem. Clearly Nablus 
did not rank highly in the hierarchy of priority locations, and the opportunity 
presented by the earthquake of creating a new urban development on the site of the 
ruined old town was passed over, although by default new suburban areas were 
created for those who were unable to return to their damaged or destroyed houses.  
The findings of this chapter consequently reinforce the leitmotif of the thesis 
concerning the essentially de minimis character of the Mandatory authority’s 
approach to the city. At the same time it reveals a specific aspect of that approach in 
terms of how privately funded philanthropic donations were used to plug the funding 
gaps which emerged in those geographical locations which were not considered 
priority development areas. With this in mind it is now appropriate to turn to another 
event specific to Nablus, which occurred some years later in 1936, the year of the 
Arab revolt: with a view to ascertaining whether the same ‘hands off’ approach was 
employed, not in the field of reconstruction, but in events concerning security and the 
maintenance of law and order. The incident concerned involved the de facto arrest of 
the Mayor of Nablus, not by the police, but by the military authorities, and so 
provides an opportunity to examine the relations between the civilian and military 
authorities within Mandate Palestine, albeit within the broader constraints imposed 
by the Government in London. This event, like the earthquake, made sufficient 
impact that it became the subject of questions raised in Parliament. It is to this which 
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Chapter IV considered the impact of the 1927 earthquake on Nablus, and what this 
natural disaster, and the response to it, revealed about the attitude of the Mandatory 
Government towards the city, with its minimalist approach to Government 
intervention and reliance upon private sector donations to fund reconstruction. 
Chapter V examines a related but different set of issues arising from a particular 
incident which took place during the autumn of the first year of the Arab Revolt in 
1936. It involved the army, the police, and the Mayor, Suleiman Bey Tuqan. A scion 
of one of the city’s leading families, he was elected Mayor in 1925, a post he held 
until 1950.2His forced co-option by the army late one evening in September 1936, 
and the subsequent reaction to it, provide an opportunity to examine the differences 
of perspective between the civil administration and the military in Mandate Palestine, 
together with the tensions arising from them which is one of the key themes of this 
chapter. Within the broader context of colonial administration in the decades 
following World War I it goes on to argue that the divergence of views between High 
Commissioner Wauchope and Lieut-General Dill reflected broader shifts in colonial 
governance taking place in the 1920s and 30s, using French Morocco as a point of 
comparison.  
The arrest of the Mayor in September 1936 took place at the end of the first phase of 
the Arab Revolt in Palestine, which had started in April that year as a protest against 
rising levels of Jewish immigration.3Although the start of the revolt took the form of a 
nationwide strike,4the beginning of armed insurrection can be traced to “an attack on 
15 April 1936 on a convoy of taxis on the Nablusto Tulkarm road in which the 
assailants murdered two Jewish passengers.”5 The Government’s account to 
Parliament of this incident noted that it resulted in the murder of two Arabs by Jews 
north of Petah Tikvah two days later, with further clashes between Jews and Arabs 
between Jaffa and Tel Aviv in the succeeding days. Order was restored on the 20th 
April.6 
 
1 This incident took place in September 1936, when the Mayor was Suleiman Bey Tuqan 
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Following the arrival of British reinforcements in August 1936, together with a military 
offensive in September, the strike and related insurrection was called off in October.7 
The arrival of the Peel Commission in November 1936 and its subsequent 
recommendation for partition triggered the second phase of the revolt in September 
1937,8 which was then crushed decisively by the military9 and had come to an end 
by the outbreak of World War II.10The constraints which had been imposed on the 
military by the High Commissioner in 193611were lifted during the second phase of 
the revolt when they had a much freer hand.  
As far as Jabal Nablus was concerned, the 1937 – 1939 period marked a decisive 
change from the earlier policy of minimal state intervention: for the military, police, 
and intelligence services the area was the subject of close and active engagement. 
This is the reason why the time period covered by this thesis from the early years 
following the end of World War I concludes with the start of the Arab revolt in 1936. 
The events of that year started a process which would lead to the end of the de 
minimis state policy as it crushed the revolt and then geared up for the much wider 
scale of hostilities caused by the outbreak of World War II. This chapter 
consequently traces the closing down of an era of colonial governance in Nablus and 
the beginning of a new one. That change marked a shift from a thinly spread, hands-
off civilian regime to a far more repressive and militarised one. Such a change of 
emphasis from ‘benign neglect’ to active engagement mirrored a similar 
metamorphosis in colonial development policy more widely in the inter-war years, 
where an earlier emphasis on self-development and self-sufficiency was gradually 
replaced by the view that colonial development could become “a means of alleviating 
distress in Britain”12 by using colonial territories as export markets for British 
manufactured goods. To achieve that objective however it was necessary to 
maintain at least a basic level of law and order so that normal commercial operations 
could continue unimpeded. I would argue that there are parallels here with the 
‘Limited Raj’13 of the British in India, where a similar system of ‘governance on the 
cheap’ which ruled indirectly through influential members at the apex of the local 
social and political hierarchies was nevertheless backed up “by a monopoly of armed 
power”14 to be drawn upon if and when necessary. In both countries there was a tacit 
understanding with local elites that they would be left unencumbered to maintain 
their dominant social and economic position so long as the imperial power could 
pursue its economic interests.15 
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Specifically in the case of Palestine those interests were primarily focussed on 
maintaining Ian unrestricted flow of oil to the port of Haifa as the possibility of war 
with Germany became more apparent, and it is within the context of these broader 
imperial considerations that the means used for the suppression of the Arab Revolt 
should be considered. The tensions which developed between the civilian and 
military authorities which are discussed below16 arose because of the differing views 
between the two on the appropriate degree of force to be deployed to suppress the 
revolt. The civilian authorities, mindful of their need to govern indirectly by co-opting 
members of the leading Palestinian families, wanted to use the minimum amount of 
force necessary. This is consistent with their generally de minimis approach to 
governing Nablus which is the leitmotif of this thesis, but which as noted above came 
to an end after the initial phase of the revolt. 
Methodologically, this chapter zooms in to examine a small-scale case study in order 
to uncover specific features of the shift from civilian to military rule in Nablus that 
would otherwise go unnoticed with a more macro scale approach. Following Tuqan’s 
arrest, the authorities moved quickly to apologise for his treatment and so minimise 
the political damage which might have accrued as a result of the incident. It was not 
in their interests to weaken or sever the links between the mandatory government 
and the head of the local municipal authority, as to do so could have resulted in a 
need for more direct engagement by the central government headquartered in 
Jerusalem, and thus jeopardise their policy of de minimis rule. To the extent that this 
chapter deals with a local incident it maintains the approach taken in the three 
preceding chapters of analysing the actions of the mandatory government from the 
perspective of an individual city in Palestine and its surrounding hinterland. It also 
progresses the arguments of the preceding chapters by demonstrating that the civil 
authorities only intervene to the extent necessary to maintain law and order, and so 
avoid any developments which might cause it to become a centre of political 
opposition to the overarching policy objective of the creation of the Jewish National 
Home. That of course was precisely what did happen in 1936 and I would 
consequently argue that the neglect of Jabal Nablus during the earlier years of the 
Mandate was an important contributory factor in causing that part of Palestine to 
become the epicentre of the revolt. Given that this theme derives from the overall 
findings of the thesis as a whole, as opposed to the specifics of this particular 
chapter, it is developed in the concluding chapter which follows. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the relations between the police and the 
military before examining the arrest itself - as well as the strategic importance of the 
Nablus area from a military perspective during the first year of the Arab Revolt, 
together with the events which took place in the months prior to this incident. It then 
goes on to consider the response of the mayor to his arrest and the subsequent 
attempts at damage limitation by the Mandatory authorities once the incident 
became published in the local press and was subsequently raised in Parliament. 
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Finally it draws some general conclusions on the relations between the civil and 
military authorities, as well as between both these arms of the British government 
and the local Nabulsi population. There were clearly tensions between the civil and 
military, notwithstanding the fact that the headquarters of the Mandatory authorities 
in Jerusalem worked to ensure that they did not become too apparent to the 
Government in London. The tensions themselves derived from differing perspectives 
on priorities, with the military more interested in shorter term requirements to 
suppress the revolt, and their civilian counterparts more mindful of the longer term 
importance of maintaining a working relationship with the leaders of the local 
population.    
Nablus and the Arab Revolt: a British Military Pespective 
The first time the British army encountered the Jabal Nablus region in the twentieth 
century was in 1918 when General Allenby was pushing the Ottoman army north 
prior to the battle of Megiddo.17 It was then that they discovered the challenging 
terrain of thesteep hills surrounding the city, together with the strategic importance of 
the Jerusalem-Nablus road which was the only properly surfaced road capable of 
taking year-round vehicular traffic which ran north up the central ‘spine’ of 
Palestine.18 Following the war, Nablus was considered by the gendarmerie located 
there “as one of the most fanatically Moslem towns in the whole country, worse even 
than Hebron.”19 Given that it was one ofthe main population centres of the central 
uplands of Palestine, it was well suited as a point from which to develop resistance, 
or revolt.20 This perception was shared by the military authorities, whose information 
for Commanders stated in the general introduction to Palestine that the hilly country 
of the surrounding area was almost exclusively populated with Muslems, who were 
“dependent on the large town of Nablus.”21Local observers were also of the view that 
the urban population included relatively large numbers of young professionals (or 
effendiyya) who were unable to find employment with the Mandatory authorities, and 
manifested their disaffection by inciting violence amongst the slum-dwellers “lying 
behind the Great Bazaar.”22It is interesting to note here that the perceptions of the 
military reflected those of their civilian colleagues in government, some of whom had 
expressed concern about the lack of employment opportunities, and the negative 
effects that these could have on the maintenance of law and order.23 
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Apart from the strategically important road connecting the city to Jerusalem to its 
south, there was also a rail link connecting it to Tulkarm to its west, and this posed a 
challenge to the military as the line crossed over a main road which, due to the 
nature of the terrain, offered no alternative routes in the event that the bridge over 
the crossing was blown.24 A decision was consequently taken to destroy the bridge 
before it could be sabotaged, and it was blown up on 13th June 1936.25As the military 
authorities observed at the time, it also denied use of the railway to rebels in both 
Nablus and Tulkarm.26 In September 1936 Lieutenant-General Dill was appointed 
senior military officer in Palestine, in anticipation of martial law being declared to put 
down the revolt.27His (geographical) strategic priorities were revealing, and there 
were only three of them: Haifa, Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem-Nablus main road.28 
The importance accorded to this key transport and communications artery into and 
out of Nablus was no doubt in part a reflection of the high level of guerrilla activity 
which took place in the surrounding hills. In his despatch of 30th October 1936, 
reporting on the general situation in Palestine, Dill observed that the main armed 
bands active in the revolt were operating in the Jenin-Nablus-Tulkarm triangle, and 
totalled about200 men.29He went on to note that they showed no sign of dispersing –
unlike other bands elsewhere in the territory- and decided that “steps would therefore 
have to be taken to disperse them by force.”30 
That same month had brought news that Fawzi Al Qawaqji, the self-styled 
‘commander in chief of the Arab Revolt in Southern Syria,31was near Nablus.32 
Military intelligence at the time had ascertained his preference for a village north of 
Nablus whose location facilitated the receipt of weapons both from Syria and from 
Trans-Jordan, while at the same time offering an escape route to the latter should 
one become necessary.33The attraction of the hilly country was that it was harder for 
both planes and soldiers to attack the rebels there than it was down on the more 
open country of the coastal plain.34 In the introduction to the British military 
assessment of the Arab Revolt, the different types of terrain encountered across 
Palestine were classified on a ten point scale ranging from (1) ‘excellent going’ to (8) 
‘rocky ground near Nablus’: (9) ‘a rocky hillside north of Nablus’: and (10) ‘a 
complete tank obstacle the Beidan gorge, East of Nablus.’35Clearly the Nablus area 
provided the most challenging terrain from the perspective of the Mandatory power, 
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and so it is unsurprising that for this reason it was the favoured territory for an 
operational baseas far as the leaders of the revolt were concerned.  
The Role and Conduct of the Army and the Police 
“Legally, British soldiers fighting internal insurgents conducted themselves as an aid 
to the civil power.”36This point was established, inter alia, in both the 1929 Manual of 
Military Law and the King’s Regulations, as re-issued in 1935 with a section on 
duties in aid of the civil power.37 As stated above, by the autumn of 1936 the 
Government in London anticipated that it would be necessary to impose martial law  
inPalestine due to the state of unrest caused by the revolt. The responsibility for that 
decision however was vested in the High Commissoner, and Wauchope sought to 
avoid such a draconian step which he feared could have repercussions in other 
British controlled territories in the region, such as Egypt and Iraq. He was 
furthermore of the view –subsequently vindicated- that by October 1936 there was a 
good chance that the Arab Higher Committee would call off the strike which had 
generated the momentum for the revolt that Spring.38 It was clear from the Lieut. 
General’s report on the 1936 ‘disturbances’ that he disagreed with the High 
Commissioner’s decision not to declare martial law, and considered that by failing to 
do so “an opportunity had been missed of re-establishing British authority.”39 
It would be wrong however to conclude that British forces at the time were overly 
restrained by the civil authorities, as a series of Orders in Council and Emergency 
Regulations passed in 1936 – 1937 gave them wide-ranging powers to search, 
detain, and impose collective punishment.40These orders and regulations created a 
situation where British actions hitherto considered unlawful became lawful.41The 
1936 Emergency Regulations for example vested powers in District Commissioners 
and subsequently military commanders to appropriate and demolish property “in 
accordance with the exigencies of the local situation.”42In August 1936 the Palestine 
Post reported that Edward Keith-Roach, Northern District Commissioner, had 
imposed a collective fine of £P 5,000 on the inhabitants of the town of Nablus, using 
his powers under the Collective Fines Ordinances.43 His reasons for doing so were 
revealing of British attitudes towards the Nabulsis, and can be found in the text of the 
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Order quoted in the Palestine Post article.44It starts with a list of complaints 
concerning attacks in and around the town on British troops in the areafor which he 
considered the Nabulsis to be responsible. The culminating reason however for 
imposing the fine was given as arising from the failure of the townspeople “to render 
any assistance to discover the offenders”45 and subsequently conniving at their 
escape.46 Clearly by the first year of the Arab Revolt there was an almost complete 
absence of trust and co-operation between the town and even the civil authorities. 
It was against this background of growing and mutual hostility that “considerable 
reinforcements were drafted from Egypt until the beginning of August (1936) when 
eleven battalions were in the country.”47According to the army’s own version of 
events, sufficient forces had arrived by September 1936 to persuade the Arab Higher 
Committee of the futility of continuing with armed conflict.48Notwithstanding the 
increase in the number of soldiers in the territory, they did not operate as a self-
contained unit, but operated in close liaison with the police force, which in Palestine 
shared many of the characteristics of a gendarmerie.49 Many of the UK nationals 
were ex-servicemen who carried weapons,50 were drilled by army sergeants, “and 
fought alongside the army under military command.”51 As a general rule, the British 
members of the police force operated mainly in the towns, in part due to their limited 
numbers, combined with a shortage of transport (and the concomitant supply 
difficulties) with which to convey them “to the chain of rural stations in the hills 
around Nablus.”52That said, in general the job of interrogating suspects and 
prisoners was left to the police,53 although their success in extracting useful 
information for the military was especially constrained in Jabal Nablus due to the 
level of opposition to the Government, and “the spell and virtual control of Fawzi.”54 
Despite this general separation of operational areas, with the army concentrating its 
offensives against the armed bands in the hills, the military records of the revolt 
maintained that the police “have always taken their lead from the army.”55 The ‘lead’ 
in this context was not that to be found in a formal chain of command, but rather one 
where one group of men looked to another56 due to a shared operational culture and 
experiences, reinforced by the fact that both groups were working together in an 
overseas territory. During the early days of the Arab revolt for example, the police in 
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Nablus were assisted by the Seaforth Highlanders when facing a crowd throwing 
volleys of stones. They opened fire, killing two Arabs and wounding four others 
before order was restored.57 
 Camaraderie apart, however, there were also more hard-headed reasons why the 
military took a close interest in the operations of the police, as they were aware of 
the growing number of attempts to steal guns from police stations during the second 
phase of the revolt in 1938.58 There were suspicions that these thefts were tacitly 
facilitated by Arab policemen on guard duty in police stations, but the challenge to 
the army was that the theft of rifles and ammunition enabled an increase in the 
incidence of sniping by the rebels.59 Because of this problem, responsibility for the 
police – and their weapons- was transferred to the army in September 1938.60 While 
the case was being made for this transfer, ten examples were cited of thefts of police 
rifles and ammunition, of which the first in the list was an incident which took place 
on the night of 16th August 1938 at the Nablus police station.61 Following a request 
for entry by an Arab, a number of armed men ran inside, cut the telephone wires, 
and then made off with four rifles and a total of 924 rounds of ammunition.62 
Interestingly, the records of the civil administration in Palestine convey a more 
positive picture of the police, citing the general reliability of its Arab members.63 The 
formal position set out by the Mandatory Government in Jerusalem was that the 
functions of the police and military followed a conventional pattern which by then was 
well established: the police were primarily responsible for the maintenance of law 
and order, and would only call on the services of the military when they were no 
longer able to contain a particular situation.64  Military establishments were located 
across the territory, and there was an army barracks in Nablus.65 As for the police 
themselves, there were twenty on foot, reinforced by ten mounted.66 Some of those 
on foot were Palestinian Arabs with a reputation for being both reliable and efficient 
in conveying information on local conditions to their superiors.67 During riots against 
Government policy which took place in Nablus in August 1931, when the police 
opened fire to disperse the crowd, both a British Corporal and a Palestinian 
Constable “were specially promoted to the rank of Sergeant and Corporal 
 
57‘Shooting in Palestine.’ Article of 25 May 1936,  Times newspaper digital archive 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 WO 191/90, TNA 
61 WO 191/90, TNA, Appendix D 
62 Ibid 
63 See e.g. the CO 814 TNA series covering the annual Palestine Government reports 
64  This relationship is set out in AIR 5/1250, TNA,The Palestine and Transjordan Defence Scheme 
65  Ibid 
66  These figures are given in tables at the end of Herbert Dowbiggen’s letter of 17 March 1930 to the High 
Commissioner in T 161/1029/2, TNA, Palestine & Transjordan: Exchequer Responsibility for Police and 
Defence. That letter summarises the recommendations made in his report on the organisation of the police in 
Palestine  
67  Edward Horne, A Job Well Done  144  
150 
 
respectively for their courageous conduct”.68In the view of the Mandatory authorities, 
the British and Palestinian police worked well together, including on night duty in 
Nablus.69 
This difference in perspective is at least partially accounted for by the rising tensions 
between the Arabs and the British as the Mandate progressed, culminating in the 
start of the Arab revolt in 1936, at a time when Jewish immigration from Europe into 
Palestine was reaching its peak following Hitler’s consolidation of power in 
Germany.70 Those tensions would have had a corrosive effect on the degree of trust 
between Arabs and the British, and it was only to be expected that the loyalty of Arab 
police officers would have been stretched to the limit once the army embarked on 
counter-insurgency operations in the villages and house-demolitions in the towns: 
within communities where the local police almost certainly had friends and family 
members. The obvious solution to this problem from a military perspective was to 
develop oversight, and eventually control, over the police force to minimise the risks 
of its armoury falling into rebel hands To make the case to the civil authorities that 
such control was necessary, the military had to highlight the weaknesses and risks in 
the current system. It is possible to conclude the Government in Jerusalem was itself 
receptive to the idea of the need for reform as the revolt progressed, given its 
invitation to Sir Charles Tegart, with his extensive experience of policing in India, to 
advise on the structure and operations of the Palestine police during 1938 and 
1939.71 
Whereas the military authorities may have shared concerns with senior police 
officers about the reliability of Arab police constables during the revolt, amongst the 
more junior ranks of the British police attitudes were informed by a supposition that 
Europeans were superior to the colonised population. For Douglas Duff, who had 
served in both the army and the Palestine Police, “our attitude was that of Britons of 
the Diamond Jubilee era, to us all non-Europeans were ‘wogs’”.72Such prejudices 
varied not only according to race, but also to religious affiliation. According to 
historians of the Black Watch Battalion, British forces discriminated in Mandate 
Palestine in similar ways to their later counter-insurgency operations in Malaya: 
“targeting the Muslim community while working with or treating lenientlythose 
perceived to be friendly – including Christians and Druze”.73 Given that the Black 
Watch were posted to Nablus in the Spring of 1938,74 it is unlikely that relations 
between the British and the local population became any more cordial: according to 
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Mathew Hughes, “Arab propaganda played on the fact that Scottish regiments were 
especially unpleasant.”75 
According to British army reports of the history of the revolt, the steadily escalating 
campaign of violence during 1936 included sniping attacks from armed groups in the 
hills “both by day and by night.”76During the week of 11th – 19th August 
reinforcements were brought up to Nablus from Cairo “for action against snipers in 
the rocky hillsides overlooking the camp.”77In an attempt to combat the incidence of 
sniping, searchlights were also installed.78 Nablus was problematic for the British as 
their military camp in the city was overlooked by steep hills with boulders providing 
cover for the snipers and making it hard to locate them.79The following week, British 
intelligence established that Fawzi Al-Quwaqji had entered Palestine across the river 
Jordan “and made for the Nablus hills.”80 His arrival might explain why the last week 
of August saw the army demolishing houses in the city, as well as walls and masonry 
on its outskirts both “as a punitive measure and to facilitate the operation of 
troops.”81 On the 5th of September air reconnaissance sorties “detected forty one 
rebels constructing sangars on the hills outside Nablus”82 which were subsequently 
fired on, creating fifteen casualties.83 Finally, on the 22nd September two howitzer 
batteries arrived from Egypt, one of which was placed in Nablus, where it was used 
to fire into the surrounding hills “very soon after arrival.”84This build up of military 
force by the British over late summer – early autumn in Jabal Nablus provides a 
useful example at the local level of how developing military superiority by the 
Mandatory power succeeded in persuading the rebels to bring their armed uprising 
to an end by October 1936.85 
The Arrest of Suleiman Bey Tuqanon 24th September 1936 
The operational structures and issues discussed above, together with the events 
which took place in the Jabal Nablus area over the summer of 1936, provide the 
broader context for the specific incident concerning the arrest of the mayor: an 
occurrence which was both reported in the ‘Telegraph’ newspaper and also gave rise 
to exchanges of correspondence between representatives of the Government and 
Members of Parliament.86  According to the report of the Assistant District 
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Commissioner (ADC) for the Samaria division of the Mandatory Government,87  
participants in the Arab Revolt had been shooting from the hills surrounding Nablus 
into the town centre during the evening of the 24th September 1936, with their targets 
including the headquarters of the military barracks, where a new Brigadier (Evetts) 
had taken over command earlier that same day.88 Around 11.00.p.m. in the evening 
he asked Raymond Cafferata, the then Superintendent of Police in Nablus,89 if he 
would request the Mayor to come over to Brigade HQ to discuss the 
sniping.90Unsurprisingly, given the lateness of the hour, he requested a police escort, 
which was provided, and subsequently arrived around 23.30.91When Mayor Tuqan 
arrived, Evetts, speaking in Arabic, put it to him that he was responsible for law and 
order in the town, and should call a stop to the shooting. He then invited him to stay 
the night and had Tuqan escorted up on to the roof of the barracks, reasoning that 
the snipers would not shoot at a fellow Arab.92 Following telephone calls between 
Nablus and Jerusalem, orders were issued for his release, which were carried out 
before dawn.93 
The Response of the Mayor 
The following day the Mayor submitted a complaint to the ADC. The Municipal 
Council subsequently met and threatened to resign en bloc, and demonstrations and 
protests were being prepared both in Nablus and the surrounding area.94The speed 
of these developments indicates that those holding municipal office were both well 
organised and capable of drawing on popular support against the Mandatory 
authorities at short notice. They also had a good understanding of the regional 
organisational structure of the Government, and what ought to have been the 
relationship between the police, military, and District Administration officials. It is 
interesting in this respect to note that when the Mayor met  with the ADC on the 26th 
September, his chief complaint against Cafferata was not that he had followed the 
wishes of the Brigadier, but that he had done so without the authority of the District 
Administration.95The nature of that complaint suggests that Tuqan was aware of the 
instructions which had been issued in 1932 regarding relations between the District 
Administration and the police,96 which required, inter alia, that the police “keep the 
Assistant District Commissioner or the District Officer informed of anything which 
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affects the good order of his District.”97That he understood the structure of the 
Mandatory administration, the way it was meant to work, and its relation with the 
military is a reflection of Tuqan’s experience in dealing with the British. In the early 
1920s, prior to his election as Mayor of Nablus, he was a member of the Advisory 
Council, and in 1934 he co-founded the National Defence party.98 
Attempts at Damage Limitation 
What had been an informal discussion between the ADC and the Mayor on 26th 
September was repeated with a more formal expression of regret for the way he had 
been treated by the Brigadier.99 Suleiman Bey Tuqan subsequently withdrew his 
complaint against Cafferata, and the Municipality their threat to resign, but by that 
time the affair had become known to the press.100 The fact that an incident that might 
otherwise have been known to only a small number of British and Palestinian 
officials subsequently reached a wider audience of newspaper readers might explain 
why some of the key players were anxious to create a favourable impression of 
themselves for posterity. Attached to the ADC’s report of what happened was one 
from Raymond Cafferata on his role.101 Although factually correct in terms of relating 
the sequence of events, he avoids stating that his instructions to his deputy to collect 
the Mayor were an order rather than a request. This is at variance with what was 
stated in the ADC’s report.102 Furthermore, when reporting on his arrival at the 
Mayor’s house Cafferata states explicitly that “there was no question of arrest”103 and 
goes on to assert that his duty “was solely one of protection”104 – from the dangers of 
travelling in the streets of Nablus so late at night. That the ADC was happy to 
enclose this report with his own, and not to comment on Cafferata’s failure to consult 
with the District Administration prior to carrying out the Brigadier’s request,105 rather 
implies that the civil administration and the police were closing ranks in an attempt to 
ensure that any blame for the incident fell on the military’s newly arrived Brigadier. In 
one sense this was correct, as the military were clearly at fault in involving the police 
in circumstances where they were under attack, and where the response should 
have been for them alone. The situation was not analogous to one of civil disorder, 
where the police request military reinforcements to contain a situation which had 
deteriorated beyond their control. 
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The High Commissioner was himself clearly of the view that the military had been 
wrong in their actions, as when writing to Lieutenant-General Dill106 he raised the 
issue “of the use of hostages for protective purposes.........compulsorily placed in 
positions of danger in order to protect the troops from sniping or other forms of 
attack.”107 Dill’s response was polite, reassuring, and misleading. He asserted that 
the Mayor had been “given accommodation for the night on the flat roof of the house, 
and was not in any danger.”108 There is no mention of the fact that the building he 
had been taken to was being sniped at, or that his ‘accommodation’ was adjacent to 
a machine gun post.109 It is furthermore worth noting in this respect that when 
Brigadier Evetts was interviewed about his time in Palestine following his retirement, 
he stated clearly that he had “held the Mayor of Nablus hostage to the Arabs’ good 
behaviour.”110 
Notwithstanding the position that the High Commissioner had taken with the military 
in Palestine, it became clear in subsequent correspondence with London that he 
wanted to play down the incident, and emphasize that it was now closed – noting 
that he had himself seen the Mayor’s brother, and would shortly be seeing the Mayor 
himself.111 References were made to “the so-called arrest of the Mayor of Nablus”112 
and the newly arrived Brigadier Evetts described simply as “ill-advised to have 
detained the mayor under virtual arrest.”113 The incident, he was pleased to report, 
had been closed “with due explanation and expression of regrets to the Mayor from 
the Assistant District Commissioner.”114 Wauchope was also anxious to play down 
any criticism of Raymond Cafferata, the Superintendent of Police in Nablus, claiming 
that he had been placed in “a most difficult position”115 in being asked to carry out 
“what was practically an order from the Brigadier”.116 There is no discussion as to 
whether or not the Superintendent should have either challenged or turned down the 
Brigadier’s request in view of the former’s almost certainly better understanding of 
the political risks involved. It is also clear that the High Commissioner felt quite 
uncomfortable about the whole affair, given his observation that it was “most 
regrettable and would be most difficult to defend had the Mayor wished to make an 
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outcry in the press.”117 We might presume in these circumstances that the civil 
authorities would have pressed harder for admonition of the military to impress upon 
them the importance of avoiding any future repetition. That they did not might 
indicate that they felt dependent on them at a time of widespread unrest as the Arab 
Revolt developed. That the High Commissioner himself was seeing both the Mayor 
and his brother reflects a degree of vulnerability experienced by the Mandatory 
authority arising from its reliance on local notables to enable its policy of de minimis 
administration. 
A desire by the Mandatory Government in Jerusalem not to be seen to be at odds 
with their military colleagues would have been a consideration when providing 
material to Ministers to respond to questions raised in Parliament. Two M.P.s, the 
Irish Peer Lord Winterton, and Mr Clifton-Brown, had indicated their intention to do 
so following a report of the arrest in the Daily Telegraph.118 These concerns would 
have been reinforced by the fact that some of the correspondence in London on the 
arrest was dealt with as if it was a related issue to that of house demolitions in 
Palestine, another matter of public attention during 1936. Wauchope’s letter of 16 
October 1936 to the Colonial Office119 refers to letters “about the demolition of 
houses in Palestine and the so-called arrest of the Mayor of Nablus.”120 The fact that 
a composite response issued from Jerusalem is indicative that the draft replies for 
the Minister to sign off in London would have covered both subjects together. That 
part of the response of the High Commissioner’s letter dealing with house 
demolitions is revealing, and worth quoting in full: 
“It is the fact that no steps are taken by Government to provide 
accommodation for the inmates of houses which are demolished as a punitive 
measure. Surely it is not reasonable to expect Government thus to take the 
sting out of what is intended (and has, I believe, proved to be) a deterrent 
punishment of collective character ? But due notice is always given to the 
occupants of the houses selected for demolition, so that they can remove their 
household effects and foodstuffs, and my information confirms what Foot said 
that the occupants invariably find shelter with friends or relatives in the 
village.”121 
Clearly Wauchope feels somewhat on the defensive about having to confirm that the 
Mandatory authorities did not offer any alternative accommodation to people whose 
houses the military had demolished. Having made the statement three lines of 
justification then follow, that they should not be mitigating what was designed to be a 
deterrent punishment, that prior notice was given to enable the people effected to 
gather their personal effects and food stores and that in practice they anyway 
 
117  Ibid 
118  This is made clear in the first paragraph of the letter of 08 October 1936 from High Commissioner 
Wauchope to Lieutenant-General Dill in CO 733/316/11, TNA 
119  CO 733/316/11, TNA 
120  Ibid 
121  Ibid 
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relocate to friends or relatives and do not finish up either destitute or homeless. The 
argument is then further reinforced in the succeeding paragraph, which contains both 
the observation that no complaints had been received about suffering caused by the 
lack of provision of alternative accommodation, and that across the mandated 
territory as a whole the total number of demolitions carried out had been around 100 
“which in the circumstances cannot be regarded as excessive.”122  It may be 
concluded from all of these statements that the High Commissioner must have felt 
somewhat uncomfortable about the issue of house demolitions, which had been the 
subject of exchanges between Lord Winterton and the Colonial Secretary in 
September 1936, when the former had expressed the view that alternative 
accommodation should be found for those whose homes were demolished, as a 
matter of prestige for the Government.123 Nevertheless, Wauchope was not critical of 
the military arm of Government for using what he believed to be an effective (if 
brutal) means of opposing the Arab revolt. 
This then is the context in which the somewhat muted response to Brigadier Evetts’ 
indelicate treatment of the Mayor should be interpreted. Clearly at a time when 
armed rebellion was breaking out in Palestine, there were limits to how far the 
authorities in Jerusalem were prepared to criticise the high-handed actions of their 
military colleagues when they were dependent on them for the suppression of civil 
unrest. Once the necessary apologies had been made to Suleiman Bey Tuqan by 
first the Assistant District Commissioner and then the High Commissioner, and it had 
subsequently become clear that the aggrieved party did not wish to make any 
political capital out of the incident, the priority of the Mandatory Government became 
to treat the matter as closed as soon as it became practical to do so, while at the 
same time minimising its impact vis-a-vis third parties in both Palestine and the 
United Kingdom once the story had been published in the press.124 The sooner it 
became possible to ‘move on’, the sooner the administration could return to the 
status quo ante, maintain its de minimis approach to Jabal Nablus, and operate at 
arms length through such local administrative structures as the municipal 
government – and its Mayor. 
It is likely however that another reason for the High Commissioner wanting to draw a 
line under this particular incident was a desire not to allow it to exacerbate the 
tensions that were clearly developing between the civil and military authorities at that 
time. When Lieut-General Dill made his report on the 1936 ‘Palestine 
Disturbances’125 he made the observation, in relation to points raised by Wauchope 
concerning the role of the garrison in Palestine, that there could be “no doubt that the 
 
122 Ibid 
123 Letter of 26 September 1936 from Lord Winterton to William Ormsby-Gore M.P. That letter also provides 
an example of house demolition and the arrest of the Mayor of Nablus being treated together in the same 
text. See CO 733/316/11, TNA 
124  The correspondence and reports in CO 733/316/11, TNA indicate that it was reported in both The Times 
and the Telegraph 
125 WO 32/9401, TNA, Palestine Disturbances 1936, Report of GOC British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan 
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task of meeting a fresh outbreak or organised rebellion is primary.”126This statement 
was then followed by the assertion that “the task of acting in aid of the Civil Power to 
quell disconnected riots issecondary.”127 Although technically correct, this implies 
that how and where the military intervene during periods of civil disorder or 
insurrection is not to be constrained by the oversight of the civil authority to which it 
is ultimately responsible. Dill’s difference of opinion with the High Commissioner 
concerning the use of martial law subsequently becomes clear in his report when he 
sets out the case for early and decisive intervention against the revolt, on the 
grounds that failure to do so will lead to the need for much larger military resources 
subsequently if the revolt is allowed to gather momentum.128 This he opines was “the 
main lesson of the recent rebellion”129 when in particular “a desire not to leave 
bitterness prevented the early declaration of Martial Law.”130 Not content to confine 
himself to this statement, Dill went on to observe that in the event of a recurrence of 
the 1936 revolt, should the civil authorities persist in constraining the freedom of 
action of the military, “it would be the duty of any commander to resist.”131 He finally 
asserts on this issue that whereas he accepts a duty to seek advice from the High 
Commissioner on political issues, “the responsibility for all action taken must be 
unreservedly his.”132 This then was the crux of the matter: Dill saw himself as the 
decision-maker seeking advice from the High Commissioner rather than the 
commander of military forces at the disposal of the civil power, to be deployed in a 
manner consistent with that power’s interpretation of the political constraints limiting 
the nature and scale of military intervention. 
His interpretation of the events of 1936 seems to have been shared by others in the 
military. A report signed off in October 1936 by a Group Captain133 argues in similar 
fashion that the Arab Higher Committee had successfully internationalised what had 
started as a local issue in Palestine,134that  Haj Amin  Husseini had become a public 
hero influential enough to cause trouble in future,135 and that as a result of what 
happened there was now greater interest in Palestinian affairs in the Muslim world, 
and consequently a risk of greater criticism of British policy.136 
Taken together, these two reports on the first year of the revolt appear to raise some 
contradictions. On the one hand a case could be made for more draconian military 
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unlikely, if the perspective taken was only focussed on Palestine, and did not take 
into account the wider considerations of reactions in the Middle East and beyond – 
especially India as far as the British were concerned. Conversely, for those who 
were aware of those wider possible ramifications, the logical position would have 
been to take a more circumspect approach, combining measured military action with 
diplomacy – the approach taken by Wauchope. The WO 191/73 report makes it clear 
that the military were indeed aware of the regional problems which could arise if the 
uprising in Palestine were mishandled. It is consequently a little puzzling that Lieut.-
General Dill, in his capacity as General Officer Commanding in the territory, was not 
more sympathetic to the rationale for, and the approach taken, by the High 
Commissioner. He did after all have very wide-ranging powers at his disposal, albeit 
short of martial law, with  the 1936 Emergency Regulations permitting the practice of 
house demolitions. These powers were not used sparingly, given that over the 
course of the revolt it was estimated that some 2,000 Palestinian Arab buildings 
were demolished.137From a purely military perspective the key issue here was the 
extent to which the use of a large amount of force early on in a conflict would create 
a situation whereby less force would be required subsequently – or vice versa. 
Questions such as these are relevant to issues concerning the appropriate level of 
resources to deploy in the course of civil government. If too little is disbursed during 
the early years of a new administration, does this risk precipitating levels of 
discontent which require significantly increased levels of resources in subsequent 
years? It is a leitmotif of this thesis that it does, which is why the neglect of Jabal 
Nablus during the 1920s became a contributory factor to its becoming an epicentre 
of the Arab Revolt in the 1930s. 
Dill’s tour of duty in Palestine came to an end one year later in September 1937,138 
and it is possible that the brevity of his posting was in part due to his differences of 
opinion with the High Commissioner, who had preferred a negotiated end to the 
1936 rebellion, and had declined to authorise planned military action to apprehend 
Fawzi Al-Quwaqji in October of that year.139  It is tempting to consider which of the 
two men had the more effective strategy for maintaining law and order in the 
mandated territory. History may have subsequently vindicated Dill, who had 
characterised the end of 1936 as an ‘armed truce’140 rather than a proper 
suppression of the revolt, which was to flare up again in 1937with the murder of Mr 
Andrews, District Commissioner for the Galilee that September.141 The Mandatory 
Government subsequently acted decisively, outlawing the Arab Higher Committee, 
and arresting and deporting political activists. No doubt the assassination of a senior 
British Government official generated a political imperative to be seen to react 
robustly, and it is possible that the absence of high-profile British casualties in 1936 
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was one of the reasons why Wauchope considered it justified to be relatively 
constrained in the use of force. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to evaluate the case study of the arrest of the mayor of Nablus 
in 1936 and ask what that tells us about the Mandatory Government’s changing 
approach to administration at the local level in Jabal Nablus. A detailed examination 
of the arrest and the reaction that followed it has revealed tensions between the 
military and civil authorities. I would argue that these were in part due to the fact that 
the mayor was the senior local notable in charge of the municipal government, and 
that the civil authorities did not want anything to weaken his co-operation with the 
local representatives of the administration headquartered in Jerusalem. Had that 
happened then more resources would have been required, with a greater level of 
direct intervention. In the event, that was what did happen, not with the civil 
administration, but with the military during the second phase of the Arab Revolt 
starting in 1937, when a significantly increased level of resources were committed to 
ensure the definitive crushing of the revolt. The period of these first two years of the 
uprising consequently saw a transition from a ‘hands-off’ de minimis style of civilian 
government to fully engaged repression by the military. This chapter has brought out 
the tensions this shift produced both within the Mandate Government and between 
the British and the local Nabulsi population. These developments also explain the 
logic for this thesis, concentrating as it does on the early years of the Mandate, to 
conclude with the Arab Revolt and not continue further in its chronology to the 
changed conditions in Palestine during the late 1930s when the Government began 
to gear up for the outbreak of World War II.  
As with the 1927 earthquake, the British response to the arrest of the Mayor 
displayed an essentially minimalist approach where the over-arching priority was to 
re-establish the status quo ante as far and as fast as possible. But just as attitudes 
towards the use of humanitarian relief at times of natural disaster were changing 
during the mandate years, so did the perception of the use of intelligence in the 
military and law enforcement fields. What had started as a marginal activity at the 
turn of the twentieth century, became of central importance to military operations.142  
That being the case, it might be tempting to presume that the reason for Brigadier 
Evetts’ insistence in demanding the presence of the Mayor of Nablus when he was 
under attack from snipers was that he wanted to apprise himself of local knowledge 
which would have been useful in hunting them down, the more so as he was able to 
converse with him in Arabic.143  The way that Suleiman Bey was treated, both 
 
142  For a general discussion of this theme see  Polly Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt, the first 
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143 CO 733/316/11, TNA. The observation is made in Cafferata’s report of the incident: “ I escorted the Mayor 
to Brigade HQ and introduced him to the Brigadier who then conversed with the Mayor in Arabic.” 
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considering the abuse to which he was subjected144 and his involuntary relocation to 
the roof of the military headquarters,145 nevertheless indicates that this is not a 
plausible explanation. More likely it reflected the general deterioration in relations 
between those responsible for putting down the revolt and the local population.146 
Even as the Arab revolt flared up in 1936, relations between the Mandatory 
authorities and Nabulsi notables in positions of municipal responsibility had clearly 
not broken down, so it may be concluded that the latter considered there were some 
benefits from the British presence which made a degree of co-operation worthwhile. 
Despite their implacable opposition to the Jewish National Home policies of the 
Mandatory Government, the Nabulsi elites never wholly broke off relations with the 
British. The photograph at the end of this chapter is telling in this respect, as it shows 
Arab recruits to the British army in 1941: in the centre of Nablus, the city which 
above all symbolised resistance to foreign rule in Palestine. 
The complexities of the Arab-British relationship were reflected in the somewhat 
convoluted dynamics between the Government in Jerusalem, its police force, and 
the military. Raymond Cafferata would have been within his rights to refuse the 
request of Brigadier Evetts to summon the Mayor so late at night, in the absence of 
permission from the local District Commissioner. It was only when it became clear 
that he had overstepped the mark that Cafferata omitted material facts in his report 
of the incident so as to show himself in a favourable light. 
Unsurprisingly the Government in Jerusalem was anxious to avoid this incident 
causing a (public) rift between itself and the military forces in Palestine upon whom it 
depended for the suppression of the revolt. It was furthermore no doubt content that 
as far as Parliament and any other interested parties in the UK were concerned, the 
specific incident of the arrest of the Mayor tended to be treated in correspondence as 
a sub-set of the more general phenomena of house-demolitions, and the 
responsibility or otherwise of the Mandatory authorities for facilitating alternative 
accommodation for those who lost their homes as a result.  
Nevertheless, the extensive correspondence and reports in the ‘Air’ and ‘War Office’ 
files indicate that there were real differences of perspective between the civil and 
military powers in Palestine. Some of those responsible for civil administration in the 
Middle East during the inter-war years saw service in different territories, including  
Sir Gilbert Clayton, who served as Chief Secretary in Palestine from 1923 – 1925, 
following earlier postings in Cairo, and before going on to represent the UK 
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Government in Iraq.147 Experiences such as those, combined with the constant flow 
of reporting telegrams between the region’s capitals, would have increased 
awareness of how political developments or military activities in any one territory 
would have had an impact elsewhere in a region where all the inhabitants shared the 
same basic language, at a time when both newspapers and radio were increasing 
the awareness of events amongst the educated and politically active classes. It is 
consequently unsurprising that whereas on the one hand army officers’ primary 
concern was simply to neutralise any threats to British authority, on the other those 
responsible for civilian government were only too aware that military action which 
could be portrayed as acts of untrammelled brutality could have repercussions both 
within the territory and outside. British colonial interests at the time stretched well 
beyond Palestine, and anything which might contribute to instability elsewhere in the 
Middle East, or, in extremis, amongst the Moslem population in India, was to be 
avoided. 
These tensions between the civil and military authorities in 1936 are indicative of a 
wider trend among European colonial regimes facing uprisings from the local 
population in the Middle East and North Africa. In Morocco, similar differences of 
perspective arose between Marechal Lyautey in the 1920s and his successors who 
fought the Rif war. Lyautey certainly believed in the ‘pacification’ of the local 
population, but only to the extent that it subsequently became possible to work with 
them, develop infrastructure projects, and expand the economy – ideally to mutual 
benefit.148 His successors however prioritised the military defeat of the rebels during 
the Rif insurgency, and were more concerned with victory than the longer term 
relations between the imperial power and the local population.149 There are 
consequently parallels between the Rif war in Morocco and the second phase of the 
Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1938 – 1939, when the British significantly increased 
the military forces to be used in Palestine and definitively crushed the revolt: albeit 
under a different commander than Lieut.-General Dill.150 
This chapter has examined in some detail a specific incident in Nablus involving the 
civil and military powers and the Mayor. Analysis of that event has led to 
consideration of wider issues concerning relations between the military and the High 
Commissioner, British policy towards the Palestinian Arabs, and broader 
considerations involving British interests in the Middle East and the likely impact that 
events in Palestine could have on them. The Jabal Nablus area itself had a certain 
strategic importance to the Government in Jerusalem, given its location in the hilly 
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country towards the north of the territory, and relative proximity to both Transjordan 
and Syria with which its politically active families had developed well-established 
links, in particular with such cities as Damascus and Salt.151From a purely military 
perspective it was not the most important centre of equipment, men, or operations: 
those were to be found in Haifa, Lydda, and Jerusalem.152 Nevertheless, it was 
home to a British military base153 –at the receiving end of sniper fire- as well as  a 
Royal Army Service Corp (R.A.S.C.) depot, a Military Transport (MT) workshop, and 
a NAAFI canteen.154 No doubt the location of the depot and workshop reflected the 
city’s transportation links, both by road to Jerusalem, and by rail to the Haifa-Beisan 
line and the coastal Haifa-Lydda-Gaza line,155 thus facilitating the transportation of 
heavy equipment which had been brought in for servicing and repair. 
Had relations between military personnel and the local population been less beset by 
mutual suspicion and cultural differences, the presence of the former might have 
offered potential for increased economic activity via the supply of goods and 
services, but the available evidence in the War Office records suggests that the 
military in Nablus operated very much as a self-contained group of units: the entry 
concerning the RAF emergency landing ground located two miles south-east of the 
city mentions only one hotel in Nablus for food and accommodation, but no other 
facilities suitable for UK personnel.156The city, unlike the new administrative capital 
under the Mandate, Jerusalem,157 was not growing either in terms of population, or 
economically, and as has been argued in chapter I of this thesis, its relative 
economic decline158 was one of the causes why Nablus became a centre of 
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“The road was at first a splendid one which took us up and down over several 
passes among the mountains of the Central Range, and made one realise how the 
centre of the country had been kept so much apart from the rest.”1 
 
“As a result of the building of highways and other improvements in means of 
transportation and communication, the commercial centres of the interior diminished 
greatly in importance while the importance of the main towns increased.”2 
 
This thesis has examined British Mandatory policy towards the town of Nablus during 
the two decades following the end of World War I (WWI). In so doing, and in its 
capacity as a study of developments at the local level, it seeks to redress the 
balance of historiography which has tended to focus on Jerusalem and the coastal 
towns at the expense of those located in the central uplands.3 Part of this focus may 
be a reflection of official sources available –as far as the UK is concerned- in the 
National Archives. In the Colonial Office: Palestine Original Correspondence files  
there are 160 files on Jerusalem, 153 on Haifa, 63 on Jaffa, but only 8 on Nablus. If 
such volumes are indicative of British priorities, then clearly Nablus was not one of 
them. 
It is a leitmotif of this thesis that the town’s relative decline under the Mandate, 
coupled with the difficulty it experienced in adjusting to its reduced status in 
comparison with its position under the Ottomans as a cultural and commercial 
centre, were key contributory factors in its role as initiator and leader of the 1936 
Arab Revolt.  However, before attempting any overall conclusions it may be helpful 
to briefly summarise its main findings. 
The most important overarchingthemes to have emerged from the research include 
that of a ‘de minimis’ style of British colonial government, where the impact of scarce 
personnel resources was leveraged through the co-option of local elites. In 
geographical terms thisproduced a contrast between areas of relative stagnation that 
were subjected to this de minimis government, and more thriving metropolitan 
centres that experienced more proactive forms of imperial governance. Within that 
 
1  06 April  1921 extract from a diary of a member of a delegation to Egypt and Palestine, describing their 
departure from Nablus in  CMS/ACC 21 F4 VOL.C, Church Missionary Society Archives, Cadbury Research 
Library, Birmingham University  
2Sa’id Himadeh (Ed), The Economic Organisation of Palestine (American University Press, Beirut, 1938), 376 
3 A similar focus is apparent in studies of the late Ottoman period: see Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering 
Palestine, 3. When speaking of the impact of the ‘integration narrative’ of European influence on Ottoman 
territories in the nineteenth century, Doumani observes that it “tends to relegate the interior regions of the 
Ottoman Empire, such as the Jabal Nablus, to the status of a periphery’s periphery.” 
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context Nablus is a case study set in the era of British imperial history during the 
period following the end of World War I. It is of particular interest because the 
relative isolation it suffered under the Mandate was in sharp contrast to the role it 
had played as an important regional cultural and commercial centre under the 
Ottomans. As a result, the impact of the Mandate was traumatic. In this respect its 
experience in the 1920s and 1930s can be characterised as passing through a 
‘shatter zone’4created by the disruptive transition from Ottoman to British rule after 
the traumas of World War I. The sensitivities revealed by the research, and the 
general lack of rapport between the Nabulsis and the Mandatory authorities need to 
be interpreted against the traumatic background of that transition. 
The tensions that arose were exacerbated by the relative economic decline of Jabal 
Nablus. Whereas the population of Jerusalem and the coastal towns was growing 
during the Mandate, that of Nablus was not. I have argued in chapter I that for the 
port towns their growth path was relatively unimpeded by regime change following 
World War I, as they were able to continue their maritime trade via the 
Mediterranean. For those in the hinterland however this option had never been 
available as their trade routes were over land. The creation of new territorial borders 
between the Mandatory powers, and the inevitable restrictions on freedom of 
movement which they entailed, consequently had a disproportionate impact on 
towns such as Nablus. Added to this was the subsequent impact of the Great 
Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which unleashed powerful deflationary 
forces on such commodities as agricultural staples. This had a debilitating effect on 
the local economy of Nablus, and its agricultural hinterland. The combination of 
relative urban decline in comparison with the expanding coastal towns and the 
depression of agricultural prices in the Jabal Nablus created the impression for its 
citizens that their part of the country was stagnating and falling behind. That relative 
decline contributed to a feeling of inferiority5 and marginalisation which would go 
some way to explaining why the town was such a centre of opposition to the 
mandate and Jewish immigration, despite the fact that it was located in a region 
which experienced very little in the way of such immigration per se.  
British perceptions of Nablus developed in the years immediately following World 
War I.In this respect the available primary source material has made it possible to 
analyse two aspects of British engagement, namely surveillance of the town’s 
political activities and government at the local level - which included the maintenance 
of law and order, education in the surrounding rural area, and public health. The 
nature of that engagement is illustrative of the exercise of de minimis government in 
a non-priority area where the primary policy objective appears to have been the 
 
4 This concept has been applied to the mainly East European territories bordering the established states and 
empires disrupted or destroyed by World War I. See Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (Eds), Shatterzone of Empires.   
See also page 5 above in the Introductory chapter 
5 See Sahar Khalifeh,Of Noble Origins,30: “What was wrong with Nablus ? It was trash now ? Or was it because 
Nablus had gas lamps and Haifa had bulbs and electric lighting ? Was it because Nablus did not have a port and 
Haifa overlooked the sea ? Was it because Nablus had no foreigners, no Jews, and no dancers ?” 
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avoidance of any form of civil or political disturbance on the one hand while on the 
other keeping public expenditure as low as possible. This aspect of the research has 
generated what is essentially the leitmotif of the whole thesis, namely that Nablus 
was not a priority for the British Mandate in Palestine, and as a result suffered from 
neglect and marginalisation relative to other urban areas. British perceptions of the 
Nabulsis ranged from relative disinterest to outright suspicion of a town with a 
historical reputation for not welcoming external control. 
An examination of the available evidence concerning the project in the early 1930s to 
create a water supply infrastructure in the town has revealed disputes not so much 
between the British and the Nabulsis, but rather between the various branches of 
Government, both in Palestine and in London. This is especially apparent in the 
arguments which arose over the quality of pipes supplied via the Crown Agents by 
the UK firm Stanton & Co,6 given that some of them burst. Unfortunately those that 
did were used to connect two reservoirs on opposite sides of the valley in which 
Nablus is located7 (between Mounts Ebal and Gerizim) and so this delayed 
completion of the project and gave a poor impression from a public relations 
perspective in relation to the local population.8 The resulting exchanges which 
subsequently developed between Government House in Jerusalem and the Colonial 
Office in London to what ought to have remained a local issue contained in the 
District Commissioner’s office in Samaria suggests that tensions were rising in 
Palestine between the British and the Arabs at a time of accelerating Jewish 
immigration.9I have argued in chapter III that the official correspondence of the time 
indicates that Nablus was not considered a priority for infrastructure development. 
While Haifa and Jerusalem took the lion’s share of the funds available, Nablus was 
relegated somewhat to the margins, despite its historical importance as a leading 
commercial and cultural centre under the Ottomans.  
A good body of archive material has survived concerning the 1927 earthquake, and 
the Government’s response to it. This has revealed that the earthquake mainly 
impacted the poorer residents, whose   houses were made of low quality materials 
and more likely to collapse.10 Fatalities consequently arose only amongst the native 
Arab population and not the colonial administrators. As a result the Mandatory 
authority was blamed for doing too little, too late and demonstrations broke out when 
the High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, visited to see for himself the extent of the 
damage. The source material has also revealed that the timing of the earthquake 
coincided with a period when the authorities in Jerusalem were in the process of 
 
6  For a discussion of ‘imperial preference’ in the supply of British goods to British-controlled territories 
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7  See the letter of 26 August 1934 from Fawcett Pudsey, Director of Public Works in Palestine to the Crown 
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8Ibid, memo of July 1934 
9  In 1931 this was running at just over 4,000 per annum, but had risen to over 45,000 by 1934, peaking that 
decade at 66,427 in 1935: see http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-immigrantion-to-palestine-1919-
1941 
10Geoffrey Powell, PLUMER, The Soldier’s General,  315 
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renewing the Government estate and planning purpose-built structures in place of 
the rented accommodation then in use.11  Earmarking funds for that purpose 
necessarily entailed constraints on other forms of expenditure. The 1926 Department 
of Public Works annual report also indicated that expenditure was being directed 
towards specific towns such as Haifa and Jaffa, where significantly more projects 
were planned than in Nablus.12 That mode of thinking meant that by the time of the 
1927 earthquake the response of the authorities was characterised by a somewhat 
minimalist approach designed to do no more than was necessary to mitigate the 
impact of the destruction. A leitmotif of this thesis is that Nablus lost out relative to 
other parts of Palestine during the decades following WWI, at a time when the whole 
territory was anyway under financial constraints imposed initially by the debts 
accrued as a result of the war, and subsequently by the impact of the Great 
Depression. At the time of the earthquake, the effects of these constraints were 
partially mitigated in relation to the damage caused by recourse to the humanitarian 
disaster relief funds which flowed in as a response – including those from the Jewish 
community in the New York area. 
The final ‘snapshot’ of relations between the British and local Nabulsi society was 
well documented in British Government reports and correspondence at the time. This 
was the forced co-option by the army of Mayor Tuqan of Nablus during the first year 
of the Arab Revolt. The reaction to this incident provides an opportunity to examine 
the differences of perspective between the civil administration and the military in 
Mandate Palestine, together with the tensions arising from them. I have argued in 
chapter V that the arrest provides an insight into one of the consequences of a policy 
of minimalist state intervention, given the efforts made by the government to bring 
the incident to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and so avoid the need to allocate 
resources for  managing any ‘fall out’. Following Tuqan’s apprehension, the 
authorities moved quickly to apologise for his treatment and so minimise the political 
damage which might have accrued as a result of the incident. However, whereas the 
civil power wanted the minimum use of force necessary to restore order, the priority 
of the military by contrast was to crush the revolt which developed that year, with a 
view to ensuring that it could not recur.13 During the second phase of the Arab revolt  
in 1938 – 1939, not only was the UK gearing up for war, but in Palestine the scale of 
military intervention in the revolt was significantly increased. That period 
consequently marked the end of the policy of essentially laissez-faire ‘de minimis’ 





11CO 733/165/7, TNA, Department of Public Works Reorganisation of Staff 1929 
12  CO 814/2, TNA,  Department of Public Works Annual Report 1926 




Palestine as viewed from the perspective of Lyautey 
A key frame of reference in helping me understand the workings of British rule in 
Nablus has been provided by a different imperial regime in the interwar MENA 
region: that of French-ruled Morocco, and particularly the policies of Marechal Hubert 
Lyautey. I have also argued that the tensions between the civil and military 
authorities in 1936 were to some extent reflected in similar differences of perspective 
between Marechal  Lyautey in Morocco in the 1920s and his successors who fought 
the Rif war. As Resident-General of Morocco, Lyautey certainly believed in the 
‘pacification’ of the local population, but only to the extent that it subsequently 
became possible to work with them, develop infrastructure projects, and expand the 
economy – ideally to mutual benefit.14 His successors however prioritised the military 
defeat of the rebels during the Rif insurgency, and were more concerned with victory 
than the longer term relations between the imperial power and the local population.15 
There are consequently parallels between the Rif war in Morocco and the second 
phase of the Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1938 – 1939, when the British 
significantly increased the military forces to be used in Palestine and definitively 
crushed the revolt: albeit under a different commander than Lieut.-General Dill.16 
These different approaches to dealing with insurrections in colonial territories depend 
on whether the primary objective was to maintain power and authority by means of 
superior military force, or whether it was to establish a sustainable working 
relationship with the indigenous population, backed up by the minimum use of force 
kept mostly in reserve. Lyautey himself however had views on how to govern 
colonies which could shed some light both on the approach taken by the British 
Mandatory authorities in Palestine as a whole and on Jabal Nablus in particular. 
Des Territoires ‘Utiles’ et ‘Inutiles’17 
Marechal  Lyautey’s  concepts of which parts of Morocco were useful to France as 
opposed to those characterised as ‘useless’ were arguably a rationalisation of the 
resource constraints imposed by the French Government on the numbers of troops 
to be stationed in Morocco following the end of World War I.18  The essence of the 
idea however was simple: if the colonial power lacked the military resources to 
effectively control the whole of a colonised territory, then it had to decide on its 
priorities in terms of which parts of the territory were of greatest importance to its 
strategic interests. Le Maroc utile was consequently that part of the country which 
 
14 For a general discussion of Lyautey’s approach, see William Hoisington, Lyautey, preface vii + 18-19 
15  For a discussion of the Rif war and the changes in French Government policy towards the handling of 
insurgencies at that time,  see Moshe Gershovich, French Military Rule in Morocco, 122 – 161. Chapter 5: The 
Rif War and the end of ‘Pacification’ 
16 For a discussion of the Arab Revolt from a British military perspective,  see WO 191/88, TNA, History of the 
Disturbances in Palestine, 1936 - 1939 
17  For an explanation of this concept, see William Hoisington, Lyautey,  90 
18  The development of the concept of ‘le Maroc utile’ and ‘le Maroc Inutile’, and the resource constraints 
which brought it about is discussed in chapter 4 of Moshe Gershovich, French Military Rule 
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held an evident economic, military, or political importance. Le Maroc inutile by 
contrastconstituted any region where French effort required a financial and military 
expenditure out of proportion to the return.19 The emergence of the concept can be 
dated from French military defeat in the oasis of Tafilalet in 1918, situated in south-
east Morocco, near the border with Algeria.  Lyautey subsequently wrote the region 
off as being of no economic or strategic value from a French colonial perspective: 
and so part of le Maroc inutile.20 Conversely, le Maroc utile: 
“included all the regions that contained resources necessary for the economic 
development of Morocco and for its military and political stability, those 
indispensable for the country’s security and development”.21 
The Application of the Concept to Mandate Palestine 
Viewed from this perspective, ‘useful Palestine’ was the British Government’s 
headquarters in Jerusalem, the coastal ports, - in particular Haifa22 as the conduit for 
Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean - and the fertile coastal strip which constituted the 
embryonic Jewishnational home. The latter was the main justification used by the 
British for their control oftheterritory.23  By contrast, towns in the central highland 
chain, such as Hebron, Nablus, and Jenin, were not considered of particular 
importance. Although not necessarily ‘useless Palestine’ they were certainly not 
priorities: and as a result they were not growing and developing at the same rate. In 
the case of Nablus there was evidence of stagnation in terms of its municipal 
revenues, which grew only marginally between 1928, when they were £8,970, and 
1936, when they were £9,290.24 During the same period, Haifa’s revenues went from 
£26,000 - £111,000 and Tel Aviv’s from £78,000 - £447,000.25 It is the relative 
difference between the priority areas and the largely neglected and marginalised 
hinterland which is important here, rather than low living standards in an absolute 
sense. When considering the conditions of destitution pertaining in Palestine at the 
time of the Arab revolt, George Stuart, Deputy Director of Medical Services, was of 
the view that “no distressed family visited could not be paralleled or even 
outmatched, in poverty, hunger, and dirt, by many inhabitants of the East End of 
most large English and Scottish towns.”26 In contemporary American terms  Jabal 
 
19 Hoisington, Lyautey  90 
20 Gershovich, French Military Rule  111 
21 Gershovich, French Military Rule  113 
22For a discussion of the strategic importance of Haifa to the British, see Jacob Norris, Land of Progress, 99.  For 
a discussion of the similar importance of the port of Casablanca to the French in Morocco, see Daniel Rivet, 
Lyautey et l’Institution du Protectorat Francais au Maroc, 1912 – 1925 (Editions L’Harmattan, Paris, 1988),  132 
- 133 
23 For a discussion of the importance of the Jewish national home concept to both British imperial interests in 
the Middle East and their ideas on how to develop Palestine, see Norris, Land of Progress   64-65 
24  CO 821/11, TNA, Blue Book of Statistics 1936,  114: Finances of Municipalities, Total Revenue and 
Expenditure, 1927 – 1936    
25  Ibid (figures rounded for illustrative purposes) 
26  George Stuart, Deputy Director of Medical Services, and W J E Philips, Senior Medical Officer, ‘Observations 
on the application of relief measures to certain areas, 31 December 1939.’  Quoted in Naomi  Shepherd, 
Ploughing Sand, 153 
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Nablus was akin to a ‘rustbelt’ zone, falling behind other regions in terms of 
economic growth, seeing its working age population seeking employment 
opportunities elsewhere, and becoming prone to populist political movements which 
disdained the affluence of more flourishing metropolitan elites better placed to exploit 
the opportunities of a more globalised economy. 
Closing Remarks 
This thesis is a study at the local level of a town which was arguably one of the great 
‘losers’ from the British mandate in respect of its former role as a commercial and 
cultural centre under the Ottomans: notwithstanding the fact that many will argue that 
Palestine as a whole lost out as a result of the mandate, and the subsequent events 
of 1948.27 It is precisely this point however which illustrates the relevance of studying 
the fate of Nablus during the early years of the British Mandate. What happened 
there in the 1920s and 1930s was a precursor of what was to happen to all the 
Palestinian communities following successively the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948 and the Six Day war in June 1967, as they were progressively marginalised in 
the face of an increasingly powerful and growing Jewish community with a largely 
separate economy. Throughout the Mandate period the coastal strip, where most of 
the Jewish immigrants were located, developed into the dominant economic region 
of the territory as a whole. This economic dominance translated into political 
dominance during the war which broke out at the time of the British withdrawal. 
Henceforth the new state of Israel was to progressively extend its power and 
influence, first up to the 1949 armistice line, and subsequently into what is now the 
West Bank following the Jordanian withdrawal of 1967. The origins of that 
progressive development however can be traced back to the first two decades of the 
Mandate, and I would argue that what happened during those years set the scene 
for and enabled all of the subsequent developments: although this is not to suggest 
that the actual course of subsequent events became inevitable. 
The research has revealed various themes relating to the devastation suffered by a 
primarily rural society as a result of World War I. These included the debilitating 
impact of droughts, infestations, and natural disasters such as the 1927 earthquake, 
as well as the legacy of an Ottoman past which made it difficult to cope with the 
many changes brought about by the advent of the mandate. As Pere Jaussen noted 
from his time spent in the city in the 1920s, the Nabulsis were well aware of the 
imperfections and weaknesses of the Ottoman regime, but they nevertheless missed 
it to an extent that he thought many Westerners found hard to appreciate.28 In his 
view the real reason for this nostalgia was that the Ottomans were fellow Muslims 
 
27 “In the summer of 1948……Palestinian social and cultural life was totally destroyed.”  Ilan Pappe, The Rise 
and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty, the Husaynis 1700-1948 (Saqi  Books, London, 2010),  339 
28 Pere Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes, 263. His French text reads:  ”J’ai entendu des Naplousiens 
s’exprimer librement sur l’ancien regime turc: ils en reconnaissent les imperfections, la faiblesse……….mais le 
regrettent.  Et les motifs de cette mentalite sont sans doute plus forts et plus profonds que certains esprits 
occidentaux pourraient se l’imaginer.” 
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and the Nabulsis saw the British as infidels whose authority they were unable to 
accept.29 
It has also revealed various tensions within the British Government.These were 
apparent between local District Commissioners and their Head Office in Jerusalem, 
as well as between Jerusalem and London, and between the military and civil 
authorities. The overall conclusion however is that even in quite a small national 
territory such as Palestine, generalized statements must be treated with caution, and 
qualified according to different localities. From a British perspective, some parts of 
the territory were considered more important than others, and received much greater 
investment. For the marginalised ‘losers’ by contrast, in respect of such investment, 
minimalist Government  was  the order of the day. From the Palestinian perspective, 
the way particular groups responded to the mandate was very much conditioned by 
their formative experiences under the Ottomans and their perception as to whether 
or not they were favored or disadvantaged in relation to the status quo ante. By 
taking these varying considerations into account it becomes easier to understand 
why Nablus became both birth place and symbol of the 1936 Arab revolt against the 
British and their Jewish national home policy, despite the fact that under the 
Mandate there were virtually no Jews in the area of the ancient city of Shechem.30 It 
had been a regional commercial centre under the Ottomans with well established 
links to such cities as Damascus.Nearly all of this was lost following the successive 
shocks of World War I and the sudden regime change with the arrival of the British.  
Nablus had a well-established soap making industry at the turn of the twentieth 
century which went into a steep decline under the Mandate, partially due to the loss 
of export markets such as Egypt, and partially due to growing competition from new, 
and capital intensive, Jewish enterprises. Because of the difficulties of raising capital 
in a city closely integrated with an agricultural hinterland characterized by high 
degrees of indebtedness, the city was unable tocompete and stagnated 
economically. It was the coming together of these destructive forces which created 
the conditions for revolt. 
This thesis has hopefully contributed to a better understanding of how a steady 
process of marginalization, in a part of the Palestinian territory which was anyway 
relatively isolated in the central uplands, created the conditions which sparked the 
Arab revolt. For the way the Nabulsis saw the mandate, it may be fitting to conclude 
with a statement from Sahar Khalifeh, one of the leading authors to have emerged 
from the city during the second half of the twentieth century: 
“Palestinian society still suffered from its disconnection from the world and from its 
history. It had become an orphan after the Turks left, with no support from any side. 
 
29   Jaussen, Coutumes Palestiniennes  264 
30  Excepting the Samaritan community 
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As a result, it had withdrawn to protect its foundations in the realm of women and 














31 Sahar Khalifeh, Of Noble Origins (The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 40-41. Khalifeh was born in 
Nablus in 1941 and is the author of eight novels   
32 This Image is taken from Sahar Khalifeh’s entry in the ‘Personalities’ section of the Palestinian Academic 









AIR 5/1250         The Palestine and Transjordan Defence Scheme 
AIR 10 /1990  Index of Aerodrome & Landing Grounds in Palestine,    
  March 1939 
 
AIR 23/633         Weekly Resume of Disturbances in Palestine 
CO 733/2 Schedule of expenditure for the year ending March 1922 
CO 733/134/3Enquiry into Municipal Government in Palestine 
 
CO 733/135/10  Palestine Guaranteed Loan Ordinance, 1927 
CO 733/142/13  The 1927 Earthquake 
 
CO 733/153/5   The 1928 Earthquake 
CO 733/154/8 Department of Public Works,DistrictReorganisation 1928 
 
CO 733/165/7 Department of Public Works Staff Reorganisation 1929                  
 
CO 733/171/5 Department of Public Works, District Reorganisation 1929 
 
CO 733/185/77072  Johnson-Crosbie: Report of Committee on the  
                                Economic Condition of Agriculturalists and the Fiscal    
    Measures of Government in Relation Thereto  
 
CO 733/190 Court cases in Nablus concerning land sales 
CO733/209/16Nablus Water Supply 
CO 733/214/4 Agricultural Council Minutes of January 1932 
 
CO 733/214/9    Letter of 08 October 1932 from High Commissioner to  
   Secretary of State for the Colonies  
CO 733/226/14 Nablus Water Supply 
 
CO 733/240/2 District Administration 
CO 733/241/12Village Water Supplies 
174 
 
CO733/259/6 Reports of Assistant Commissioner, Northern District 
CO 733/263/7 Rural Education (1934) 
CO 733/267/7Nablus Water Supply: Defective Pipes 
CO 733/277/11 Child Marriage, Education for Arab Girls (1935) 
CO 733/316/11 House Demolitions, and the Arrest of the Mayor of   
 Nablus 
 
CO 733/318/8 Agricultural Development and Settlement. Memorandum  
by the Palestine Secretariat 
CO 742/4          Palestine Official Gazette 1927 
CO 742/13       Palestine Official Gazette 1936 
 
CO 793/7          Palestine Register of Correspondence 1927 
 
CO 793/9          Palestine Register of Correspondence 1927 – 1928 
 
CO 814/1 Palestine Administration Reports, 1921 – 1925 
CO 814/2         Palestine Administration Reports1926 – 1928 
CO 814/4 Department of Education Annual Report, 1929 – 1930 
CO 814/4         Department of Public Works Annual Report 1929 
CO 821/1Palestine Blue Book of Government Statistics, 1926 –  
1927  
 
CO 821/2Palestine Blue Book, 1927  
 
CO 1073/261   Instructions regarding the relations between the   
District Administration and the Police 
FO 141/672   Monthly political reports on Palestine and Trans-Jordan  
 
FO 141/673/1 October 1922 report on Palestine and Transjordan 
 
FO/371/16854/E1732    Memo of 27 March 1933 
 
FO 371/16926 Opposition in Nablus to land sales 
FO 371/61938 Arab Disturbances of 1936 and 1937-1939 
 
FO 406/43 Eastern Affairs, Further Correspondence, Part IV. January  




FO/608/97 Monthly Political Reports, October 1922 
 
FO 608/99 Petition from Nablus against Zionist domination of Palestine 
MPH1/949 Maps relating to WO 191/70 on Lessons of the Arab  
Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 
 
T 161/587/3Palestine: Nablus, Improvement of Water Supply 
T 161/899/3  Government Assistance for Earthquake Damage in          
Transjordan 
 
T 161/1029/2 Palestine & Transjordan: Exchequer Responsibility for  
Police & Defence 
 
WO 32/4174 Command of Palestine Armed Forces. Army Council  
  Instructions to Lieut-General J G Dill   
 
WO 32/9401 Palestine Disturbances 1936. Report of G.O.C. British  
Forces in Palestine & Transjordan   
 
WO 33/1436   Information for Commanders Reinforcing Troops 
 
WO 191/70  Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in  
Palestine,1936 
 
WO 191/73     Note on Proposals and Schemes for Restoration of   
                       Order under Military Control in Palestine, 1936 
 
WO 191/75     Preliminary Notes on Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion         
                       1936 
 
WO 191/88     History of Disturbances in Palestine 1936 – 1939 
 
WO 191/90     The Development of the Palestine Police Force under  
Military Control 
 
Middle East Centre Archives, St. Antony’s College, Oxford 
Civil Service List 1937. Government Printing Press Jerusalem 
Papers of Raymond Cafferata, reference GB165-0044 
Church Missionary Society Archives 





Annual reports of the Government of Palestine’s Department of Agriculture, Forests, 
and Fisheries, 1925 – 1932 
 
Census of Palestine 1931: Population of Villages, Towns, and Administrative Areas 
by E. Mills, Superintendent of Census. Jerusalem, 1932 
Mills, E: Census of Palestine 1931, Jerusalem, 1933: vol. II, Tables 
 
French, Lewis, First Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in 
Palestine, Jerusalem, December 1931 
 
Palestine Government Office of Statistics estimates 
 
Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937 
Simpson, Sir John Hope, Palestine Land Settlement, Urban Development and 
Immigration, Jerusalem, July 1930 
 
Imperial War Museum 
Papers of Field Marshall Lord Chetwode of XXth Corps Operations, ref. PP/MCR/C1  
Oral history of Brigadier John Evetts 
Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates: Commons, 1920 
 
Commons, Volume 170,  7th May 1923 
 
Commons, Volume 209, 18–29th July 1927 
Commons, Volume 281, 7th November 1933 
Commons, Volume 289, 11th May 1934 
Lords, Volume 93, 27th June 1934 
Commons, Volume 310, 24th March 1936 
Commons, Volume 311, 23rd April 1936 
Commons, Volume 313, 19th June 1936 
Institut du Monde Arabe, Paris 
Report on the State of Palestine submitted to His Excellency the High Commissioner 
for Palestine by the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Congress on 13 
October 1925  
177 
 
Israel State Archives 
Municipal Services: Municipality Samaria District, Nablus / Shekhem 1921 
Official Residences / New Officials’ Residences, Nablus / Shekhem 1921 
O’Donnell Commission report 1931 
British Mandate Collection, Balata Landing Ground, Nablus Air Field 1932 
Memorandum by the Municipality of Nablus, 1933 
British Mandate Collection, Police Post  Deir  Sharaf, Sub-District  Nablus 1934 
 
Nablus Annual Report 1936 
British Mandate collection, Acquisition of land for Nablus sports ground 1939 
Newspapers 
Palestine Bulletin, 3rd October 1927, ‘Arabs Dissatisfied with Earthquake Loan.’ 
Copies of the Palestine Bulletin are available for consultation online at the National 
Library of Israel: http://web.nli.org.il/sites/JPress/English/Pages/Palestine-
Bulletin.aspx 
Palestine Bulletin, 6th August 1931. ‘Nablus is better than Jerusalem’ 
Palestine Post,  16th December 1934. ‘Nablus wants Electricity’ 
Palestine Post, 5th February 1935. ‘Latest from Nablus, 150mm of water in 24 hours’ 
Palestine Post, 14th August 1936, ‘£P 5,000 Collective Fine Imposed Upon Nablus’ 
Times Digital Archive, 9th April 1925, ‘Jews Stoned by Arabs at Nablus’ 
Times Digital Archive,15thJuly 1927. ‘The Palestine Earthquake’ 
Times Digital Archive,  3rd October 1927. ‘Earthquake Sufferers in Palestine’ 




Abu-Ghazaleh, Adnan,Palestinian Arab Cultural Nationalism, 1919 – 1960. Amana 
Books, Vermont, USA. 1991 
Abujidi, Nurhan,Urbicide in Palestine: Spaces of Oppression and Resilience. 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2014 
178 
 
Abu-Sitta, Dr. Salman,Atlas of Palestine 1917 – 1966. Palestine Land Society, 
London, 2010 
Aldrich, Robert and McKensie, Kirsten (Eds),The Routledge History of Western 
Empires. Routledge, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, 2014 
Al-Salim, Farid, Palestine and the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, Modernisation and 
the Path to Palestinian Statehood. L B Taurus & Co. Ltd, London, 2015   
 
An-Nimr, Ihsan,History of Jabal Nablus and al-Balqa, at-Ta’awuniyyah Press, Nablus 
1975 
 
Arafat, Naseer,Nablus, City of Civilisations. Cultural Heritage Enrichment Centre, 
Nablus, 2012 
 
Ashbee, C R,A Palestine Notebook, 1918–1923. William Heinemann Ltd, London, 
1923 
 
Avneri, Arieh,The Claim of Dispossession, Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs, 
1878–1948.Hidekel Press, Tel Aviv, 1982 
Barnett, Michael & Weiss, Thomas (Eds),Humanitarianism in Question, Politics, 
Power, Ethics. Cornell University Press, New York, 2008 
Barnett, Michael & Weiss, Thomas (Eds),Humanitarianism Contested: Where angels 
fear to tread. Routledge, Abingdon, 2011 
Bartov, Omer and Weitz, Eric (Eds), Shatterzone of Empires, Coexistance and 
Violence in the German, Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 2013 
Bayly, Christopher,Empire and information: Intelligence gathering and social 
communication in India. Cambridge University Press, 1996 
Bayly, Christopher,The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914, Global Connections 
and Comparisons. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004 
 
Bentwich, Norman, Palestine. Ernest Benn Ltd, London, 1934 
Bethell, Nicholas, The Palestine Triangle, the Struggle Between the British, the Jews 
and the Arabs 1935 – 48. Andre Deutsch Ltd, London, 1979 
Bowman, Humphrey,Middle East Window. Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, London, 
1942 
Braudel, Fernand,La Mediterranee et  le Monde Mediterraneen a l’Epoque de 
Philippe II, Tome Premier, Librairie Armand Collin, Paris, 1966 
179 
 
Braudel, Fernand,Afterthoughts on Material Civilisation and Capitalism. John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977 
Braudel, Fernand,La Mediterranee, l’Espace et l’Histoire. Flammarion, Paris, 1985   
Braudel, Fernand,A History of Civilisations, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1995 
 
Brett, E A,Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, The Politics of 
Economic Change 1919 – 1939. Heinemann, London, 1973 
 
Brinner, William and Rischin, Moses (Eds),Like All the Nations ? The Life and 
Legacy of Judah L Magnes. State University of New York Press, 1987 
Bruce, Anthony,The Last Crusade, The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. 
Thistle Publishing, London, 2013 
Bullock, Alan,Hitler, a study in tyranny. Pelican Books, Middlesex, 1962 
Bunton, Martin,Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917–1936 Oxford University 
Press, 2007 
Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Collin, and Miller, Peter (Eds),The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality.University of Chicago Press, 1991 
 
Campos, Michelle,Ottoman Brothers, Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early 
Twentieth-Century Palestine. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011 
Cannadine, David,Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire. Allen Lane, 
The Penguin Press, London, 2001 
Caplan, Neil,Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question. Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 
London, 1978  
 
Chalcraft, John,Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2016 
Constantine, Stephen,The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914 -40. 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London, 1984 
 
Crummy, Donald (Ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa. James 
Currey Ltd, London, 1986 
 
Dean, Mitchell,Critical and Effective Histories, Foucault’s methods and Historical 
Sociology, Routledge, London, 1994 
Dobson, Miriam &Ziemann, Benjamin (Eds),Reading Primary Sources, the 
interpretation of texts from 19th and 20th Century History. Routledge, Abingdon, 2009 
180 
 
Doumani, Beshara, Rediscovering Palestine, Merchants and Peasants in Jabal 
Nablus, 1700 – 1900. University of California Press Ltd, London 1995 
 
Doumani, Beshara,Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean, a Social History. 
Cambridge University Press, 2017   
 
Drew, Alison,We are no longer in France. Communists in Colonial Algeria. 
Manchester University Press, 2014 
 
D’Souza, Rohan,Drowned and Dammed, Colonial Capitalism and Flood Control in 
Eastern India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006 
 
Duff, Douglas,Bailing with a Teaspoon. John Long Ltd, London, 1953 
Eisenman, Robert,Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel, A History of the Survival of 
Tanzimat and Sharia in the British Mandate and the Jewish State. Grave Distractions 
Publications, Nashville, 2015 
 
Emrence, Cem,Remapping the Ottoman Middle East: Modernity, Imperial 
Bureaucracy and the Islamic State. I B Taurus, London, 2012  
 
Evans, Martin,Algeria, France’s Undeclared War. Oxford University Press, 2012 
Fleischmann, Ellen,The Nation and its ‘new’ Women, The Palestinian Women’s 
Movement 1920 – 1948. University of California Press Ltd, London, 2003 
FolkeAx, Christina, Brimnes, Niels, Jensen, NiklasThode, and Oslund, Karen  
(Eds),Cultivating the Colonies, Colonial States and their Environmental Legacies. 
Ohio University Press, Athens, 2011 
Fuccaro, Nelida,Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009 
Gershovich, Moshe,French Military Rule in Morocco, Colonialism and its 
Consequences. Frank Cass, London, 2000 
 
Glenk, Helmut,From Desert Sands to Golden Oranges: The History of the German 
Templer Settlement of Sarona in Palestine, 1871 -1947. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, 
Canada, 2005 
 
Greenberg, Ela,Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow, Education and Islam in 
Mandate Palestine. University of Texas Press, Austin, 2010 
 
Grossman, David, Rural Arab Demography and Early Jewish Settlement in 
Palestine. Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2011 
 
Harington, General Sir Charles,Plumer of Messines. John Murray, London, 1935 
181 
 
Headrick, Daniel,THE TENTACLES OF PROGRESS. Technology Transfer in the 
Age of Imperialism, 1850 – 1940. Oxford University Press, 1988 
Himadeh, Sa’id B (Ed),Economic Organisation of Palestine. American Press, Beirut, 
1938 
Hoisington, William,Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco, Macmillan Press 
Ltd, London, 1995 
Horne, Edward,A Job Well Done (Being a History of the Palestine Police Force 1920 
– 1948).The Book Guild Ltd, Sussex, 2003   
Jaussen, Père, J-A,Coutumes Palestiniennes, Naplouse et Son District. Librairie 
Orientaliste Paul Geuthner.  Paris, 1927 
 
Jacobson, Abigail,From Empire to Empire. Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British 
Rule. Syracuse University Press, New York, 2011 
John, Robert and Hadawi, Sami,the Palestine Diary. Volume 1, 1914– 1945. 
Palestine Research Centre, Beirut, 1970 
 
Kamen, Charles,Little Common Ground, Arab Agriculture and Jewish Settlement in 
Palestine, 1920–1948. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991 
Kelly, Matthew,The Crime of Nationalism, Britain, Palestine, and Nation-Building on 
the Fringe of Empire. University of California Press, 2017 
Khalifeh, Sahar,Of Noble Origins. The American University in Cairo Press, 2012 
 
Knowles, L C A,The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire. George 
Routledge & Sons Ltd, London 1924 
Laurens, Henry,La Questionne de Palestine, Tome deuxieme, 1922-1947: Une 
Mission sacree de civilisation. Librairie Artheme Fayard, Paris  2002 
Lemire, Vincent,La Soif De Jerusalem, Essai d’hydrohistoire (1840 – 1948). 
Publication de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2010 
Linklater, Eric,The Black Watch, The History of the Royal Highland Regiment. Barrie 
& Jenkins Ltd, London, 1977 
MacLaren, Roy,Empire and Ireland, the Transatlantic  career of the Canadian 
Imperialist Hamar Greenwood, 1870 -1948. Mc.Gill-Queen’s University Press, 2015. 
Chapter 17: Egypt & Palestine  
 
Mansur, G,The Arab Worker under Mandate Palestine. Jerusalem, 1936 
Masterman, E W G,Hygiene and Disease in Palestine in Modern and in Biblical 




Matthews, Weldon,Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists 
and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine. I B Taurus. New York. 2006 
 
McCarthy, Justin,The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of 
the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate. Columbia University Press, New York, 
1990 
 
Miller, Rory (Ed.), Britain, Palestine and Empire: the Mandate Years. Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., Farnham, 2010 
 
Miller, Ylana,Government and Society in Rural Palestine 1920–1948. University of 
Texas Press, Austin, 1985 
 
Mitchell, Timothy,Rule of Experts, Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.  University of 
California Press, London, 2002 
Mohs, Polly,Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: the first modern intelligence 
war.Routledge, Abingdon, 2008 
Musallam, Adnan,Bethlehem in the British Era, 1917 – 1948. Palestinian Conflict 
Resolution Centre, Bethlehem, 2002   
 
Naguib, Nefissa and Okkenhaug, Inger Marie (Eds),Interpreting Welfare and Relief in 
the Middle East. BRILL, Leiden, 2008 
Norris, Jacob,Land of Progress, Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905 
– 1948. Oxford University Press, 2013    
Ogilvie, Major D D,Fighting on Three Fronts, a Black Watch Battalion in the Great 
War. Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2014 
PALESTINE & TRANSJORDAN ADMINISTRATION REPORTS 1918 – 1948. 
Introduction to Volume 1 1918 – 1924. Archive Editions, 1995 
Pappe, Ilan,The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty, the Husaynis 1700-
1948.Saqi Books, London, 2010 
 
Paris, Timothy,In Defence of Britain’s Middle Eastern Empire, A Life of Sir Gilbert 
Clayton. Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne, 2016 
Parsons, Laila,The Commander, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab 
Independence 1914 – 1948. Saqi Books, London, 2017 
Pedersen, Susan,The Guardians, the League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. 
Oxford University Press 2015 
183 
 
Philipp, Thomas &Schaebler, Birgit (Eds),The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration 
and Fragmentation. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1998 
 
Philipp, Thomas and Schumann, Christoph (Eds), From the Syrian Land to the 
States of Syria and Lebanon. Ergon Verlag Wurzburg, Beirut, 2004 
A PLAN  OF ACTION: Embodying a series of reports issued by the Research 
Committee of the Empire Economic Union and other papers. Faber & Faber Ltd, 
London, 1932 
 
Powell, Geoffrey,PLUMER, The Soldier’s General. Pen & Sword Military Classics, 
Barnsley, 2004 
Ramsden, John,The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902 – 1940. Longman Group Ltd, 
London, 1978 
Rivet, Daniel,Lyautey et l’Institution du Protectorat Francais au Maroc, 1912 – 1925. 
Editions L’Harmattan, Paris, 1988   
Rogan, Eugene,Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire. Transjordan 
1850–1921 Cambridge University Press, 1999 
 
Schayegh, Cyrus (Ed.),A Global Middle East: Mobility, Materiality and Culture in the 
Modern Age, 1880–1940. I B Taurus & Co. Ltd, London, 2015 
Scholch, Alexander,Palestine in Transformation, 1856 – 1882. Institute for Palestine 
Studies. Washington. 1993 
Seikaly, May,Haifa, Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918-1939. I B Taurus & Co. 
Ltd, London, 1995 
Senellart, Michel (Ed), Michel Foucault: Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at 
the College de France, 1977 – 1978. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009    
Shahwan, Usamah,Public Administration in Palestine Past and Present. University 
Press of America, Oxford, 2003   
 
Shamir, Ronen, Current Flow, the Electrification of Palestine. Stanford University 
Press 2013 
Shepherd, Naomi,Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917 – 1948. John 
Murray, London, 1999 
Sherman, A J,Mandate Days, British Lives in Palestine 1918-1948. Thames & 
Hudson, New York, 1998 
Smelanski, M,Jewish Colonisation and the Fellah. Mischarw’Tassia Publishing Co. 




Smith, Barbara,The Roots of Separatism in Palestine. I B Taurus & Co. Ltd, London, 
1993 
Stein, Kenneth,The Land Question in Palestine, 1917 –1939. University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1984   
 
Stockwell, Sarah (Ed), The British Empire, Themes and Perspectives. Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2008    
Storrs, Sir Ronald,The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs. G P Putnam & Sons, New 
York, 1937 
 
Tamari, Salim,The Mountain against the Sea; Essays on Palestinian Society and 
Culture. University of California Press Ltd, London,  2008 
 
Tamari, Salim,Year of the Locust, A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of Palestine’s 
Ottoman Past. University of California Press Ltd, London, 2011 
Tuqan, Fadwa,A Mountainous Journey, A Poet’s Autobiography. Graywolf Press, 
Minnesota, 1990 
 
Wasserstein, Bernard,The British in Palestine, the Mandatory Government and the 
Arab-Jewish Conflict. Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, 1991  
Wasserstein, Bernard,Israelis and Palestinians, Why Do They Fight, Can They Stop 
? Yale University Press, London, 2003 
Watenpaugh, Keith,Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern 
Humanitarianism. University of California Press, 2015 
 
Yang, Anand,The Limited Raj. Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 
1793-1920. University of California Press Ltd, London, 1989 
 





Amiran, D H K,‘A Revised Earthquake-Catalogue of Palestine’. Israel Exploration 
Journal, Vol. 2 No.1 (1952)  48-65 
Avci, Yasemin, Vincent Lemire &FalestinNaili,‘Publishing Jerusalem’s Ottoman 
Municipal Archives (1892–1917)’. Institute for Palestine Studies, 2014, Issue 60. 110 
Barakat, Rana,‘The Jerusalem Fella, Mandate Era Popular Politics’ 




Clarke, A P S, ‘Commerce, Industry & Banking’ in Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Sciences 164,  ‘Palestine, a Decade of Development’,  
(November 1932)   95 - 107 
Damodaran, Vinita,‘Environment, Ethnicity & History in Chotanagpur, India, 1850 – 
1970’. Environment and History, Vol.3, No.3  (October 1997)  273 – 298 
 
Darwin, John,‘An Undeclared Empire, the British in the Middle East, 1918 – 1939’. 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, May 1999, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 159-176 
Drayton, Richard, and Motadel, David, ‘Discussion on the future of global history’. 
Journal of Global History (2018) 13,  1-21 
El Eini, Roza,‘Trade Agreements and the Continuation of Tariff Protection Policy in 
Mandate Palestine in the 1930s’. Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 34, No.1 (January 
1998) 
El Eini, Roza,‘British Agricultural-Educational Institutions in Mandate Palestine and 
their Impress on the Rural Landscape’.Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 35, No.1, 
January 1999   98-114 
 
Gallagher, John and Robinson, Ronald,‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’. The 
Economic History Review, new series, Vol.6, No.1 (1953) 1-15 
 
Halabi, Awad,‘Liminal Loyalties, Ottomanism and Palestinian responses to the 
Turkish War of Independence, 1919 – 1922’. Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 
41, No.3 (Spring 2012) 
 
Hughes, Matthew,‘A Very British Affair ? British Armed Forces and the Repression of 
the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936 – 39’. Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, Autumn 2009. Vol. 87. 234 – 255: and Winter 2009, 357 – 373 
Kedourie, Elie,‘Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine’. Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 5, No.1, January 1969.  44-68 
 
Kushner, David,‘Zealous Towns in Nineteenth Century Palestine’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Volume 3, No.3, July 1997.   597-612 
 
Laurens, Henry,‘Nouveaux regards sur la questionne de Palestine’. Revue d’Etudes 
Palestiniennes, 2007, No.104 
McNeill, J R,‘Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History’. 
History and Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of History, Vol.42, Issue 4, December 
2003, 5-43 
Meiton, Frederik,‘Nation or Industry, the Non-Electrification of Nablus’. Jerusalem 




Power, Jane,‘‘Real Unions,’ Arab Organized Labour in British Palestine’. Arab 
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 20, No.1 (Winter 1998) 13-28 
Prince, A E,‘Palestine in Transition from War to Peace’,Queen’s Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
01 July 1920.  368-388. Queen’s Quarterly was a publication of Queen’s University, 
Kingston, Ontario 
 
Reynolds, Jonathan,‘Good and Bad Muslims, Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern 
Nigeria’. International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 34, No.3 (2001) 601-
618 
 
Robin, Libby, Review of ‘Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies 
toward a Global Environmental History’ by Christoph Mauch and Christian Pfister. 
Environmental History, July 2010, Vol.15 No.3   552-554 
 
Rook, Robert,‘An American in Palestine, Elwood Mead and Zionist water resource 
planning, 1923 – 1936’.Arab Studies Quarterly, Volume 22, No. 1 (Winter 2000)  71 -
89 
 
Visher, S S,‘Bailey Willis, 1857-1949’. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers. Vol.39 No.4 (Dec. 1949)  291-292 
Yazbak, Mahmoud,‘The Municipality of a Muslim Town, Nablus 1868 – 1914’. 





Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA): 
Personalities.  http://passia.org/personalities 
 
